C++ priv_check_cred函数代码示例

static int 
random_ioctl(cdev_t dev, u_long cmd, caddr_t data, int flags, struct ucred *cred)
{
	int error;
	int intr;
	
	/*
	 * Even inspecting the state is privileged, since it gives a hint
	 * about how easily the randomness might be guessed.
	 */
	error = 0;

	switch (cmd) {
	/* Really handled in upper layer */
	case FIOASYNC:
		break;
	case MEM_SETIRQ:
		intr = *(int16_t *)data;
		if ((error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_ROOT, 0)) != 0)
			break;
		if (intr < 0 || intr >= MAX_INTS)
			return (EINVAL);
		register_randintr(intr);
		break;
	case MEM_CLEARIRQ:
		intr = *(int16_t *)data;
		if ((error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_ROOT, 0)) != 0)
			break;
		if (intr < 0 || intr >= MAX_INTS)
			return (EINVAL);
		unregister_randintr(intr);
		break;
	case MEM_RETURNIRQ:
		error = ENOTSUP;
		break;
	case MEM_FINDIRQ:
		intr = *(int16_t *)data;
		if ((error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_ROOT, 0)) != 0)
			break;
		if (intr < 0 || intr >= MAX_INTS)
			return (EINVAL);
		intr = next_registered_randintr(intr);
		if (intr == MAX_INTS)
			return (ENOENT);
		*(u_int16_t *)data = intr;
		break;
	default:
		error = ENOTSUP;
		break;
	}
	return (error);
}

static int
mmopen(struct dev_open_args *ap)
{
	cdev_t dev = ap->a_head.a_dev;
	int error;

	switch (minor(dev)) {
	case 0:
	case 1:
		if (ap->a_oflags & FWRITE) {
			if (securelevel > 0 || kernel_mem_readonly)
				return (EPERM);
		}
		error = 0;
		break;
	case 14:
		error = priv_check_cred(ap->a_cred, PRIV_ROOT, 0);
		if (error != 0)
			break;
		if (securelevel > 0 || kernel_mem_readonly) {
			error = EPERM;
			break;
		}
		error = cpu_set_iopl();
		break;
	default:
		error = 0;
		break;
	}
	return (error);
}

/* system call implementation */
int
system_override(__unused struct proc *p, struct system_override_args * uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
{
	uint64_t timeout = uap->timeout;
	uint64_t flags = uap->flags;
	int error = 0;

	/* Check credentials for caller. Only entitled processes are allowed to make this call. */
	if ((error = priv_check_cred(kauth_cred_get(), PRIV_SYSTEM_OVERRIDE, 0))) {
		goto out;
	}	

	/* Check to see if some flags are specified. Zero flags are invalid. */
	if ((flags == 0) || ((flags & ~SYS_OVERRIDE_FLAGS_MASK) != 0)) {
		error = EINVAL;
		goto out;
	}

	lck_mtx_lock(&sys_override_lock);

	enable_system_override(flags);

	PROCESS_OVERRIDING_SYSTEM_DEFAULTS(timeout);

	disable_system_override(flags);

	lck_mtx_unlock(&sys_override_lock);

out:
	return error;
}

/*
 * mlockall(int how)
 *
 * No requirements
 */
int
sys_mlockall(struct mlockall_args *uap)
{
	struct thread *td = curthread;
	struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
	vm_map_t map = &p->p_vmspace->vm_map;
	vm_map_entry_t entry;
	int how = uap->how;
	int rc = KERN_SUCCESS;

	if (((how & MCL_CURRENT) == 0) && ((how & MCL_FUTURE) == 0))
		return (EINVAL);

	rc = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_ROOT, 0);
	if (rc) 
		return (rc);

	vm_map_lock(map);
	do {
		if (how & MCL_CURRENT) {
			for(entry = map->header.next;
			    entry != &map->header;
			    entry = entry->next);

			rc = ENOSYS;
			break;
		}
	
		if (how & MCL_FUTURE)
			map->flags |= MAP_WIREFUTURE;
	} while(0);
	vm_map_unlock(map);

	return (rc);
}

int
zone_dataset_attach(struct ucred *cred, const char *dataset, int jailid)
{
	struct zone_dataset_head *head;
	zone_dataset_t *zd, *zd2;
	struct prison *pr;
	int dofree, error;

	if ((error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_ZFS_JAIL, 0)) != 0)
		return (error);

