C++ PORT_Memcpy函数代码示例

static void
sftk_TLSPRFHashUpdate(TLSPRFContext *cx, const unsigned char *data, 
                        unsigned int data_len)
{
    PRUint32 bytesUsed = cx->cxKeyLen + cx->cxDataLen;

    if (cx->cxRv != SECSuccess)	/* function has previously failed. */
    	return;
    if (bytesUsed + data_len > cx->cxBufSize) {
	/* We don't use realloc here because 
	** (a) realloc doesn't zero out the old block, and 
	** (b) if realloc fails, we lose the old block.
	*/
	PRUint32 newBufSize = bytesUsed + data_len + 512;
    	unsigned char * newBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(newBufSize);
	if (!newBuf) {
	   cx->cxRv = SECFailure;
	   return;
	}
	PORT_Memcpy(newBuf, cx->cxBufPtr, bytesUsed);
	if (cx->cxBufPtr != cx->cxBuf) {
	    PORT_ZFree(cx->cxBufPtr, bytesUsed);
	}
	cx->cxBufPtr  = newBuf;
	cx->cxBufSize = newBufSize;
    }
    PORT_Memcpy(cx->cxBufPtr + bytesUsed, data, data_len);
    cx->cxDataLen += data_len;
}

/* If key is not NULL then the gx value will be stored as an attribute with
   the type given by the gxAttrType parameter. */
static CK_RV
jpake_Sign(PLArenaPool * arena, const PQGParams * pqg, HASH_HashType hashType,
           const SECItem * signerID, const SECItem * x,
           CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue * out)
{
    SECItem gx, gv, r;
    CK_RV crv;

    PORT_Assert(arena != NULL);
    
    gx.data = NULL;
    gv.data = NULL;
    r.data = NULL;
    crv = jpake_mapStatus(JPAKE_Sign(arena, pqg, hashType, signerID, x, NULL,
                                     NULL, &gx, &gv, &r),
                          CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
    if (crv == CKR_OK) {
        if ((out->pGX != NULL && out->ulGXLen >= gx.len) ||
            (out->pGV != NULL && out->ulGVLen >= gv.len) ||
            (out->pR  != NULL && out->ulRLen >= r.len)) {
            PORT_Memcpy(out->pGX, gx.data, gx.len); 
            PORT_Memcpy(out->pGV, gv.data, gv.len); 
            PORT_Memcpy(out->pR, r.data, r.len);
            out->ulGXLen = gx.len;
            out->ulGVLen = gv.len;
            out->ulRLen = r.len;
        } else {
            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
        }
    } 
    return crv;
}

SECItem *
SSL_GetSessionID(PRFileDesc *fd)
{
    sslSocket *    ss;
    SECItem *      item = NULL;

    ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
    if (ss) {
	ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
	ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);

	if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->firstHsDone && ss->sec.ci.sid) {
	    item = (SECItem *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SECItem));
	    if (item) {
		sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
		if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
		    item->len = SSL2_SESSIONID_BYTES;
		    item->data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(item->len);
		    PORT_Memcpy(item->data, sid->u.ssl2.sessionID, item->len);
		} else {
		    item->len = sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength;
		    item->data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(item->len);
		    PORT_Memcpy(item->data, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, item->len);
		}
	    }
	}

	ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
	ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
    }
    return item;
}

static PRLibrary *
sftkdb_LoadFromPath(const char *path, const char *libname)
{
    char *c;
    int pathLen, nameLen, fullPathLen;
    char *fullPathName = NULL;
    PRLibSpec libSpec;
    PRLibrary *lib = NULL;


    /* strip of our parent's library name */ 
    c = strrchr(path, PR_GetDirectorySeparator());
    if (!c) {
	return NULL; /* invalid path */
    }
    pathLen = (c-path)+1;
    nameLen = strlen(libname);
    fullPathLen = pathLen + nameLen +1;
    fullPathName = (char *)PORT_Alloc(fullPathLen);
    if (fullPathName == NULL) {
	return NULL; /* memory allocation error */
    }
    PORT_Memcpy(fullPathName, path, pathLen);
    PORT_Memcpy(fullPathName+pathLen, libname, nameLen);
    fullPathName[fullPathLen-1] = 0;

    libSpec.type = PR_LibSpec_Pathname;
    libSpec.value.pathname = fullPathName;
    lib = PR_LoadLibraryWithFlags(libSpec, PR_LD_NOW | PR_LD_LOCAL);
    PORT_Free(fullPathName);
    return lib;
}

