C++ HMAC_Final函数代码示例

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    if(argc != 2) {
        printf("Usage: ./test_app <file_name>\n");
        return -1;
    }

    ENGINE *e = load_engine(ENGINE_MODULE, "test_engine");
    if(e == 0) {
        printf("Unable to load engine\n");
        return -1;
    }
    ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "username", "user", 0);
    ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "password", "password", 0);
    ENGINE_init(e);
    
    HMAC_CTX ctx;
    HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
    HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, "test_key\0", 9, EVP_sha1(), e);

    FILE *f = fopen(argv[1], "r");
    char buf[BUF_SIZE];
    while(!feof(f)) {
        size_t ln = fread(buf, sizeof(char), BUF_SIZE, f);
        if(ln == 0) continue;
        HMAC_Update(&ctx, buf, ln);
    }
    fclose(f);
    
    unsigned int siglen;
    unsigned char md[20];
    HMAC_Final(&ctx, md, &siglen);
    ENGINE_finish(e);

    printf("HMAC-SHA1: ");
    for(size_t i = 0; i < siglen; i++) printf("%02x", md[i]);
    printf("\n");

    return 0;
}

/* {{{ libssh2_mac_method_hmac_md5_hash
 * Calculate hash using full md5 value
 */
static int libssh2_mac_method_hmac_md5_hash(LIBSSH2_SESSION *session, unsigned char *buf, unsigned long seqno,
																	  const unsigned char *packet, unsigned long packet_len, 
																	  const unsigned char *addtl, unsigned long addtl_len, void **abstract)
{
	HMAC_CTX ctx;
	unsigned char seqno_buf[4];

	libssh2_htonu32(seqno_buf, seqno);

	HMAC_Init(&ctx, *abstract, 16, EVP_md5());
	HMAC_Update(&ctx, seqno_buf, 4);
	HMAC_Update(&ctx, packet, packet_len);
	if (addtl && addtl_len) {
		HMAC_Update(&ctx, addtl, addtl_len);
	}
	HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, NULL);
	HMAC_cleanup(&ctx);

	return 0;
}

/* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
static void eap_pwd_kdf(uint8_t *key, int keylen, char const *label,
			int label_len, uint8_t *retult, int retult_bit_len)
{
	HMAC_CTX	*hmac_ctx;
	uint8_t		digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
	uint16_t	i, ctr, L;
	int		retult_byte_len, len = 0;
	unsigned int	mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
	uint8_t		mask = 0xff;

	MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
	retult_byte_len = (retult_bit_len + 7) / 8;

	ctr = 0;
	L = htons(retult_bit_len);
	while (len < retult_byte_len) {
		ctr++; i = htons(ctr);

		HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, key, keylen, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
		if (ctr > 1) HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, digest, mdlen);
		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof(uint16_t));
		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)label, label_len);
		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *) &L, sizeof(uint16_t));
		HMAC_Final(hmac_ctx, digest, &mdlen);
		if ((len + (int) mdlen) > retult_byte_len) {
			memcpy(retult + len, digest, retult_byte_len - len);
		} else {
			memcpy(retult + len, digest, mdlen);
		}
		len += mdlen;
		HMAC_CTX_reset(hmac_ctx);
	}

	/* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
	if (retult_bit_len % 8) {
		mask <<= (8 - (retult_bit_len % 8));
		retult[retult_byte_len - 1] &= mask;
	}

	HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
}

char * Crypto_Digest_HMAC (int count, char * algoName,
                           char * data, char * key) {

  count = count;
  HMAC_CTX ctx;
  const EVP_MD *md;
  unsigned char hmac_value [EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
  unsigned int hmac_len;

  OpenSSL_add_all_digests ();
  md = EVP_get_digestbyname (algoName);
  if (!md) return "";

  HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
  HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, key, strlen (key), md, NULL);
  HMAC_Update (&ctx, (unsigned char *) data, strlen (data));
  HMAC_Final (&ctx, hmac_value, &hmac_len);
  HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);

  return Crypto_Digest_MakeHexDigest (hmac_value, hmac_len);;
}

int cmeHMACFinal(HMAC_CTX **ctx, unsigned char *out, unsigned int *outl)
{
    int result;

    result=HMAC_Final(*ctx,out,outl);
    cmeFree(*ctx);
    if (result==0)  //1= success, 0=failure
    {
#ifdef ERROR_LOG
        fprintf(stderr,"CaumeDSE Error: cmeHMACFinal(), HMAC_Final() failure!\n");
#endif
        return (1);
    }
    else
    {
#ifdef DEBUG
        fprintf(stdout,"CaumeDSE Debug: cmeHMACFinal(), HMAC_Final() success.\n");
#endif
       return (0);
    }

int hmac::digest(lua_State * L)
{
    target_type * self = lua::to<hmac>(L, 1);
    
    unsigned char * md = new unsigned char[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    unsigned int md_len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
    
    HMAC_Final(self, md, &md_len);
    
    std::size_t output_len = md_len * 2 + 1;
    char * output = new char[output_len];
    char * output_end = hex_encode(md, md + md_len, output, output + output_len);
    *output_end = '\0';
    
    lua_pushstring(L, output);
    
    delete [] md;
    delete [] output;
    
    return 1;
}

int por_verify_block(char *filepath, size_t filepath_len, unsigned char *block, size_t block_len, unsigned int index, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len){
	
	HMAC_CTX ctx;
	POR_key *key = NULL;
	unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
	unsigned int digest_len = 0;
	int ret = 0;
	
	if(!filepath || !block || !block_len || !tag || !tag_len) return 0;
	if(filepath_len >= MAXPATHLEN) return 0;
	
	key = por_get_keys();
	if(!key) goto cleanup;
	
	HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
	HMAC_Init(&ctx, key->prf_key, key->prf_key_size, EVP_sha1());

	HMAC_Update(&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&index, sizeof(unsigned int));
	HMAC_Update(&ctx, (unsigned char *)filepath, (int)filepath_len);
	HMAC_Update(&ctx, block, block_len);
		
	HMAC_Final(&ctx, digest, &digest_len);
		
	HMAC_cleanup(&ctx);			

	ret = memcmp(digest, tag, tag_len);

/*	printf("Tag: ");
	printhex(tag, tag_len);
	printf("Verify: ");
	printhex(digest, digest_len);
*/
	if(key) destroy_por_key(key);

	if(ret == 0) return 1;
	
cleanup:
	return 0;
	
}

static int
verify(const ocra_suite * ocra, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_l,
    const uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_l, const char *resp)
{
	int ret;
	unsigned int md_l = 20;
	uint8_t *md = NULL;
	char *tmp;
	HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;

	if (0 != (ret = hmac_new(&ctx)))
		return ret;

	if (NULL == ((md = (uint8_t *)malloc(mdlen(ocra->hotp_alg)))))
		return RFC6287_ERR_POSIX;

	if ((1 != HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, key_l, evp_md(ocra->hotp_alg), NULL)) ||
	    (1 != HMAC_Update(ctx, buf, (int)buf_l)) ||
	    (1 != HMAC_Final(ctx, md, &md_l)) ||
	    (md_l != mdlen(ocra->hotp_alg))) {
		hmac_destroy(ctx);
		free(md);
		return RFC6287_ERR_OPENSSL;
	}
	hmac_destroy(ctx);
	if (ocra->hotp_trunc) {
		ret = truncate_md(md, md_l, ocra->hotp_trunc, &tmp);
		free(md);
		if (0 != ret)
			return ret;
	} else
		tmp = (char *)md;
	if (0 != memcmp(resp, tmp,
	    (ocra->hotp_trunc) ? (unsigned int)ocra->hotp_trunc : md_l))
		ret = RFC6287_VERIFY_FAILED;
	else
		ret = RFC6287_SUCCESS;
	free(tmp);
	return ret;
}

static void kderive_update(struct kderive_context *ctx)
{
	uint32_t i;
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010002f)
	HMAC_CTX hctx;
#endif
        HMAC_CTX *phctx = NULL;
	unsigned char *pos = ctx->out;
	uint32_t *p_iter = (uint32_t *)ctx->fid;
	uint32_t num_iters = ctx->out_len / PRF_OUTPUT_SIZE;

	check_prf_iters(num_iters);

