Python compat.orb函数代码示例

def OpenFlow(self, payload):
    if self is None or self.dport == 6653 or self.dport == 6633 or self.sport == 6653 or self.sport == 6633:  # noqa: E501
        # port 6653 has been allocated by IANA, port 6633 should no longer be used  # noqa: E501
        # OpenFlow function may be called with None self in OFPPacketField
        of_type = orb(payload[1])
        if of_type == 1:
            err_type = orb(payload[9])
            # err_type is a short int, but last byte is enough
            if err_type == 255:
                err_type = 65535
            return ofp_error_cls[err_type]
        elif of_type == 16:
            mp_type = orb(payload[9])
            if mp_type == 255:
                mp_type = 65535
            return ofp_stats_request_cls[mp_type]
        elif of_type == 17:
            mp_type = orb(payload[9])
            if mp_type == 255:
                mp_type = 65535
            return ofp_stats_reply_cls[mp_type]
        else:
            return ofpt_cls[of_type]
    else:
        return TCP_guess_payload_class_copy(self, payload)

 def m2i(self, pkt, s):
     family = None
     if pkt.type == 1:  # A
         family = socket.AF_INET
     elif pkt.type in [2, 5, 12]:  # NS, CNAME, PTR
         if hasattr(pkt, "_orig_s") and pkt._orig_s:
             if orb(s[0]) & 0xc0:
                 s = dns_get_str(s, 0, pkt)[0]
             else:
                 s = dns_get_str(pkt._orig_s, pkt._orig_p, _internal=True)[0]  # noqa: E501
         else:
             s = dns_get_str(s, 0)[0]
     elif pkt.type == 16:  # TXT
         ret_s = list()
         tmp_s = s
         # RDATA contains a list of strings, each are prepended with
         # a byte containing the size of the following string.
         while tmp_s:
             tmp_len = orb(tmp_s[0]) + 1
             if tmp_len > len(tmp_s):
                 warning("DNS RR TXT prematured end of character-string (size=%i, remaining bytes=%i)" % (tmp_len, len(tmp_s)))  # noqa: E501
             ret_s.append(tmp_s[1:tmp_len])
             tmp_s = tmp_s[tmp_len:]
         s = ret_s
     elif pkt.type == 28:  # AAAA
         family = socket.AF_INET6
     if family is not None:
         s = inet_ntop(family, s)
     return s

 def dispatch_hook(cls, _pkt=None, *args, **kargs):
     """
     If the TLS class was called on raw SSLv2 data, we want to return an
     SSLv2 record instance. We acknowledge the risk of SSLv2 packets with a
     msglen of 0x1403, 0x1503, 0x1603 or 0x1703 which will never be casted
     as SSLv2 records but TLS ones instead, but hey, we can't be held
     responsible for low-minded extensibility choices.
     """
     if _pkt and len(_pkt) >= 2:
         byte0 = orb(_pkt[0])
         byte1 = orb(_pkt[1])
         if (byte0 not in _tls_type) or (byte1 != 3):
             from scapy.layers.tls.record_sslv2 import SSLv2
             return SSLv2
         else:
             s = kargs.get("tls_session", None)
             if s and _tls_version_check(s.tls_version, 0x0304):
                 if s.rcs and not isinstance(s.rcs.cipher, Cipher_NULL):
                     from scapy.layers.tls.record_tls13 import TLS13
                     return TLS13
     if _pkt and len(_pkt) < 5:
             # Layer detected as TLS but too small to be a real packet (len<5).  # noqa: E501
             # Those packets appear when sessions are interrupted or to flush buffers.  # noqa: E501
             # Scapy should not try to decode them
         return conf.raw_layer
     return TLS

 def dispatch_hook(cls, _pkt=None, *args, **kargs):
     if _pkt and len(_pkt) >= 2:
         version = orb(_pkt[0])
         if version == 0x04:  # OpenFlow 1.3
             from scapy.contrib.openflow3 import OpenFlow3
             return OpenFlow3.dispatch_hook(_pkt, *args, **kargs)
         elif version == 0x01:  # OpenFlow 1.0
             # port 6653 has been allocated by IANA, port 6633 should no
             # longer be used
             # OpenFlow function may be called with a None
             # self in OFPPacketField
             of_type = orb(_pkt[1])
             if of_type == 1:
                 err_type = orb(_pkt[9])
                 # err_type is a short int, but last byte is enough
                 if err_type == 255:
                     err_type = 65535
                 return ofp_error_cls[err_type]
             elif of_type == 16:
                 mp_type = orb(_pkt[9])
                 if mp_type == 255:
                     mp_type = 65535
                 return ofp_stats_request_cls[mp_type]
             elif of_type == 17:
                 mp_type = orb(_pkt[9])
                 if mp_type == 255:
                     mp_type = 65535
                 return ofp_stats_reply_cls[mp_type]
             else:
                 return ofpt_cls[of_type]
         else:
             warning("Unknown OpenFlow packet")
     return _UnknownOpenFlow

 def dispatch_hook(cls, _pkt=None, *args, **kargs):
     if _pkt and len(_pkt) >= 4:
         if orb(_pkt[0]) in [0x12, 0x16, 0x17]:
             return IGMP
         elif orb(_pkt[0]) == 0x11 and len(_pkt) < 12:
             return IGMP
     return IGMPv3

def obfuscate(pay, secret, session_id, version, seq):
    '''