/*
 * copy desc and value into target. Target is known to be big enough to
 * hold desc +2 +value, which is good because the result of this will be
 * *desc"*value". We may, however, have to add some escapes for special
 * characters imbedded into value (rare). This string potentially comes from
 * a user, so we don't want the user overflowing the target buffer by using
 * excessive escapes. To prevent this we count the escapes we need to add and
 * try to expand the buffer with Realloc.
 */
static char *
secmod_doDescCopy(char *target, int *targetLen, const char *desc,
			int descLen, char *value)
{
    int diff, esc_len;

    esc_len = NSSUTIL_EscapeSize(value, '\"') - 1;
    diff = esc_len - strlen(value);
    if (diff > 0) {
	/* we need to escape... expand newSpecPtr as well to make sure
	 * we don't overflow it */
	char *newPtr = PORT_Realloc(target, *targetLen * diff);
	if (!newPtr) {
	    return target; /* not enough space, just drop the whole copy */
	}
	*targetLen += diff;
	target = newPtr;
	value = NSSUTIL_Escape(value, '\"');
	if (value == NULL) {
	    return target; /* couldn't escape value, just drop the copy */
	}
    }
    PORT_Memcpy(target, desc, descLen);
    target += descLen;
    *target++='\"';
    PORT_Memcpy(target, value, esc_len);
    target += esc_len;
    *target++='\"';
    if (diff > 0) {
	PORT_Free(value);
    }
    return target;
}

/*
 * This function expands the internal state of the prng to fulfill any number
 * of bytes we need for this request. We only use this call if we need more
 * than can be supplied by a single call to SHA256_HashBuf.
 *
 * This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4, Hashgen
 */
static void
prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *returned_bytes,
             unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes)
{
    PRUint8 data[VSize(rng)];
    PRUint8 thisHash[SHA256_LENGTH];

    PORT_Memcpy(data, V(rng), VSize(rng));
    while (no_of_returned_bytes) {
        SHA256Context ctx;
        unsigned int len;
        unsigned int carry;

        SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
        SHA256_Update(&ctx, data, sizeof data);
        SHA256_End(&ctx, thisHash, &len, SHA256_LENGTH);
        if (no_of_returned_bytes < SHA256_LENGTH) {
            len = no_of_returned_bytes;
        }
        PORT_Memcpy(returned_bytes, thisHash, len);
        returned_bytes += len;
        no_of_returned_bytes -= len;
        /* The carry parameter is a bool (increment or not).
     * This increments data if no_of_returned_bytes is not zero */
        carry = no_of_returned_bytes;
        PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data) - 1, carry);
    }
    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
    PORT_Memset(thisHash, 0, sizeof thisHash);
}

/* create a virtual password per PKCS 12, the password is converted
 * to unicode, the salt is prepended to it, and then the whole thing
 * is returned */
SECItem *
sec_pkcs12_create_virtual_password(SECItem *password, SECItem *salt,
				   PRBool swap)
{
    SECItem uniPwd = {siBuffer, NULL,0}, *retPwd = NULL;

    if((password == NULL) || (salt == NULL)) {
	return NULL;
    }

    if(password->len == 0) {
	uniPwd.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ZAlloc(2);
	uniPwd.len = 2;
	if(!uniPwd.data) {
	    return NULL;
	}
    } else {
	uniPwd.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ZAlloc(password->len * 3);
	uniPwd.len = password->len * 3;
	if(!PORT_UCS2_ASCIIConversion(PR_TRUE, password->data, password->len,
				uniPwd.data, uniPwd.len, &uniPwd.len, swap)) {
	    SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&uniPwd, PR_FALSE);
	    return NULL;
	}
    }

    retPwd = (SECItem *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SECItem));
    if(retPwd == NULL) {
	goto loser;
    }

    /* allocate space and copy proper data */
    retPwd->len = uniPwd.len + salt->len;
    retPwd->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(retPwd->len);
    if(retPwd->data == NULL) {
	PORT_Free(retPwd);
	goto loser;
    }

    PORT_Memcpy(retPwd->data, salt->data, salt->len);
    PORT_Memcpy((retPwd->data + salt->len), uniPwd.data, uniPwd.len);

    SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&uniPwd, PR_FALSE);

    return retPwd;

loser:
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
    SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&uniPwd, PR_FALSE);
    return NULL;
}

/* Use this function to update the ClientRandom of a client's handshake state
 * after replacing its ClientHello message. We for example need to do this
 * when replacing an SSLv3 ClientHello with its SSLv2 equivalent. */
SECStatus SSLInt_UpdateSSLv2ClientRandom(PRFileDesc *fd, uint8_t *rnd,
                                         size_t rnd_len, uint8_t *msg,
                                         size_t msg_len) {
  sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
  if (!ss) {
    return SECFailure;
  }

  SECStatus rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
  if (rv != SECSuccess) {
    return rv;
  }

  rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
  if (rv != SECSuccess) {
    return rv;
  }

  // Zero the client_random struct.
  PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);

  // Copy over the challenge bytes.
  size_t offset = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rnd_len;
  PORT_Memcpy(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[offset], rnd, rnd_len);

