C++ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR函数代码示例

//.........这里部分代码省略.........
         * (*) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
         *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
         */

        /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
         * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
         */
        pA = &local_A;
        BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
        if (!BN_div(D, M, pA, B, ctx)) {
            goto err;
        }

        /* Now
         *      A = D*B + M;
         * thus we have
         * (**)  sign*Y*a  ==  D*B + M   (mod |n|).
         */

        tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */

        /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
        A = B;
        B = M;
        /* ... so we have  0 <= B < A  again */

        /* Since the former  M  is now  B  and the former  B  is now  A,
         * (**) translates into
         *       sign*Y*a  ==  D*A + B    (mod |n|),
         * i.e.
         *       sign*Y*a - D*A  ==  B    (mod |n|).
         * Similarly, (*) translates into
         *      -sign*X*a  ==  A          (mod |n|).
         *
         * Thus,
         *   sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a  ==  B  (mod |n|),
         * i.e.
         *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
         *
         * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign),  we arrive back at
         *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
         *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
         * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
         */

        if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx)) {
            goto err;
        }
        if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y)) {
            goto err;
        }

        M = Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */
        Y = X;
        X = tmp;
        sign = -sign;
    }

    /*
     * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
     *      A == gcd(a,n);
     * we have
     *       sign*Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|),
     * where  Y  is non-negative.
     */

    if (sign < 0) {
        if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y)) {
            goto err;
        }
    }
    /* Now  Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|).  */

    if (BN_is_one(A)) {
        /* Y*a == 1  (mod |n|) */
        if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) {
            if (!BN_copy(R, Y)) {
                goto err;
            }
        } else {
            if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx)) {
                goto err;
            }
        }
    } else {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
        goto err;
    }
    ret = R;

err:
    if (ret == NULL && out == NULL) {
        BN_free(R);
    }

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
    return ret;
}

int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) {
  BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
  int ret = -1;
  int new_state, state, skip = 0;

  assert(s->handshake_func == dtls1_connect);
  assert(!s->server);
  assert(SSL_IS_DTLS(s));

  ERR_clear_error();
  ERR_clear_system_error();

  if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
    cb = s->info_callback;
  } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
    cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
  }

  s->in_handshake++;

  for (;;) {
    state = s->state;

    switch (s->state) {
      case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
        if (cb != NULL) {
          cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
        }

        if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
          buf = BUF_MEM_new();
          if (buf == NULL ||
              !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
            ret = -1;
            goto end;
          }
          s->init_buf = buf;
          buf = NULL;
        }

        if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
          ret = -1;
          goto end;
        }

        /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */

        s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
        s->init_num = 0;
        s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
        s->hit = 0;
        break;

      case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
      case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
        s->shutdown = 0;

        /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
        if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_connect, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
          ret = -1;
          goto end;
        }

        dtls1_start_timer(s);
        ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s);
        if (ret <= 0) {
          goto end;
        }

        if (s->d1->send_cookie) {
          s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
          s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
        } else {
          s->state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
        }

        s->init_num = 0;
        /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
        if (s->bbio != s->wbio) {
          s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
        }

        break;

      case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
      case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
        ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s);
        if (ret <= 0) {
          goto end;
        }
        if (s->d1->send_cookie) {
          /* start again, with a cookie */
          dtls1_stop_timer(s);
          s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
        } else {
          s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
        }
        s->init_num = 0;
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

static int bio_write(BIO *bio, const char *buf, int num_) {
  size_t num = num_;
  size_t rest;
  struct bio_bio_st *b;

  BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);

  if (!bio->init || buf == NULL || num == 0) {
    return 0;
  }

  b = bio->ptr;
  assert(b != NULL);
  assert(b->peer != NULL);
  assert(b->buf != NULL);

  b->request = 0;
  if (b->closed) {
    // we already closed
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE);
    return -1;
  }

  assert(b->len <= b->size);

  if (b->len == b->size) {
    BIO_set_retry_write(bio);  // buffer is full
    return -1;
  }