#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010002f)
	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
        phctx = &hctx;
#else
        phctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
        /* I guess we presume it was successful? */
#endif
	for (i = 0; i < num_iters; i++) {
		/*
		 * update the iteration number in the fid
		 */
		*p_iter = htobe32(i);
		HMAC_Init_ex(phctx,
			     ctx->pkey, ctx->pkey_len >> 3,
			     EVP_sha256(),
			     NULL);
		HMAC_Update(phctx, ctx->fid, ctx->fid_len);
		HMAC_Final(phctx, pos, NULL);

		pos += PRF_OUTPUT_SIZE;
	}
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010002f)
	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(phctx);
#else
        HMAC_CTX_free(phctx);
#endif
}

// Other 'common' functions for this format:
void encfs_common_setIVec(encfs_common_custom_salt *cur_salt, unsigned char *ivec, uint64_t seed, unsigned char *key)
{
	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	unsigned int mdLen = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
	int i;
	HMAC_CTX mac_ctx;

	memcpy( ivec, &key[cur_salt->keySize], cur_salt->ivLength );
	for(i=0; i<8; ++i) {
		md[i] = (unsigned char)(seed & 0xff);
		seed >>= 8;
	}
	// combine ivec and seed with HMAC
	HMAC_CTX_init(&mac_ctx);
	HMAC_Init_ex( &mac_ctx, key, cur_salt->keySize, EVP_sha1(), 0 );
	HMAC_Init_ex( &mac_ctx, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
	HMAC_Update( &mac_ctx, ivec, cur_salt->ivLength );
	HMAC_Update( &mac_ctx, md, 8 );
	HMAC_Final( &mac_ctx, md, &mdLen );
	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&mac_ctx);
	memcpy( ivec, md, cur_salt->ivLength );
}

		void init(RC4_KEY* rc4, const unsigned char* session_key, const unsigned char* peer_key)
		{
			HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
			HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx);
			HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac_ctx, (void*)peer_key, peer_key_size, EVP_sha1(), NULL);

			HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, session_key, session_key_size);

			unsigned char rc4_keystring[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
			unsigned int rc4_keystring_size = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
			
			HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, rc4_keystring, &rc4_keystring_size);
			
			HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);

			RC4_set_key(rc4, rc4_keystring_size, rc4_keystring);
			
			const unsigned char rc4_key_init[rc4_init_size] = { 0x00 };
			unsigned char rc4_key_init_output[rc4_init_size];

			RC4(rc4, sizeof(rc4_key_init), rc4_key_init, rc4_key_init_output);
		}

/* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
static void
eap_pwd_kdf(uint8_t *key, int keylen, const char *label, int labellen,
	    uint8_t *result, int resultbitlen)
{
    HMAC_CTX hctx;
    uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
    uint16_t i, ctr, L;
    int resultbytelen, len = 0;
    unsigned int mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
    uint8_t mask = 0xff;

    resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7)/8;
    ctr = 0;
    L = htons(resultbitlen);
    while (len < resultbytelen) {
	ctr++; i = htons(ctr);
	HMAC_Init(&hctx, key, keylen, EVP_sha256());
	if (ctr > 1) {
	    HMAC_Update(&hctx, digest, mdlen);
	}
	HMAC_Update(&hctx, (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof(uint16_t));
	HMAC_Update(&hctx, (const uint8_t *)label, labellen);
	HMAC_Update(&hctx, (uint8_t *) &L, sizeof(uint16_t));
	HMAC_Final(&hctx, digest, &mdlen);
	if ((len + (int) mdlen) > resultbytelen) {
	    memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len);
	} else {
	    memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
	}
	len += mdlen;
	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
    }

