C++ condor_sockaddr::to_sinful方法代码示例

/*
 *	@returns: the number of bytes sent, if succeeds
 *	          -1, if fails
 */
int _condorOutMsg::sendMsg(const int sock,
                           const condor_sockaddr& who,
                           _condorMsgID msgID,
                           unsigned char * mac)
{
	_condorPacket* tempPkt;
	int seqNo = 0, msgLen = 0, sent;
	int total = 0;
    unsigned char * md = mac;
    //char str[10000];

	if(headPacket->empty()) // empty message
		return 0;
   
	while(headPacket != lastPacket) {
		tempPkt    = headPacket;
		headPacket = headPacket->next;
		tempPkt->makeHeader(false, seqNo++, msgID, md);
		msgLen    += tempPkt->length;

		
		sent = condor_sendto(sock, tempPkt->dataGram,
		              tempPkt->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE,
                      0, who);

		if(sent != tempPkt->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE) {
			dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "sendMsg:sendto failed - errno: %d\n", errno);
			headPacket = tempPkt;
			clearMsg();
			return -1;
		}
        //int i;
        //str[0] = 0;
        //for (i=0; i<tempPkt->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE; i++) {
        //    sprintf(&str[strlen(str)], "%02x,", tempPkt->dataGram[i]);
        //}
        //dprintf(D_NETWORK, "--->packet [%d bytes]: %s\n", sent, str);

		dprintf( D_NETWORK, "SEND [%d] %s ", sent, sock_to_string(sock) );
		dprintf( D_NETWORK|D_NOHEADER, "%s\n",
				 who.to_sinful().Value());
		total += sent;
		delete tempPkt;
        md = 0;
	}

	// headPacket = lastPacket
    if(seqNo == 0) { // a short message
		msgLen = lastPacket->length;
        lastPacket->makeHeader(true, 0, msgID, md);
			// Short messages are sent without initial "magic" header,
			// because we don't need to specify sequence number,
			// and presumably for backwards compatibility with ancient
			// versions of Condor.  The crypto header may still
			// be there, since that is in the buffer starting at
			// the position pointed to by "data".
		sent = condor_sendto(sock, lastPacket->data, lastPacket->length,
							 0, who);
		if(sent != lastPacket->length) {
			dprintf( D_ALWAYS, 
				 "SafeMsg: sending small msg failed. errno: %d\n",
				 errno );
			headPacket->reset();
			return -1;
		}
        //str[0] = 0;
        //for (i=0; i<lastPacket->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE; i++) {
        //    sprintf(&str[strlen(str)], "%02x,", lastPacket->dataGram[i]);
        //}
        //dprintf(D_NETWORK, "--->packet [%d bytes]: %s\n", sent, str);
		dprintf( D_NETWORK, "SEND [%d] %s ", sent, sock_to_string(sock) );
		dprintf( D_NETWORK|D_NOHEADER, "%s\n", who.to_sinful().Value());
		total = sent;
    }
    else {
        lastPacket->makeHeader(true, seqNo, msgID, md);
        msgLen += lastPacket->length;
        sent = condor_sendto(sock, lastPacket->dataGram,
                      lastPacket->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE,
                      0, who);
        if(sent != lastPacket->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE) {
            dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "SafeMsg: sending last packet failed. errno: %d\n", errno );
            headPacket->reset();
            return -1;
        }
        //str[0] = 0;
        //for (i=0; i<lastPacket->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE; i++) {
        //    sprintf(&str[strlen(str)], "%02x,", lastPacket->dataGram[i]);
        //}
        //dprintf(D_NETWORK, "--->packet [%d bytes]: %s\n", sent, str);
        dprintf( D_NETWORK, "SEND [%d] %s ", sent, sock_to_string(sock) );
        dprintf( D_NETWORK|D_NOHEADER, "%s\n", who.to_sinful().Value());
        total += sent;
    }

	headPacket->reset();
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

//.........这里部分代码省略.........
			thehost = hostnames[i].Value();
			peer_description.append_to_list(thehost);

			if ( !(mask&deny_resolved) && lookup_user_host_deny(perm,who,thehost) ) {
				mask |= deny_mask(perm);
				if( deny_reason ) {
					deny_reason->sprintf(
						"%s authorization policy denies hostname %s",
						PermString(perm), thehost );
				}
			}

			if ( !(mask&allow_resolved) && lookup_user_host_allow(perm,who,thehost) ) {
				mask |= allow_mask(perm);
				if( allow_reason ) {
					allow_reason->sprintf(
						"%s authorization policy allows hostname %s",
						PermString(perm), thehost );
				}
			}
		}
			// if we found something via our hostname or subnet mactching, we now have 
			// a mask, and we should add it into our table so we need not
			// do a gethostbyaddr() next time.  if we still do not have a mask
			// (perhaps because this host doesn't appear in any list), create one
			// and then add to the table.
			// But first, check our parent permission levels in the
			// authorization heirarchy.
			// DAEMON and ADMINISTRATOR imply WRITE.
			// WRITE, NEGOTIATOR, and CONFIG_PERM imply READ.
		bool determined_by_parent = false;
		if ( mask == 0 ) {
			if ( PermTypeArray[perm]->behavior == USERVERIFY_ONLY_DENIES ) {
				dprintf(D_SECURITY,"IPVERIFY: %s at %s not matched to deny list, so allowing.\n",who, addr.to_sinful().Value());
				if( allow_reason ) {
					allow_reason->sprintf(
						"%s authorization policy does not deny, so allowing",
						PermString(perm));
				}

				mask |= allow_mask(perm);
			} else {
				DCpermissionHierarchy hierarchy( perm );
				DCpermission const *parent_perms =
					hierarchy.getPermsIAmDirectlyImpliedBy();
				bool parent_allowed = false;
				for( ; *parent_perms != LAST_PERM; parent_perms++ ) {
					if( Verify( *parent_perms, addr, user, allow_reason, NULL ) == USER_AUTH_SUCCESS ) {
						determined_by_parent = true;
						parent_allowed = true;
						dprintf(D_SECURITY,"IPVERIFY: allowing %s at %s for %s because %s is allowed\n",who, addr.to_sinful().Value(),PermString(perm),PermString(*parent_perms));
						if( allow_reason ) {
							MyString tmp = *allow_reason;
							allow_reason->sprintf(
								"%s is implied by %s; %s",
								PermString(perm),
								PermString(*parent_perms),
								tmp.Value());
						}
						break;
					}
				}
				if( parent_allowed ) {
					mask |= allow_mask(perm);
				}
				else {