  // we can write
  if (num > b->size - b->len) {
    num = b->size - b->len;
  }

  // now write "num" bytes
  rest = num;

  assert(rest > 0);
  // one or two iterations
  do {
    size_t write_offset;
    size_t chunk;

    assert(b->len + rest <= b->size);

    write_offset = b->offset + b->len;
    if (write_offset >= b->size) {
      write_offset -= b->size;
    }
    // b->buf[write_offset] is the first byte we can write to.

    if (write_offset + rest <= b->size) {
      chunk = rest;
    } else {
      // wrap around ring buffer
      chunk = b->size - write_offset;
    }

    OPENSSL_memcpy(b->buf + write_offset, buf, chunk);

    b->len += chunk;

    assert(b->len <= b->size);

    rest -= chunk;
    buf += chunk;
  } while (rest);

  return num;
}

static int aead_rc4_md5_tls_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
                                 size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
                                 const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
                                 const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
                                 const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
  struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
  MD5_CTX md;
#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
  size_t rc4_off, md5_off, blocks;
  extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
#else
  const size_t rc4_off = 0;
  const size_t md5_off = 0;
#endif
  uint8_t digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];

  if (in_len + rc4_ctx->tag_len < in_len) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_rc4_md5_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (nonce_len != 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_rc4_md5_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (max_out_len < in_len + rc4_ctx->tag_len) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_rc4_md5_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
    return 0;
  }

  if (nonce_len != 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_rc4_md5_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  memcpy(&md, &rc4_ctx->head, sizeof(MD5_CTX));
  /* The MAC's payload begins with the additional data. See
   * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.1 */
  MD5_Update(&md, ad, ad_len);

#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
  /* 32 is $MOD from rc4_md5-x86_64.pl. */
  rc4_off = 32 - 1 - (rc4_ctx->rc4.x & (32 - 1));
  md5_off = MD5_CBLOCK - md.num;
  /* Ensure RC4 is behind MD5. */
  if (rc4_off > md5_off) {
    md5_off += MD5_CBLOCK;
  }
  assert(md5_off >= rc4_off);

  if (in_len > md5_off && (blocks = (in_len - md5_off) / MD5_CBLOCK) &&
      (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 20)) == 0) {
    /* Process the initial portions of the plaintext normally. */
    MD5_Update(&md, in, md5_off);
    RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, rc4_off, in, out);

    /* Process the next |blocks| blocks of plaintext with stitched routines. */
    rc4_md5_enc(&rc4_ctx->rc4, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off, &md, in + md5_off,
                blocks);
    blocks *= MD5_CBLOCK;
    rc4_off += blocks;
    md5_off += blocks;
    md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
    md.Nl += blocks <<= 3;
    if (md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks) {
      md.Nh++;
    }
  } else {

/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| == -1),
 * maximum acceptable body length |max|. The first four bytes (msg_type and
 * length) are read in state |header_state|, the body is read in state |body_state|. */
long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int header_state, int body_state, int msg_type,
                      long max, enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) {
  uint8_t *p;
  unsigned long l;
  long n;
  int al;

  if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
    /* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the
     * ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous
     * call. */
    assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
    s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
    if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
      goto f_err;
    }
    *ok = 1;
    s->state = body_state;
    s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4;
    s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
    return s->init_num;
  }

  p = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;

  if (s->state == header_state) {
    assert(s->init_num < 4);

    for (;;) {
      while (s->init_num < 4) {
        int bytes_read = ssl3_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num],
                                         4 - s->init_num, 0);
        if (bytes_read <= 0) {
          *ok = 0;
          return bytes_read;
        }
        s->init_num += bytes_read;
      }

      static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
      if (s->server || memcmp(p, kHelloRequest, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) != 0) {
        break;
      }

      /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing
       * a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct.
       * Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */
      s->init_num = 0;

      if (s->msg_callback) {
        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s,
                        s->msg_callback_arg);
      }
    }

    /* s->init_num == 4 */

    if (msg_type >= 0 && *p != msg_type) {
      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
      goto f_err;
    }
    s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);

    n2l3(p, l);
    if (l > (unsigned long)max) {
      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
      goto f_err;
    }

    if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, l + 4)) {
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
      goto err;
    }
    s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
    s->state = body_state;

    s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4;
    s->init_num = 0;
  }