    Obfuscation methodology from section 3.7
    https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-06#section-3.7

    '''

    pad = b""
    curr_pad = b""

    # pad length must equal the payload to obfuscate.
    # pad = {MD5_1 [,MD5_2 [ ... ,MD5_n]]}

    while len(pad) < len(pay):

        msg = hashlib.md5()
        msg.update(struct.pack('!I', session_id))
        msg.update(secret.encode())
        msg.update(struct.pack('!BB', version, seq))
        msg.update(curr_pad)
        curr_pad = msg.digest()
        pad += curr_pad

    # Obf/Unobfuscation via XOR operation between plaintext and pad

    return b"".join(chb(orb(pad[i]) ^ orb(pay[i])) for i in range(len(pay)))

def in6_getAddrType(addr):
    naddr = inet_pton(socket.AF_INET6, addr)
    paddr = inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET6, naddr)  # normalize
    addrType = 0
    # _Assignable_ Global Unicast Address space
    # is defined in RFC 3513 as those in 2000::/3
    if ((orb(naddr[0]) & 0xE0) == 0x20):
        addrType = (IPV6_ADDR_UNICAST | IPV6_ADDR_GLOBAL)
        if naddr[:2] == b' \x02':  # Mark 6to4 @
            addrType |= IPV6_ADDR_6TO4
    elif orb(naddr[0]) == 0xff:  # multicast
        addrScope = paddr[3]
        if addrScope == '2':
            addrType = (IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL | IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
        elif addrScope == 'e':
            addrType = (IPV6_ADDR_GLOBAL | IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
        else:
            addrType = (IPV6_ADDR_GLOBAL | IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
    elif ((orb(naddr[0]) == 0xfe) and ((int(paddr[2], 16) & 0xC) == 0x8)):
        addrType = (IPV6_ADDR_UNICAST | IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
    elif paddr == "::1":
        addrType = IPV6_ADDR_LOOPBACK
    elif paddr == "::":
        addrType = IPV6_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED
    else:
        # Everything else is global unicast (RFC 3513)
        # Even old deprecated (RFC3879) Site-Local addresses
        addrType = (IPV6_ADDR_GLOBAL | IPV6_ADDR_UNICAST)

    return addrType

def _tzsp_guess_next_tag(payload):
    """
    :return: class representing the next tag, Raw on error, None on missing payload  # noqa: E501
    """

    if not payload:
        warning('missing payload')
        return None

    tag_type = orb(payload[0])

    try:
        tag_class_definition = _TZSP_TAG_CLASSES[tag_type]

    except KeyError:

        return _tzsp_handle_unknown_tag(payload, tag_type)

    if type(tag_class_definition) is not dict:
        return tag_class_definition

    try:
        length = orb(payload[1])
    except IndexError:
        length = None

    if not length:
        warning('no tag length given - packet to short')
        return Raw

    try:
        return tag_class_definition[length]
    except KeyError:
        warning('invalid tag length {} for tag type {}'.format(length, tag_type))  # noqa: E501
        return Raw

 def pre_dissect(self, s):
     # Get the frame check sequence
     sty = orb(s[0])
     ty = orb(s[1]) >> 2
     fc = struct.unpack("!H", s[2:4])[0]
     length = 12 + 6 * ((ty != 1 or sty in [0x8, 0x9, 0xa, 0xb, 0xe, 0xf]) + (ty in [0, 2]) + (ty == 2 and fc & 3 == 3))  # noqa: E501
     return s[:length] + s[-4:] + s[length:-4]

 def dispatch_hook(cls, _pkt=None, *args, **kargs):
     if _pkt:
         c = orb(_pkt[0])
         if c in [1, 2] and len(_pkt) >= 5:
             t = orb(_pkt[4])
             return cls.registered_methods.get(t, cls)
     return cls

 def dispatch_hook(cls, _pkt=None, *args, **kargs):
     if _pkt and len(_pkt) >= 4:
         from scapy.contrib.igmpv3 import IGMPv3
         if orb(_pkt[0]) in [0x22, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32]:
             return IGMPv3
         if orb(_pkt[0]) == 0x11 and len(_pkt) >= 12:
             return IGMPv3
     return IGMP

