C++ PORT_Memset函数代码示例

/*
 * See addemdum to NIST SP 800-38A
 * Generically handle cipher text stealing. Basically this is doing CBC
 * operations except someone can pass us a partial block.
 *
 *  Output Order:
 *  CS-1:  C1||C2||C3..Cn-1(could be partial)||Cn   (NIST)
 *  CS-2: pad == 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn-1(is full)||Cn   (Schneier)
 *  CS-2: pad != 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(is partial)(Schneier)
 *  CS-3: C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(could be partial)   (Kerberos)
 *
 * The characteristics of these three options:
 *  - NIST & Schneier (CS-1 & CS-2) are identical to CBC if there are no
 * partial blocks on input.
 *  - Scheier and Kerberos (CS-2 and CS-3) have no embedded partial blocks,
 * which make decoding easier.
 *  - NIST & Kerberos (CS-1 and CS-3) have consistent block order independent
 * of padding.
 *
 * PKCS #11 did not specify which version to implement, but points to the NIST
 * spec, so this code implements CTS-CS-1 from NIST.
 *
 * To convert the returned buffer to:
 *   CS-2 (Schneier): do
 *       unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 *       pad = *outlen % blocksize;
 *       if (pad) {
 *          memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize);
 *          memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad);
 *      memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize);
 *       }
 *   CS-3 (Kerberos): do
 *       unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 *       pad = *outlen % blocksize;
 *       if (pad == 0) {
 *           pad = blocksize;
 *       }
 *       memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize);
 *       memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad);
 *   memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize);
 */
SECStatus
CTS_EncryptUpdate(CTSContext *cts, unsigned char *outbuf,
                  unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
                  const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
                  unsigned int blocksize)
{
    unsigned char lastBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
    unsigned int tmp;
    int fullblocks;
    int written;
    unsigned char *saveout = outbuf;
    SECStatus rv;

    if (inlen < blocksize) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    if (maxout < inlen) {
        *outlen = inlen;
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
        return SECFailure;
    }
    fullblocks = (inlen / blocksize) * blocksize;
    rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, outlen, maxout, inbuf,
                        fullblocks, blocksize);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
        return SECFailure;
    }
    *outlen = fullblocks; /* AES low level doesn't set outlen */
    inbuf += fullblocks;
    inlen -= fullblocks;
    if (inlen == 0) {
        return SECSuccess;
    }
    written = *outlen - (blocksize - inlen);
    outbuf += written;
    maxout -= written;

    /*
     * here's the CTS magic, we pad our final block with zeros,
     * then do a CBC encrypt. CBC will xor our plain text with
     * the previous block (Cn-1), capturing part of that block (Cn-1**) as it
     * xors with the zero pad. We then write this full block, overwritting
     * (Cn-1**) in our buffer. This allows us to have input data == output
     * data since Cn contains enough information to reconver Cn-1** when
     * we decrypt (at the cost of some complexity as you can see in decrypt
     * below */
    PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf, inlen);
    PORT_Memset(lastBlock + inlen, 0, blocksize - inlen);
    rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, &tmp, maxout, lastBlock,
                        blocksize, blocksize);
    PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
        *outlen = written + blocksize;
    } else {
        PORT_Memset(saveout, 0, written + blocksize);
    }
    return rv;
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

/*
 * This function expands the internal state of the prng to fulfill any number
 * of bytes we need for this request. We only use this call if we need more
 * than can be supplied by a single call to SHA256_HashBuf.
 *
 * This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4, Hashgen
 */
static void
prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *returned_bytes,
             unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes)
{
    PRUint8 data[VSize(rng)];
    PRUint8 thisHash[SHA256_LENGTH];

    PORT_Memcpy(data, V(rng), VSize(rng));
    while (no_of_returned_bytes) {
        SHA256Context ctx;
        unsigned int len;
        unsigned int carry;

        SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
        SHA256_Update(&ctx, data, sizeof data);
        SHA256_End(&ctx, thisHash, &len, SHA256_LENGTH);
        if (no_of_returned_bytes < SHA256_LENGTH) {
            len = no_of_returned_bytes;
        }
        PORT_Memcpy(returned_bytes, thisHash, len);
        returned_bytes += len;
        no_of_returned_bytes -= len;
        /* The carry parameter is a bool (increment or not).
     * This increments data if no_of_returned_bytes is not zero */
        carry = no_of_returned_bytes;
        PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data) - 1, carry);
    }
    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
    PORT_Memset(thisHash, 0, sizeof thisHash);
}