  /* next state (body_state) */
  p = s->init_msg;
  n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
  while (n > 0) {
    int bytes_read = ssl3_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], n,
                                     0);
    if (bytes_read <= 0) {
      s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
      *ok = 0;
      return bytes_read;
    }
    s->init_num += bytes_read;
    n -= bytes_read;
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
                         size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
                         size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
  AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)&ctx->state;

  if (tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) {
    // Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction.
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
    return 0;
  }

  if (in_len < HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
    return 0;
  }

  if (max_out_len < in_len) {
    // This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it
    // will always be removed on return.
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
    return 0;
  }

  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (in_len > INT_MAX) {
    // EVP_CIPHER takes int as input.
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  // Configure the explicit IV.
  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
      !tls_ctx->implicit_iv &&
      !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) {
    return 0;
  }

  // Decrypt to get the plaintext + MAC + padding.
  size_t total = 0;
  int len;
  if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, (int)in_len)) {
    return 0;
  }
  total += len;
  if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) {
    return 0;
  }
  total += len;
  assert(total == in_len);

  // Remove CBC padding. Code from here on is timing-sensitive with respect to
  // |padding_ok| and |data_plus_mac_len| for CBC ciphers.
  size_t data_plus_mac_len;
  crypto_word_t padding_ok;
  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
    if (!EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(
            &padding_ok, &data_plus_mac_len, out, total,
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx),
            HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx))) {
      // Publicly invalid. This can be rejected in non-constant time.
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
      return 0;
    }
  } else {
    padding_ok = CONSTTIME_TRUE_W;
    data_plus_mac_len = total;
    // |data_plus_mac_len| = |total| = |in_len| at this point. |in_len| has
    // already been checked against the MAC size at the top of the function.
    assert(data_plus_mac_len >= HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
  }
  size_t data_len = data_plus_mac_len - HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);

  // At this point, if the padding is valid, the first |data_plus_mac_len| bytes
  // after |out| are the plaintext and MAC. Otherwise, |data_plus_mac_len| is
  // still large enough to extract a MAC, but it will be irrelevant.

  // To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
  // length for legacy ciphers.
  uint8_t ad_fixed[13];
  OPENSSL_memcpy(ad_fixed, ad, 11);
  ad_fixed[11] = (uint8_t)(data_len >> 8);
  ad_fixed[12] = (uint8_t)(data_len & 0xff);
  ad_len += 2;

  // Compute the MAC and extract the one in the record.
  uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
  size_t mac_len;
  uint8_t record_mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
  uint8_t *record_mac;
  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
                                  const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
                                  BN_CTX *ctx) {
  int ret = 0;
  BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
  BIGNUM *tmp_a;

  // p must be a prime > 3
  if (BN_num_bits(p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd(p)) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
    return 0;
  }

  if (ctx == NULL) {
    ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
    if (ctx == NULL) {
      return 0;
    }
  }

  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
  tmp_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  if (tmp_a == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  // group->field
  if (!BN_copy(&group->field, p)) {
    goto err;
  }
  BN_set_negative(&group->field, 0);
  // Store the field in minimal form, so it can be used with |BN_ULONG| arrays.
  bn_set_minimal_width(&group->field);

  // group->a
  if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_a, a, &group->field, ctx)) {
    goto err;
  }
  if (group->meth->field_encode) {
    if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->a, tmp_a, ctx)) {
      goto err;
    }
  } else if (!BN_copy(&group->a, tmp_a)) {
    goto err;
  }

  // group->b
  if (!BN_nnmod(&group->b, b, &group->field, ctx)) {
    goto err;
  }
  if (group->meth->field_encode &&
      !group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->b, &group->b, ctx)) {
    goto err;
  }