  // Rehash the SSLv2 client hello message.
  return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, msg, msg_len);
}

NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNSSCertificateFakeTransport::Read(nsIObjectInputStream* aStream)
{
  PRUint32 len;
  nsresult rv = aStream->Read32(&len);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return rv;
  }

  nsXPIDLCString str;
  rv = aStream->ReadBytes(len, getter_Copies(str));
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return rv;
  }

  // On a non-chrome process we cannot instatiate mCert because we lack
  // nsNSSComponent.  nsNSSCertificateFakeTransport object is used only to carry the
  // certificate serialization.

  mCertSerialization = SECITEM_AllocItem(nsnull, nsnull, len);
  if (!mCertSerialization)
      return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
  PORT_Memcpy(mCertSerialization->data, str.Data(), len);

  return NS_OK;
}

/*
 * See addemdum to NIST SP 800-38A
 * Generically handle cipher text stealing. Basically this is doing CBC
 * operations except someone can pass us a partial block.
 *
 *  Output Order:
 *  CS-1:  C1||C2||C3..Cn-1(could be partial)||Cn   (NIST)
 *  CS-2: pad == 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn-1(is full)||Cn   (Schneier)
 *  CS-2: pad != 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(is partial)(Schneier)
 *  CS-3: C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(could be partial)   (Kerberos)
 *
 * The characteristics of these three options:
 *  - NIST & Schneier (CS-1 & CS-2) are identical to CBC if there are no
 * partial blocks on input.
 *  - Scheier and Kerberos (CS-2 and CS-3) have no embedded partial blocks,
 * which make decoding easier.
 *  - NIST & Kerberos (CS-1 and CS-3) have consistent block order independent
 * of padding.
 *
 * PKCS #11 did not specify which version to implement, but points to the NIST
 * spec, so this code implements CTS-CS-1 from NIST.
 *
 * To convert the returned buffer to:
 *   CS-2 (Schneier): do
 *       unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 *       pad = *outlen % blocksize;
 *       if (pad) {
 *          memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize);
 *          memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad);
 *      memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize);
 *       }
 *   CS-3 (Kerberos): do
 *       unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 *       pad = *outlen % blocksize;
 *       if (pad == 0) {
 *           pad = blocksize;
 *       }
 *       memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize);
 *       memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad);
 *   memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize);
 */
SECStatus
CTS_EncryptUpdate(CTSContext *cts, unsigned char *outbuf,
                  unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
                  const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
                  unsigned int blocksize)
{
    unsigned char lastBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
    unsigned int tmp;
    int fullblocks;
    int written;
    unsigned char *saveout = outbuf;
    SECStatus rv;

    if (inlen < blocksize) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    if (maxout < inlen) {
        *outlen = inlen;
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
        return SECFailure;
    }
    fullblocks = (inlen / blocksize) * blocksize;
    rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, outlen, maxout, inbuf,
                        fullblocks, blocksize);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
        return SECFailure;
    }
    *outlen = fullblocks; /* AES low level doesn't set outlen */
    inbuf += fullblocks;
    inlen -= fullblocks;
    if (inlen == 0) {
        return SECSuccess;
    }
    written = *outlen - (blocksize - inlen);
    outbuf += written;
    maxout -= written;

    /*
     * here's the CTS magic, we pad our final block with zeros,
     * then do a CBC encrypt. CBC will xor our plain text with
     * the previous block (Cn-1), capturing part of that block (Cn-1**) as it
     * xors with the zero pad. We then write this full block, overwritting
     * (Cn-1**) in our buffer. This allows us to have input data == output
     * data since Cn contains enough information to reconver Cn-1** when
     * we decrypt (at the cost of some complexity as you can see in decrypt
     * below */
    PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf, inlen);
    PORT_Memset(lastBlock + inlen, 0, blocksize - inlen);
    rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, &tmp, maxout, lastBlock,
                        blocksize, blocksize);
    PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
        *outlen = written + blocksize;
    } else {
        PORT_Memset(saveout, 0, written + blocksize);
    }
    return rv;
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

/*
 * create a new context which is the clone of the state of old context.
 */
PK11Context *
PK11_CloneContext(PK11Context *old)
{
    PK11Context *newcx;
    PRBool needFree = PR_FALSE;
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
    void *data;
    unsigned long len;

    newcx = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(old->type, old->slot, old->operation,
                                        old->key, old->param);
    if (newcx == NULL)
        return NULL;

    /* now clone the save state. First we need to find the save state
      * of the old session. If the old context owns it's session,
      * the state needs to be saved, otherwise the state is in saveData. */
    if (old->ownSession) {
        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(old);
        data = pk11_saveContext(old, NULL, &len);
        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(old);
        needFree = PR_TRUE;
    } else {
        data = old->savedData;
        len = old->savedLength;
    }

    if (data == NULL) {
        PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE);
        return NULL;
    }