def dns_get_str(s, p, pkt=None, _internal=False):
    """This function decompresses a string s, from the character p.
    params:
     - s: the string to decompress
     - p: start index of the string
     - pkt: (optional) an InheritOriginDNSStrPacket packet

    returns: (decoded_string, end_index, left_string)
    """
    # The _internal parameter is reserved for scapy. It indicates
    # that the string provided is the full dns packet, and thus
    # will be the same than pkt._orig_str. The "Cannot decompress"
    # error will not be prompted if True.
    max_length = len(s)
    name = b""  # The result = the extracted name
    burned = 0  # The "burned" data, used to determine the remaining bytes
    q = None  # Will contain the index after the pointer, to be returned
    processed_pointers = [p]  # Used to check for decompression loops
    while True:
        if abs(p) >= max_length:
            warning("DNS RR prematured end (ofs=%i, len=%i)" % (p, len(s)))
            break
        cur = orb(s[p])  # current value of the string at p
        p += 1  # p is now pointing to the value of the pointer
        burned += 1
        if cur & 0xc0:  # Label pointer
            if q is None:
                # p will follow the pointer, whereas q will not
                q = p + 1
            if p >= max_length:
                warning("DNS incomplete jump token at (ofs=%i)" % p)
                break
            p = ((cur & ~0xc0) << 8) + orb(s[p]) - 12  # Follow the pointer
            burned += 1
            if pkt and hasattr(pkt, "_orig_s") and pkt._orig_s:
                # There should not be a loop as pkt is None
                name += dns_get_str(pkt._orig_s, p, None, _internal=True)[0]
                if burned == max_length:
                    break
            elif p in processed_pointers:
                warning("DNS decompression loop detected")
                break
            elif not _internal:
                raise Scapy_Exception("DNS message can't be compressed" +
                                      "at this point!")
            processed_pointers.append(p)
            continue
        elif cur > 0:  # Label
            name += s[p:p + cur] + b"."
            p += cur
            burned += cur
        else:
            break
    if q is not None:
        # Return the real end index (not the one we followed)
        p = q
    # name, end_index, remaining
    return name, p, s[burned:]

 def dispatch_hook(cls, _pkt=None, *args, **kargs):
     if _pkt and len(_pkt) >= 1:
         if (orb(_pkt[0]) >> 5) & 0x7 == 2:
             from . import gtp_v2
             return gtp_v2.GTPHeader
     if _pkt and len(_pkt) >= 8:
         _gtp_type = orb(_pkt[1:2])
         return GTPforcedTypes.get(_gtp_type, GTPHeader)
     return cls

 def do_dec(cls, s, context=None, safe=False):
     l, s, t = cls.check_type_check_len(s)
     x = 0
     if s:
         if orb(s[0]) & 0x80:  # negative int
             x = -1
         for c in s:
             x <<= 8
             x |= orb(c)
     return cls.asn1_object(x), t

    def decrypt(self, sa, esp, key, icv_size=None):
        """
        Decrypt an ESP packet

        @param sa:         the SecurityAssociation associated with the ESP packet.
        @param esp:        an encrypted ESP packet
        @param key:        the secret key used for encryption
        @param icv_size:   the length of the icv used for integrity check

        @return:    a valid ESP packet encrypted with this algorithm
        @raise IPSecIntegrityError: if the integrity check fails with an AEAD
                                    algorithm
        """
        if icv_size is None:
            icv_size = self.icv_size if self.is_aead else 0

        iv = esp.data[:self.iv_size]
        data = esp.data[self.iv_size:len(esp.data) - icv_size]
        icv = esp.data[len(esp.data) - icv_size:]

        if self.cipher:
            mode_iv = self._format_mode_iv(sa=sa, iv=iv)
            cipher = self.new_cipher(key, mode_iv, icv)
            decryptor = cipher.decryptor()

            if self.is_aead:
                # Tag value check is done during the finalize method
                decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(
                    struct.pack('!LL', esp.spi, esp.seq)
                )

            try:
                data = decryptor.update(data) + decryptor.finalize()
            except InvalidTag as err:
                raise IPSecIntegrityError(err)

        # extract padlen and nh
        padlen = orb(data[-2])
        nh = orb(data[-1])

        # then use padlen to determine data and padding
        data = data[:len(data) - padlen - 2]
        padding = data[len(data) - padlen - 2: len(data) - 2]

        return _ESPPlain(spi=esp.spi,
                        seq=esp.seq,
                        iv=iv,
                        data=data,
                        padding=padding,
                        padlen=padlen,
                        nh=nh,
                        icv=icv)