  // group->a_is_minus3
  if (!BN_add_word(tmp_a, 3)) {
    goto err;
  }
  group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp(tmp_a, &group->field));

  if (group->meth->field_encode != NULL) {
    if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->one, BN_value_one(), ctx)) {
      goto err;
    }
  } else if (!BN_copy(&group->one, BN_value_one())) {
    goto err;
  }

  ret = 1;

err:
  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
  BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
  return ret;
}

int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
	{
	BUF_MEM *buf;
	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
	unsigned long alg_a;
	int ret= -1;
	int new_state,state,skip=0;
	int listen;

	ERR_clear_error();
	ERR_clear_system_error();

	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
		cb=s->info_callback;
	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
	
	listen = s->d1->listen;

	/* init things to blank */
	s->in_handshake++;
	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);

	s->d1->listen = listen;

	if (s->cert == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_accept, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
		return(-1);
		}

	for (;;)
		{
		state=s->state;

		switch (s->state)
			{
		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
			s->renegotiate=1;
			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */

		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

			s->server=1;
			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);

			if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
				{
				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				return -1;
				}
			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;

			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
				{
				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
					{
					ret= -1;
					goto end;
					}
				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
					{
					ret= -1;
					goto end;
					}
				s->init_buf=buf;
				}

			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
				{
				ret= -1;
				goto end;
				}

			s->init_num=0;

			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
				{
				/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
				 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
				 * ...but not with SCTP :-)
				 */
					if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }

				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
				}
			else
				{
				/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
				 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
				}

			break;
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

static int conn_state(BIO *bio, BIO_CONNECT *c) {
  int ret = -1, i;
  char *p, *q;
  int (*cb)(const BIO *, int, int) = NULL;

  if (c->info_callback != NULL) {
    cb = c->info_callback;
  }

  for (;;) {
    switch (c->state) {
      case BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE:
        p = c->param_hostname;
        if (p == NULL) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, conn_state, BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_SPECIFIED);
          goto exit_loop;
        }
        for (; *p != 0; p++) {
          if (*p == ':' || *p == '/') {
            break;
          }
        }

        i = *p;
        if (i == ':' || i == '/') {
          *(p++) = 0;
          if (i == ':') {
            for (q = p; *q; q++) {
              if (*q == '/') {
                *q = 0;
                break;
              }
            }
            if (c->param_port != NULL) {
              OPENSSL_free(c->param_port);
            }
            c->param_port = BUF_strdup(p);
          }
        }

        if (c->param_port == NULL) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, conn_state, BIO_R_NO_PORT_SPECIFIED);
          ERR_add_error_data(2, "host=", c->param_hostname);
          goto exit_loop;
        }

        if (!bio_ip_and_port_to_socket_and_addr(
                &bio->num, &c->them, &c->them_length, c->param_hostname,
                c->param_port)) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, conn_state, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET);
          ERR_add_error_data(4, "host=", c->param_hostname, ":", c->param_port);
          goto exit_loop;
        }

        memset(c->ip, 0, 4);
        maybe_copy_ipv4_address(c->ip, &c->them);

        if (c->nbio) {
          if (!bio_socket_nbio(bio->num, 1)) {
            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, conn_state, BIO_R_ERROR_SETTING_NBIO);
            ERR_add_error_data(4, "host=", c->param_hostname, ":",
                               c->param_port);
            goto exit_loop;
          }
        }

        i = 1;
        ret = setsockopt(bio->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (char *)&i,
                         sizeof(i));
        if (ret < 0) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR(setsockopt);
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, conn_state, BIO_R_KEEPALIVE);
          ERR_add_error_data(4, "host=", c->param_hostname, ":", c->param_port);
          goto exit_loop;
        }

        BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
        ret = connect(bio->num, (struct sockaddr*) &c->them, c->them_length);
        if (ret < 0) {
          if (bio_fd_should_retry(ret)) {
            BIO_set_flags(bio, (BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY));
            c->state = BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT;
            bio->retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
          } else {
            OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR(connect);
            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, conn_state, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR);
            ERR_add_error_data(4, "host=", c->param_hostname, ":",
                               c->param_port);
          }
          goto exit_loop;
        } else {
          c->state = BIO_CONN_S_OK;
        }
        break;

