本文整理汇总了Python中backend.Backend.get_public_key_raw方法的典型用法代码示例。如果您正苦于以下问题：Python Backend.get_public_key_raw方法的具体用法？Python Backend.get_public_key_raw怎么用？Python Backend.get_public_key_raw使用的例子？那么恭喜您, 这里精选的方法代码示例或许可以为您提供帮助。您也可以进一步了解该方法所在类backend.Backend的用法示例。
在下文中一共展示了Backend.get_public_key_raw方法的1个代码示例，这些例子默认根据受欢迎程度排序。您可以为喜欢或者感觉有用的代码点赞，您的评价将有助于系统推荐出更棒的Python代码示例。
示例1: run
# 需要导入模块: from backend import Backend [as 别名]
# 或者: from backend.Backend import get_public_key_raw [as 别名]
def run(self):
"""
Defines the logic for the communication with the target.
IOErrors have to be handled carefully. Otherwise, the terminal application might crash
and stops responding.
:return:
"""
backend = Backend()
hw_activated = True
delay_time = 0
while hw_activated:
try:
self.device.start_nfc_reader()
# Protocol states
nonce_r_S = None
nonce_r_T = None
backend_token_hash = None
"""
Protocol step 1: receive {r_S, pseudo_student_id} encrypted with our T_pub key
"""
self.log.debug('Protocol step 1: receive {r_S, pseudo_student_id}')
raw_msg_in = self.receive_and_decrypt()
# Todo: check for errors
# Extract nonce and pseudo student ID
msg_in = json.loads(raw_msg_in.decode('utf-8'))
nonce_r_S = msg_in['rs']
pseudo_student_id = msg_in['pid']
# Fetch public key of student
self.log.info('Check Pseudo StudentID: %s', pseudo_student_id)
key, backend_token_hash = backend.get_public_key_raw(pseudo_student_id)
if key is not None:
self.log.debug('Got pub key from backend: %s', key)
# Todo: convert key to be usable in Python
# Set public key for future secure communication with target
self.nfccrypto.import_public_key_from_b64str(key)
else:
# No key yet in the database
# Todo: inform user
self.log.info('Currently no key associated with this pseudo ID.')
raise ValueError('No key for empty or given pseudo ID.')
"""
Protocol step 2: send {r_s, r_t} encrypted with S_pub key
r_s: the nonce the target sent us
r_t: a new nonce of our own
T: hash of our public key (does this help anything? better sign the message in addition to that)
"""
self.log.debug('Protocol step 2: send {r_s, r_t, T}')
rawRandom = os.urandom(32)
nonce_r_T = base64.b64encode(rawRandom).decode('utf-8')
self.log.debug('My random r_t: %s', nonce_r_T)
msg_out = json.dumps({
"type": 2,
"rs": nonce_r_S,
"rt": nonce_r_T
}).encode('utf-8')
self.encrypt_and_send(msg_out)
"""
Protocol step 3: receive {r_t, token_hash} encrypted with our T_pub key
At this step, the properties freshness and confidentiality should be fulfilled.
It should be ok to trust the target.
"""
self.log.debug('Protocol step 3: receive {r_t, commands}')
raw_msg_in = self.receive_and_decrypt()
# Todo: check for errors
msg_in = json.loads(raw_msg_in.decode('utf-8'))
msg_r_T = msg_in['rt']
msg_token_hash = msg_in['htoken']
self.log.debug('Androids token hash: %s', msg_token_hash)
# Validate response
if nonce_r_T == msg_r_T and backend_token_hash == msg_token_hash:
# Identical nonces and hashed tokens: message should be fresh and user should be authentic
self.log.info('Both nonce values are identical and hashes are the same. r_T="%s", hash="%s"',
nonce_r_T, backend_token_hash)
# Grant access here
self.log.info('ACCESS GRANTED.')
else:
self.log.error('Nonce r_T and received value or token hashes do not match. Replay attack?')
self.log.error('Nonce values match: %s, token hash values match: %s',
nonce_r_T == msg_r_T,
backend_token_hash == msg_token_hash)
self.device.shutdown_nfc_reader()
# Wait some time before permitting a client to connect again
# Otherwise Android tries to reconnect, but actually, it should not be necessary
delay_time = 3
except (KeyboardInterrupt, SystemExit):
hw_activated = False
except AttributeError as e:
#.........这里部分代码省略.........