	/* Allocate memory before we grab prison's mutex. */
	zd = malloc(sizeof(*zd) + strlen(dataset) + 1, M_ZONES, M_WAITOK);

	sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
	pr = prison_find(jailid);	/* Locks &pr->pr_mtx. */
	sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
	if (pr == NULL) {
		free(zd, M_ZONES);
		return (ENOENT);
	}

	head = osd_jail_get(pr, zone_slot);
	if (head != NULL) {
		dofree = 0;
		LIST_FOREACH(zd2, head, zd_next) {
			if (strcmp(dataset, zd2->zd_dataset) == 0) {
				free(zd, M_ZONES);
				error = EEXIST;
				goto end;
			}
		}
	} else {

int
sys_osethostname(struct sethostname_args *uap)
{
	struct thread *td = curthread;
	size_t len;
	char *hostname;
	int name[2];
	int error;

	name[0] = CTL_KERN;
	name[1] = KERN_HOSTNAME;
	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_SETHOSTNAME, 0);
	if (error)
		return (error);
	len = MIN(uap->len, MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
	hostname = kmalloc(MAXHOSTNAMELEN, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);

	error = copyin(uap->hostname, hostname, len);
	if (error) {
		kfree(hostname, M_TEMP);
		return (error);
	}

	error = kernel_sysctl(name, 2, NULL, 0, hostname, len, NULL);

	kfree(hostname, M_TEMP);
	return (error);
}

int
sys_setegid(struct setegid_args *uap)
{
	struct proc *p = curproc;
	struct ucred *cr;
	gid_t egid;
	int error;

	lwkt_gettoken(&proc_token);
	cr = p->p_ucred;
	egid = uap->egid;
	if (egid != cr->cr_rgid &&		/* allow setegid(getgid()) */
	    egid != cr->cr_svgid &&		/* allow setegid(saved gid) */
	    (error = priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_CRED_SETEGID, 0))) {
		goto done;
	}
	if (cr->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
		cr = cratom(&p->p_ucred);
		cr->cr_groups[0] = egid;
		setsugid();
	}
	error = 0;
done:
	lwkt_reltoken(&proc_token);
	return (error);
}

int
sys_seteuid(struct seteuid_args *uap)
{
	struct proc *p = curproc;
	struct ucred *cr;
	uid_t euid;
	int error;

	lwkt_gettoken(&proc_token);
	cr = p->p_ucred;
	euid = uap->euid;
	if (euid != cr->cr_ruid &&		/* allow seteuid(getuid()) */
	    euid != cr->cr_svuid &&		/* allow seteuid(saved uid) */
	    (error = priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_CRED_SETEUID, 0))) {
		lwkt_reltoken(&proc_token);
		return (error);
	}

	/*
	 * Everything's okay, do it.  Copy credentials so other references do
	 * not see our changes.
	 */
	if (cr->cr_uid != euid) {
		change_euid(euid);
		setsugid();
	}
	lwkt_reltoken(&proc_token);
	return (0);
}

static int
ksem_chown(struct file *fp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, struct ucred *active_cred,
    struct thread *td)
{
	struct ksem *ks;
	int error;