      case BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT:
        i = bio_sock_error(bio->num);
        if (i) {
          if (bio_fd_should_retry(ret)) {
            BIO_set_flags(bio, (BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY));
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(
    BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
    const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
  int retry_counter = 32;
  BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;

  if (b == NULL) {
    ret = BN_BLINDING_new(NULL, NULL, m);
  } else {
    ret = b;
  }

  if (ret == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  if (ret->A == NULL && (ret->A = BN_new()) == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }
  if (ret->Ai == NULL && (ret->Ai = BN_new()) == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  if (e != NULL) {
    BN_free(ret->e);
    ret->e = BN_dup(e);
  }
  if (ret->e == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  if (mont != NULL) {
    ret->mont = mont;
  }

  do {
    if (!BN_rand_range(ret->A, ret->mod)) {
      goto err;
    }

    int no_inverse;
    if (BN_mod_inverse_ex(ret->Ai, &no_inverse, ret->A, ret->mod, ctx) == NULL) {
      /* this should almost never happen for good RSA keys */
      if (no_inverse) {
        if (retry_counter-- == 0) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
          goto err;
        }
        ERR_clear_error();
      } else {
        goto err;
      }
    } else {
      break;
    }
  } while (1);

  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx, ret->mont)) {
    goto err;
  }

  return ret;

err:
  if (b == NULL) {
    BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
    ret = NULL;
  }

  return ret;
}

int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) {
  BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
  uint32_t alg_a;
  int ret = -1;
  int new_state, state, skip = 0;

  assert(s->handshake_func == dtls1_accept);
  assert(s->server);
  assert(SSL_IS_DTLS(s));

  ERR_clear_error();
  ERR_clear_system_error();

  if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
    cb = s->info_callback;
  } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
    cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
  }

  s->in_handshake++;

  if (s->cert == NULL) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_accept, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
    return -1;
  }

  for (;;) {
    state = s->state;

    switch (s->state) {
      case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
        s->renegotiate = 1;
        /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */

      case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
      case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
        if (cb != NULL) {
          cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
        }

        if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
          buf = BUF_MEM_new();
          if (buf == NULL || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
            ret = -1;
            goto end;
          }
          s->init_buf = buf;
          buf = NULL;
        }

        if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
          ret = -1;
          goto end;
        }

        s->init_num = 0;

        if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
          if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
            ret = -1;
            goto end;
          }

          if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            ret = -1;
            goto end;
          }

          s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
        } else {
          /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, * we will just send a
           * HelloRequest */
          s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
        }

        break;

      case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
      case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
        s->shutdown = 0;
        dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
        dtls1_start_timer(s);
        ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
        if (ret <= 0) {
          goto end;
        }
        s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
        s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
        s->init_num = 0;

        if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
          ret = -1;
          goto end;
        }
        break;

      case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

/* Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format, possibly followed
 * by a sequence of CA certificates that should be sent to the peer in the
 * Certificate message. */
int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file) {
  BIO *in;
  int ret = 0;
  X509 *x = NULL;

  ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */

  in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
  if (in == NULL) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
    goto end;
  }

  if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
    goto end;
  }

  x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback,
                            ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
  if (x == NULL) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
    goto end;
  }

  ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);

  if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
    ret = 0; /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply ret==0 ... */
  }

  if (ret) {
    /* If we could set up our certificate, now proceed to the CA
     * certificates. */
    X509 *ca;
    int r;
    uint32_t err;

    SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx);

    while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback,
                                   ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata)) !=
           NULL) {
      r = SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
      if (!r) {
        X509_free(ca);
        ret = 0;
        goto end;
      }
      /* Note that we must not free r if it was successfully added to the chain
       * (while we must free the main certificate, since its reference count is
       * increased by SSL_CTX_use_certificate). */
    }

    /* When the while loop ends, it's usually just EOF. */
    err = ERR_peek_last_error();
    if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM &&
        ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) {
      ERR_clear_error();
    } else {
      ret = 0; /* some real error */
    }
  }

end:
  X509_free(x);
  BIO_free(in);
  return ret;
}

static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, const char *sender, int len,
                              uint8_t *p) {
  unsigned int ret;
  int npad, n;
  unsigned int i;
  uint8_t md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
  EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;

  if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
      !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
    return 0;
  }