/*
 * Generates new random bytes and advances the internal prng state.
 * additional bytes are only used in algorithm testing.
 *
 * This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4
 */
static SECStatus
prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
                      PRUint8 *returned_bytes, unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes,
                      const PRUint8 *additional_input,
                      unsigned int additional_input_len)
{
    PRUint8 H[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* both H and w since they
                   * aren't used concurrently */
    unsigned int carry;

    if (!rng->isValid) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
        return SECFailure;
    }
    /* This code only triggers during tests, normal
     * prng operation does not use additional_input */
    if (additional_input) {
        SHA256Context ctx;
/* NIST SP 800-90 defines two temporaries in their calculations,
     * w and H. These temporaries are the same lengths, and used
     * at different times, so we use the following macro to collapse
     * them to the same variable, but keeping their unique names for
     * easy comparison to the spec */
#define w H
        rng->V_type = prngAdditionalDataType;
        SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
        SHA256_Update(&ctx, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
        SHA256_Update(&ctx, additional_input, additional_input_len);
        SHA256_End(&ctx, w, NULL, sizeof w);
        PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), w, sizeof w, carry)
        PORT_Memset(w, 0, sizeof w);
#undef w
    }

    if (no_of_returned_bytes == SHA256_LENGTH) {
        /* short_cut to hashbuf and a couple of copies and clears */
        SHA256_HashBuf(returned_bytes, V(rng), VSize(rng));
    } else {
        prng_Hashgen(rng, returned_bytes, no_of_returned_bytes);
    }
    /* advance our internal state... */
    rng->V_type = prngGenerateByteType;
    SHA256_HashBuf(H, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
    PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), H, sizeof H, carry)
    PRNG_ADD_BITS(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->C, sizeof rng->C, carry);
    PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->reseed_counter,
                            sizeof rng->reseed_counter, carry)
    carry = 1;
    PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter, (sizeof rng->reseed_counter) - 1, carry);

    /* if the prng failed, don't return any output, signal softoken */
    if (!rng->isValid) {
        PORT_Memset(returned_bytes, 0, no_of_returned_bytes);
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
        return SECFailure;
    }
    return SECSuccess;
}

/* Use this function to update the ClientRandom of a client's handshake state
 * after replacing its ClientHello message. We for example need to do this
 * when replacing an SSLv3 ClientHello with its SSLv2 equivalent. */
SECStatus SSLInt_UpdateSSLv2ClientRandom(PRFileDesc *fd, uint8_t *rnd,
                                         size_t rnd_len, uint8_t *msg,
                                         size_t msg_len) {
  sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
  if (!ss) {
    return SECFailure;
  }

  SECStatus rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
  if (rv != SECSuccess) {
    return rv;
  }

  rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
  if (rv != SECSuccess) {
    return rv;
  }

  // Zero the client_random struct.
  PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);

  // Copy over the challenge bytes.
  size_t offset = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rnd_len;
  PORT_Memcpy(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[offset], rnd, rnd_len);

  // Rehash the SSLv2 client hello message.
  return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, msg, msg_len);
}

/* Initialize the extension data block. */
void
ssl3_InitExtensionData(TLSExtensionData *xtnData, const sslSocket *ss)
{
    unsigned int advertisedMax;
    PRCList *cursor;

    /* Set things up to the right starting state. */
    PORT_Memset(xtnData, 0, sizeof(*xtnData));
    xtnData->peerSupportsFfdheGroups = PR_FALSE;
    PR_INIT_CLIST(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares);

    /* Allocate enough to allow for native extensions, plus any custom ones. */
    if (ss->sec.isServer) {
        advertisedMax = PR_MAX(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(certificateRequestHandlers),
                               PR_ARRAY_SIZE(tls13_cert_req_senders));
    } else {
        advertisedMax = PR_MAX(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(clientHelloHandlers),
                               PR_ARRAY_SIZE(clientHelloSendersTLS));
        ++advertisedMax; /* For the RI SCSV, which we also track. */
    }
    for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->extensionHooks);
         cursor != &ss->extensionHooks;
         cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
        ++advertisedMax;
    }
    xtnData->advertised = PORT_ZNewArray(PRUint16, advertisedMax);
}