	error = 0;
	ks = fp->f_data;
	mtx_lock(&sem_lock);
#ifdef MAC
	error = mac_posixsem_check_setowner(active_cred, ks, uid, gid);
	if (error != 0)
		goto out;
#endif
	if (uid == (uid_t)-1)
		uid = ks->ks_uid;
	if (gid == (gid_t)-1)
                 gid = ks->ks_gid;
	if (((uid != ks->ks_uid && uid != active_cred->cr_uid) ||
	    (gid != ks->ks_gid && !groupmember(gid, active_cred))) &&
	    (error = priv_check_cred(active_cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, 0)))
		goto out;
	ks->ks_uid = uid;
	ks->ks_gid = gid;
out:
	mtx_unlock(&sem_lock);
	return (error);
}

static int
seeotheruids_check(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
{

	if (!seeotheruids_enabled)
		return (0);

	if (primarygroup_enabled) {
		if (cr1->cr_rgid == cr2->cr_rgid)
			return (0);
	}

	if (specificgid_enabled) {
		if (cr1->cr_rgid == specificgid ||
		    groupmember(specificgid, cr1))
			return (0);
	}

	if (cr1->cr_ruid == cr2->cr_ruid)
		return (0);

	if (suser_privileged) {
		if (priv_check_cred(cr1, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS, 0) == 0)
			return (0);
	}

	return (ESRCH);
}

/*
 * Object-specific entry points are sorted alphabetically by object type name
 * and then by operation.
 */
static int
partition_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
{
	int error;

	error = 0;

	/*
	 * Treat "0" as a no-op request because it reflects an unset
	 * partition label.  If we ever want to support switching back to an
	 * unpartitioned state for a process, we'll need to differentiate the
	 * "not in a partition" and "no partition defined during internalize"
	 * conditions.
	 */
	if (SLOT(newlabel) != 0) {
		/*
		 * Require BSD privilege in order to change the partition.
		 * Originally we also required that the process not be in a
		 * partition in the first place, but this didn't interact
		 * well with sendmail.
		 */
		error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_MAC_PARTITION, 0);
	}

	return (error);
}

static int
shm_chown(struct file *fp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, struct ucred *active_cred,
    struct thread *td)
{
	struct shmfd *shmfd;
	int error;

	error = 0;
	shmfd = fp->f_data;
	mtx_lock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
#ifdef MAC
	error = mac_posixshm_check_setowner(active_cred, shmfd, uid, gid);
	if (error != 0)
		goto out;
#endif
	if (uid == (uid_t)-1)
		uid = shmfd->shm_uid;
	if (gid == (gid_t)-1)
                 gid = shmfd->shm_gid;
	if (((uid != shmfd->shm_uid && uid != active_cred->cr_uid) ||
	    (gid != shmfd->shm_gid && !groupmember(gid, active_cred))) &&
	    (error = priv_check_cred(active_cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN, 0)))
		goto out;
	shmfd->shm_uid = uid;
	shmfd->shm_gid = gid;
out:
	mtx_unlock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Test whether the specified credentials have the privilege
 * in question.
 *
 * A kernel thread without a process context is assumed to have 
 * the privilege in question.  In situations where the caller always 
 * expect a cred to exist, the cred should be passed separately and 
 * priv_check_cred() should be used instead of priv_check().
 *
 * Returns 0 or error.
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
priv_check(struct thread *td, int priv)
{
	if (td->td_lwp != NULL)
		return priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, priv, 0);
	return (0);
}

/*
 * Set login name.
 */
int
sys_setlogin(struct setlogin_args *uap)
{
	struct thread *td = curthread;
	struct proc *p;
	struct ucred *cred;
	char buf[MAXLOGNAME];
	int error;

	cred = td->td_ucred;
	p = td->td_proc;

	if ((error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN, 0)))
		return (error);
	bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
	error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL);
	if (error == ENAMETOOLONG)
		error = EINVAL;
	if (error == 0) {
		lwkt_gettoken(&proc_token);
		memcpy(p->p_pgrp->pg_session->s_login, buf, sizeof(buf));
		lwkt_reltoken(&proc_token);
	}
	return (error);
}

int
priv_check(struct thread *td, int priv)
{

	KASSERT(td == curthread, ("priv_check: td != curthread"));

	return (priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, priv, 0));
}