  /* Search for digest of specified type in the handshake_dgst array. */
  for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
    if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] &&
        EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
      d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
      break;
    }
  }

  if (!d) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_handshake_mac, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
    return 0;
  }

  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d)) {
    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_handshake_mac, ERR_LIB_EVP);
    return 0;
  }

  n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
  if (n < 0) {
    return 0;
  }

  npad = (48 / n) * n;
  if (sender != NULL) {
    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len);
  }
  EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length);
  EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
  EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i);

  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL)) {
    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_handshake_mac, ERR_LIB_EVP);
    return 0;
  }
  EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length);
  EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad);
  EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i);
  EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret);

  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);

  return ret;
}

int ssl3_prf(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
             size_t secret_len, const char *label, size_t label_len,
             const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
             const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len) {
  EVP_MD_CTX md5;
  EVP_MD_CTX sha1;
  uint8_t buf[16], smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
  uint8_t c = 'A';
  size_t i, j, k;

  k = 0;
  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md5);
  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&sha1);
  for (i = 0; i < out_len; i += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
    k++;
    if (k > sizeof(buf)) {
      /* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_prf, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
      return 0;
    }

    for (j = 0; j < k; j++) {
      buf[j] = c;
    }
    c++;
    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&sha1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_prf, ERR_LIB_EVP);
      return 0;
    }
    EVP_DigestUpdate(&sha1, buf, k);
    EVP_DigestUpdate(&sha1, secret, secret_len);
    /* |label| is ignored for SSLv3. */
    if (seed1_len) {
      EVP_DigestUpdate(&sha1, seed1, seed1_len);
    }
    if (seed2_len) {
      EVP_DigestUpdate(&sha1, seed2, seed2_len);
    }
    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&sha1, smd, NULL);

    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md5, EVP_md5(), NULL)) {
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_prf, ERR_LIB_EVP);
      return 0;
    }
    EVP_DigestUpdate(&md5, secret, secret_len);
    EVP_DigestUpdate(&md5, smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
    if (i + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH > out_len) {
      EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md5, smd, NULL);
      memcpy(out, smd, out_len - i);
    } else {
      EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md5, out, NULL);
    }

    out += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
  }

  OPENSSL_cleanse(smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md5);
  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&sha1);

  return 1;
}

static int aead_ssl3_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
                         size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
                         const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
                         const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
  AEAD_SSL3_CTX *ssl3_ctx = (AEAD_SSL3_CTX *)ctx->aead_state;
  size_t total = 0;

  if (!ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) {
    /* Unlike a normal AEAD, an SSL3 AEAD may only be used in one direction. */
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
    return 0;
  }

  if (in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead) < in_len ||
      in_len > INT_MAX) {
    /* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (max_out_len < in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead)) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
    return 0;
  }

  if (nonce_len != 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (ad_len != 11 - 2 /* length bytes */) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE);
    return 0;
  }

  /* Compute the MAC. This must be first in case the operation is being done
   * in-place. */
  uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
  unsigned mac_len;
  if (!ssl3_mac(ssl3_ctx, mac, &mac_len, ad, ad_len, in, in_len)) {
    return 0;
  }

  /* Encrypt the input. */
  int len;
  if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in,
                         (int)in_len)) {
    return 0;
  }
  total = len;

  /* Feed the MAC into the cipher. */
  if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, mac,
                         (int)mac_len)) {
    return 0;
  }
  total += len;

  unsigned block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx);
  if (block_size > 1) {
    assert(block_size <= 256);
    assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);

    /* Compute padding and feed that into the cipher. */
    uint8_t padding[256];
    unsigned padding_len = block_size - ((in_len + mac_len) % block_size);
    memset(padding, 0, padding_len - 1);
    padding[padding_len - 1] = padding_len - 1;
    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, padding,
                           (int)padding_len)) {
      return 0;
    }
    total += len;
  }

  if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) {
    return 0;
  }
  total += len;

  *out_len = total;
  return 1;
}