    /* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
    if (resultbitlen % 8) {
	mask <<= (8 - (resultbitlen % 8));
	result[resultbytelen - 1] &= mask;
    }
}

ByteArray Hmac::doFinal() throw (HmacException, InvalidStateException) {
	if (this->state == Hmac::NO_INIT || this->state == Hmac::INIT)
	{
		throw InvalidStateException("Hmac::doFinal");
	}

	unsigned int size;
	unsigned char *md = new unsigned char[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1];
	int rc = HMAC_Final( &this->ctx, md, &size );
	HMAC_CTX_cleanup( &this->ctx );
	this->state = Hmac::NO_INIT;
	if (!rc)
	{
		delete( md );
		throw HmacException(HmacException::CTX_FINISH, "Hmac::doFinal");
	}

	ByteArray content;
	content.setDataPointer( md, size );

	return content;
}

void l4l_rest() {
			__l4l.data.l_trz=snprintf(__l4l.data.s_trz,L4L_MAX_TRZ_LEN-1,__l4l.data.s_trz_aux2,__l4l.data.s_trz_aux);
			__l4l.data.s_trz[__l4l.data.l_trz++]='\n';__l4l.data.s_trz[__l4l.data.l_trz]='\0';
			__l4l.size+=fwrite(__l4l.data.s_trz,1,__l4l.data.l_trz,__l4l.data.logFile);
			strcpy(__l4l.data.s_trz_aux,__l4l.data.s_trz);
			if(__l4l.data.currMask & __l4l.cfg.flush_mask) {
				fflush (__l4l.data.logFile);\
				fsync (fileno (__l4l.data.logFile));
			}

#ifdef L4L_HASH_METHOD
			if (__l4l.data.currMask & __l4l.cfg.hash_mask) {
				int i=0;

				HMAC_Update(&__l4l.data.ctx, (unsigned char*)&__l4l.data.s_trz, (size_t)(__l4l.data.l_trz-1));
				HMAC_Final(&__l4l.data.ctx, __l4l.data.hash_bin, &__l4l.data.len);
				for(i=0;i < L4L_MAX_HASH_LEN;i+=2) {
					__l4l.data.hash_str[i]=lut[(int)(__l4l.data.hash_bin[i] >>4)];
					__l4l.data.hash_str[i+1]=lut[(int)(__l4l.data.hash_bin[i] & 0x0f)]; 
				}
				__l4l.data.hash_str[i]='\0';
			}

unsigned int FIPS_incore_fingerprint(unsigned char *sig,unsigned int len)
    {
    const unsigned char *p1 = FIPS_text_start();
    const unsigned char *p2 = FIPS_text_end();
    const unsigned char *p3 = FIPS_rodata_start;
    const unsigned char *p4 = FIPS_rodata_end;
    HMAC_CTX c;

    HMAC_CTX_init(&c);
    HMAC_Init(&c,FIPS_hmac_key,strlen(FIPS_hmac_key),EVP_sha1());

    /* detect overlapping regions */
    if (p1<=p3 && p2>=p3)
	p3=p1, p4=p2>p4?p2:p4, p1=NULL, p2=NULL;
    else if (p3<=p1 && p4>=p1)
	p3=p3, p4=p2>p4?p2:p4, p1=NULL, p2=NULL;

    if (p1)
	HMAC_Update(&c,p1,(size_t)p2-(size_t)p1);

    if (FIPS_signature>=p3 && FIPS_signature<p4)
	{
	/* "punch" hole */
	HMAC_Update(&c,p3,(size_t)FIPS_signature-(size_t)p3);
	p3 = FIPS_signature+sizeof(FIPS_signature);
	if (p3<p4)
	    HMAC_Update(&c,p3,(size_t)p4-(size_t)p3);
	}
    else
	HMAC_Update(&c,p3,(size_t)p4-(size_t)p3);

    if (!fips_post_corrupt(FIPS_TEST_INTEGRITY, 0, NULL))
	HMAC_Update(&c, (unsigned char *)FIPS_hmac_key, 1);

    HMAC_Final(&c,sig,&len);
    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c);

    return len;
    }