    /* now copy that state into our new context. Again we have different
      * work if the new context owns it's own session. If it does, we
      * restore the state gathered above. If it doesn't, we copy the
      * saveData pointer... */
    if (newcx->ownSession) {
        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(newcx);
        rv = pk11_restoreContext(newcx, data, len);
        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(newcx);
    } else {
        PORT_Assert(newcx->savedData != NULL);
        if ((newcx->savedData == NULL) || (newcx->savedLength < len)) {
            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
            rv = SECFailure;
        } else {
            PORT_Memcpy(newcx->savedData, data, len);
            newcx->savedLength = len;
        }
    }

    if (needFree)
        PORT_Free(data);

    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
        PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE);
        return NULL;
    }
    return newcx;
}

/*
 * NOTE: This is not thread safe. Called at init time, and when loading
 * a new Entry. It is reasonably safe as long as it is not re-entered
 * (readers will always see a consistant table)
 *
 * This routine is called to add entries to the mechanism table, once there,
 * they can not be removed.
 */
void
PK11_AddMechanismEntry(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_KEY_TYPE key,
		 	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyGen, 
			CK_MECHANISM_TYPE padType,
			int ivLen, int blockSize)
{
    int tableSize = pk11_MechTableSize;
    int size = pk11_MechEntrySize;
    int entry = size++;
    pk11MechanismData *old = pk11_MechanismTable;
    pk11MechanismData *newt = pk11_MechanismTable;

	
    if (size > tableSize) {
	int oldTableSize = tableSize;
	tableSize += 10;
	newt = PORT_NewArray(pk11MechanismData, tableSize);
	if (newt == NULL) return;

	if (old) PORT_Memcpy(newt, old, oldTableSize*sizeof(*newt));
    } else old = NULL;

    newt[entry].type = type;
    newt[entry].keyType = key;
    newt[entry].keyGen = keyGen;
    newt[entry].padType = padType;
    newt[entry].iv = ivLen;
    newt[entry].blockSize = blockSize;

    pk11_MechanismTable = newt;
    pk11_MechTableSize = tableSize;
    pk11_MechEntrySize = size;
    if (old) PORT_Free(old);
}

static SECStatus
SetupAVAType(PRArenaPool *arena, SECOidTag type, SECItem *it, unsigned *maxLenp)
{
    unsigned char *oid;
    unsigned oidLen;
    unsigned char *cp;
    int      maxLen;
    SECOidData *oidrec;

    oidrec = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(type);
    if (oidrec == NULL)
	return SECFailure;

    oid = oidrec->oid.data;
    oidLen = oidrec->oid.len;

    maxLen = cert_AVAOidTagToMaxLen(type);
    if (maxLen < 0) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return SECFailure;
    }

    it->data = cp = (unsigned char*) PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, oidLen);
    if (cp == NULL) {
	return SECFailure;
    }
    it->len = oidLen;
    PORT_Memcpy(cp, oid, oidLen);
    *maxLenp = (unsigned)maxLen;
    return SECSuccess;
}

/*
 * save the current context state into a variable. Required to make FORTEZZA
 * work.
 */
SECStatus
PK11_SaveContext(PK11Context *cx,unsigned char *save,int *len, int saveLength)
{
    unsigned char * data = NULL;
    CK_ULONG length = saveLength;

    if (cx->ownSession) {
        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
        data = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, save, &length);
        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
        if (data) *len = length;
    } else if ((unsigned) saveLength >= cx->savedLength) {
        data = (unsigned char*)cx->savedData;
        if (cx->savedData) {
            PORT_Memcpy(save,cx->savedData,cx->savedLength);
        }
        *len = cx->savedLength;
    }
    if (data != NULL) {
        if (cx->ownSession) {
            PORT_ZFree(data, length);
        }
        return SECSuccess;
    } else {
        return SECFailure;
    }
}

NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNSSCertificateFakeTransport::Read(nsIObjectInputStream* aStream)
{
  // This serialization has to match that of nsNSSCertificate,
  // so read the cachedEVStatus but don't actually use it.
  uint32_t cachedEVStatus;
  nsresult rv = aStream->Read32(&cachedEVStatus);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return rv;
  }

  uint32_t len;
  rv = aStream->Read32(&len);
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return rv;
  }

  nsXPIDLCString str;
  rv = aStream->ReadBytes(len, getter_Copies(str));
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    return rv;
  }

  // On a non-chrome process we cannot instatiate mCert because we lack
  // nsNSSComponent. nsNSSCertificateFakeTransport object is used only to
  // carry the certificate serialization.

  mCertSerialization = SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, len);
  if (!mCertSerialization)
      return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
  PORT_Memcpy(mCertSerialization->data, str.Data(), len);

  return NS_OK;
}