static int
test_long_message_sha384(NSSLOWInitContext *initCtx)
{
    PRUint8 results[SHA384_LENGTH];
    /* Test vector from FIPS 180-2: appendix B.3.  */
    /*
    9d0e1809716474cb
    086e834e310a4a1c
    ed149e9c00f24852
    7972cec5704c2a5b
    07b8b3dc38ecc4eb
    ae97ddd87f3d8985.
    */
    static const PRUint8 expected[SHA384_LENGTH] =
        { 0x9d, 0x0e, 0x18, 0x09, 0x71, 0x64, 0x74, 0xcb,
          0x08, 0x6e, 0x83, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x4a, 0x1c,
          0xed, 0x14, 0x9e, 0x9c, 0x00, 0xf2, 0x48, 0x52,
          0x79, 0x72, 0xce, 0xc5, 0x70, 0x4c, 0x2a, 0x5b,
          0x07, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0xdc, 0x38, 0xec, 0xc4, 0xeb,
          0xae, 0x97, 0xdd, 0xd8, 0x7f, 0x3d, 0x89, 0x85 };
    unsigned char buf[1000];
    (void)PORT_Memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));

    return test_long_message(initCtx, HASH_AlgSHA384,
                             SHA384_LENGTH, &expected[0], results);
}

/* Initialize the extension data block. */
void
ssl3_InitExtensionData(TLSExtensionData *xtnData)
{
    /* Set things up to the right starting state. */
    PORT_Memset(xtnData, 0, sizeof(*xtnData));
    xtnData->peerSupportsFfdheGroups = PR_FALSE;
    PR_INIT_CLIST(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
}

void
CTR_DestroyContext(CTRContext *ctr, PRBool freeit)
{
    PORT_Memset(ctr, 0, sizeof(CTRContext));
    if (freeit) {
	PORT_Free(ctr);
    }
}

static void
secu_ClearPassword(char *p)
{
    if (p) {
	PORT_Memset(p, 0, PORT_Strlen(p));
	PORT_Free(p);
    }
}

SECStatus
CERT_DecodePolicyConstraintsExtension
                             (CERTCertificatePolicyConstraints *decodedValue,
                              const SECItem *encodedValue)
{
    CERTCertificatePolicyConstraints decodeContext;
    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;

    /* initialize so we can tell when an optional component is omitted */
    PORT_Memset(&decodeContext, 0, sizeof(decodeContext));

    /* make a new arena */
    arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
    if (!arena) {
        return SECFailure;
    }

    do {
        /* decode the policy constraints */
        rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena,
                &decodeContext, CERT_PolicyConstraintsTemplate, encodedValue);

        if ( rv != SECSuccess ) {
            break;
        }

        if (decodeContext.explicitPolicySkipCerts.len == 0) {
            *(PRInt32 *)decodedValue->explicitPolicySkipCerts.data = -1;
        } else {
            *(PRInt32 *)decodedValue->explicitPolicySkipCerts.data =
                    DER_GetInteger(&decodeContext.explicitPolicySkipCerts);
        }

        if (decodeContext.inhibitMappingSkipCerts.len == 0) {
            *(PRInt32 *)decodedValue->inhibitMappingSkipCerts.data = -1;
        } else {
            *(PRInt32 *)decodedValue->inhibitMappingSkipCerts.data =
                    DER_GetInteger(&decodeContext.inhibitMappingSkipCerts);
        }

        if ((*(PRInt32 *)decodedValue->explicitPolicySkipCerts.data ==
                PR_INT32_MIN) ||
            (*(PRInt32 *)decodedValue->explicitPolicySkipCerts.data ==
                PR_INT32_MAX) ||
            (*(PRInt32 *)decodedValue->inhibitMappingSkipCerts.data ==
                PR_INT32_MIN) ||
            (*(PRInt32 *)decodedValue->inhibitMappingSkipCerts.data ==
                PR_INT32_MAX)) {
            rv = SECFailure;
        }
    
    } while (0);

    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
    return(rv);
}

SECStatus CERT_DecodeBasicConstraintValue
   (CERTBasicConstraints *value, SECItem *encodedValue)
{
    EncodedContext decodeContext;
    PRArenaPool *our_pool;
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;

    do {
	PORT_Memset (&decodeContext, 0, sizeof (decodeContext));
	/* initialize the value just in case we got "0x30 00", or when the
	   pathLenConstraint is omitted.
         */
	decodeContext.isCA.data =&hexFalse;
	decodeContext.isCA.len = 1;
	
	our_pool = PORT_NewArena (SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
	if (our_pool == NULL) {
	    PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
	    GEN_BREAK (SECFailure);
	}

        rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem
	     (our_pool, &decodeContext, CERTBasicConstraintsTemplate, encodedValue);
	if (rv == SECFailure)
	    break;
	
	value->isCA = decodeContext.isCA.data 
	              ? (PRBool)(decodeContext.isCA.data[0] != 0)
		      : PR_FALSE;
	if (decodeContext.pathLenConstraint.data == NULL) {
	    /* if the pathLenConstraint is not encoded, and the current setting
	      is CA, then the pathLenConstraint should be set to a negative number
	      for unlimited certificate path.
	     */
	    if (value->isCA)
		value->pathLenConstraint = CERT_UNLIMITED_PATH_CONSTRAINT;
	} else if (value->isCA) {
	    long len = DER_GetInteger (&decodeContext.pathLenConstraint);
	    if (len < 0 || len == LONG_MAX) {
		PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
		GEN_BREAK (SECFailure);
	    }
	    value->pathLenConstraint = len;
	} else {
	    /* here we get an error where the subject is not a CA, but
	       the pathLenConstraint is set */
	    PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
	    GEN_BREAK (SECFailure);
	    break;
	}
	 
    } while (0);
    PORT_FreeArena (our_pool, PR_FALSE);
    return (rv);

}

SECStatus
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate()
{
    if (!testContext.isValid) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
	return SECFailure;
    }
   PORT_Memset(&testContext, 0, sizeof testContext);
   return SECSuccess;
}

static int test_long_message_sha256(NSSLOWInitContext *initCtx) {
    PRUint8 results[SHA256_LENGTH];
    /* cdc76e5c 9914fb92 81a1c7e2 84d73e67 f1809a48 a497200e 046d39cc c7112cd0. */
    static const PRUint8 expected[SHA256_LENGTH] =
    { 0xcd,0xc7,0x6e,0x5c, 0x99,0x14,0xfb,0x92, 0x81,0xa1,0xc7,0xe2, 0x84,0xd7,0x3e,0x67,
      0xf1,0x80,0x9a,0x48, 0xa4,0x97,0x20,0x0e, 0x04,0x6d,0x39,0xcc, 0xc7,0x11,0x2c,0xd0 };
    unsigned char buf[1000];
    (void) PORT_Memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
    return test_long_message(initCtx, HASH_AlgSHA256,
		SHA256_LENGTH, &expected[0], results);
}

SECStatus
SEC_DerSignData(PRArenaPool *arena, SECItem *result, 
	unsigned char *buf, int len, SECKEYPrivateKey *pk, SECOidTag algID)
{
    SECItem it;
    CERTSignedData sd;
    SECStatus rv;

    it.data = 0;

    /* XXX We should probably have some asserts here to make sure the key type
     * and algID match
     */

    if (algID == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
	switch(pk->keyType) {
	  case rsaKey:
	    algID = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
	    break;
	  case dsaKey:
	    algID = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST;
	    break;
	  case ecKey:
	    algID = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST;
	    break;
	  default:
	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
	    return SECFailure;
	}
    }

    /* Sign input buffer */
    rv = SEC_SignData(&it, buf, len, pk, algID);
    if (rv) goto loser;

    /* Fill out SignedData object */
    PORT_Memset(&sd, 0, sizeof(sd));
    sd.data.data = buf;
    sd.data.len = len;
    sd.signature.data = it.data;
    sd.signature.len = it.len << 3;		/* convert to bit string */
    rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &sd.signatureAlgorithm, algID, 0);
    if (rv) goto loser;

    /* DER encode the signed data object */
    rv = DER_Encode(arena, result, CERTSignedDataTemplate, &sd);
    /* FALL THROUGH */

  loser:
    PORT_Free(it.data);
    return rv;
}

static int test_long_message_sha1(NSSLOWInitContext *initCtx) {
    PRUint8 results[SHA1_LENGTH];
    /* Test vector from FIPS 180-2: appendix B.3.  */

    /* 34aa973c d4c4daa4 f61eeb2b dbad2731 6534016f. */
    static const PRUint8 expected[SHA256_LENGTH] =
    { 0x34,0xaa,0x97,0x3c, 0xd4,0xc4,0xda,0xa4, 0xf6,0x1e,0xeb,0x2b,
      0xdb,0xad,0x27,0x31, 0x65,0x34,0x01,0x6f };
    unsigned char buf[1000];
    (void) PORT_Memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
    return test_long_message(initCtx, HASH_AlgSHA1,
		SHA1_LENGTH, &expected[0], results);
}