C++ CRYPTO_memcmp函数代码示例

static int x25519_keycheck(const EC_KEY *eckey)
{
    const char *pubkey;
    if (eckey->pub_key == NULL)
        return 0;
    pubkey = eckey->pub_key->custom_data;
    if (pubkey == NULL)
        return 0;
    if (eckey->custom_data != NULL) {
        uint8_t tmp[EC_X25519_KEYLEN];
        /* Check eckey->priv_key exists and matches eckey->custom_data */
        if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
            return 0;
        if (BN_bn2lebinpad(eckey->priv_key, tmp, EC_X25519_KEYLEN)
            != EC_X25519_KEYLEN
            || CRYPTO_memcmp(tmp, eckey->custom_data,
                             EC_X25519_KEYLEN) != 0) {
            OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, EC_X25519_KEYLEN);
            return 0;
        }
        X25519_public_from_private(tmp, eckey->custom_data);
        if (CRYPTO_memcmp(pubkey, tmp, EC_X25519_KEYLEN) == 0)
            return 1;
        return 0;
    } else {
        return 1;
    }
}

static bool check_hmac(struct onion *onion, const struct hmackey *hmackey)
{
	struct sha256 hmac;

	make_hmac(onion->hop, MAX_HOPS, NULL, hmackey, &hmac);
	return CRYPTO_memcmp(&hmac, &myhop(onion)->hmac, sizeof(hmac)) == 0;
}

int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
{
    int al, i, ok;
    long n;
    unsigned char *p;

#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
    /*
     * the mac has already been generated when we received the change cipher
     * spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
     */
#endif

    /* 64 argument should actually be 36+4 :-) */
    n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 64, &ok);

    if (!ok)
        return ((int)n);

    /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
    if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
        goto f_err;
    }
    s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;

    p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
    i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;

    if (i != n) {
        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
        goto f_err;
    }

    if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) {
        al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
        goto f_err;
    }

    /*
     * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
     */
    if (s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT) {
        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
        memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
        s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
    } else {
        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
        memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
        s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
    }

    return (1);
 f_err:
    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
    return (0);
}

static int aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_open_gather(
    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce,
    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag,
    size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
  const struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx *aes_ctx =
      (struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx *) &ctx->state;

  if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
    return 0;
  }

  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_NONCE_LEN) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
    return 0;
  }

  uint8_t hmac_result[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
  hmac_calculate(hmac_result, &aes_ctx->inner_init_state,
                 &aes_ctx->outer_init_state, ad, ad_len, nonce, in,
                 in_len);
  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac_result, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
    return 0;
  }

  aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_crypt(aes_ctx, out, in, in_len, nonce);

  return 1;
}

static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(aead_poly1305_update poly1305_update,
                                       const void *ctx_buf, uint8_t *out,
                                       size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
                                       const uint8_t nonce[12],
                                       const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
                                       const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
  aead_assert_open_seal_preconditions(alignof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx),
                                      ctx_buf, out, out_len, nonce, in, in_len,
                                      ad, ad_len);

  const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx_buf;

  if (!aead_open_out_max_out_in_tag_len(out_len, max_out_len, in_len,
                                        POLY1305_TAG_LEN)) {
    /* |aead_open_out_max_out_in_tag_len| already called
     * |OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR|. */
    return 0;
  }

  size_t plaintext_len;

  plaintext_len = in_len - POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
  uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN] ALIGNED;
  aead_poly1305(poly1305_update, tag, c20_ctx, nonce, ad, ad_len, in,
                plaintext_len);
  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + plaintext_len, POLY1305_TAG_LEN) != 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
    return 0;
  }

  CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1);
  *out_len = plaintext_len;
  return 1;
}

static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
                                       size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
                                       const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
                                       const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
                                       const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
  const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
  uint8_t mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
  uint8_t poly1305_key[32] ALIGNED;
  size_t plaintext_len;
  poly1305_state poly1305;
  const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;

  if (in_len < c20_ctx->tag_len) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
    return 0;
  }

  /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
   * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
   * individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
   * |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
   * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
   * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
   * the warning. */
  if (in_len_64 >= (1ull << 32) * 64 - 64) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (nonce_len != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  plaintext_len = in_len - c20_ctx->tag_len;

  if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open,
                      CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
    return 0;
  }

  memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
  CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
                   c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0);

  CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
  poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
  poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len);
  CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac);

  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, c20_ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
    return 0;
  }

  CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1);
  *out_len = plaintext_len;
  return 1;
}

int detect_mode()
{
	// Tamanho minimo: 5 + input + 5 = 10 + input
	// Tamanho maximo: 10 + input + 10 = 20 + input
	unsigned char  input[] = "ParangaricoTirimirruaro";
	unsigned int   input_len = strlen((char*)input);
	unsigned int output_len, max_output_len;
	unsigned char* choosen_input = NULL;
	unsigned char* output = NULL;
	unsigned int choosen_len = 2*BLOCK_LEN + input_len + (input_len%BLOCK_LEN) + 2*BLOCK_LEN;
	int expected_method = 0;

	choosen_input = (unsigned char*) malloc(choosen_len);
	if ( NULL == choosen_input ) {
		printf("Out of memory!\n");
		return -1;
	}

	max_output_len = choosen_len + 50;
	output = (unsigned char*) malloc(max_output_len);
	if ( NULL == output ) {
		free(choosen_input);
		printf("Out of memory!\n");
		return -1;
	}

	memset((char*) choosen_input, 0, choosen_len);
	memcpy((char*) &choosen_input[2*BLOCK_LEN], input, input_len);

	if ( 0 == encryption_oracle_ex( choosen_input, choosen_len,
		                            output, &output_len, max_output_len, &expected_method ) ) {
		// Search for equal blocks -- if found, ECB has been used
		unsigned int i, found, iNumBlocks = output_len / BLOCK_LEN;
		unsigned char* pFirst = &output[ 1 * BLOCK_LEN ];
		found = 0;
		for(i=2; i<iNumBlocks; i++){
			unsigned char* pSecond = &output[ i * BLOCK_LEN ];
			if ( 0 == CRYPTO_memcmp(pFirst, pSecond, BLOCK_LEN) ) {
				found = 1;
				break;
			}
		}

		if(found) {
			printf("ECB detected (expected %s)\n", (expected_method?"CBC":"ECB"));
		} else {
			printf("CBC detected (expected %s)\n", (expected_method?"CBC":"ECB"));
		}

	} else {
		printf("Encryption oracle error\n");
		free(choosen_input);
		free(output);
		return -1;
	}

	free(choosen_input);
	free(output);
	return 0;
}

/** Milenage check
 *
 * @param[out] ik	Buffer for IK = 128-bit integrity key (f4), or NULL.
 * @param[out] ck	Buffer for CK = 128-bit confidentiality key (f3), or NULL.
 * @param[out] res	Buffer for RES = 64-bit signed response (f2), or NULL.
 * @param[in] auts	112-bit buffer for AUTS.
 * @param[in] opc	128-bit operator variant algorithm configuration field (encr.).
 * @param[in] ki	128-bit subscriber key.
 * @param[in] sqn	48-bit sequence number.
 * @param[in] rand	128-bit random challenge.
 * @param[in] autn	128-bit authentication token.
 * @return
 *	- 0 on success.
 *	- -1 on failure.
 *	- -2 on synchronization failure
 */
int milenage_check(uint8_t ik[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE],
		   uint8_t ck[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE],
		   uint8_t res[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE],
		   uint8_t auts[MILENAGE_AUTS_SIZE],
		   uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
		   uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
		   uint64_t sqn,
		   uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE],
		   uint8_t const autn[MILENAGE_AUTN_SIZE])
{

	uint8_t mac_a[MILENAGE_MAC_A_SIZE], ak[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE], rx_sqn[MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE];
	uint8_t sqn_buff[MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE];
	const uint8_t *amf;
	size_t i;

	uint48_to_buff(sqn_buff, sqn);

	FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(autn, MILENAGE_AUTN_SIZE, "AUTN");
	FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(rand, MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE, "RAND");

	if (milenage_f2345(res, ck, ik, ak, NULL, opc, ki, rand)) return -1;

	FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(res, MILENAGE_RES_SIZE, "RES");
	FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ck, MILENAGE_CK_SIZE, "CK");
	FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ik, MILENAGE_IK_SIZE, "IK");
	FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ak, MILENAGE_AK_SIZE, "AK");

	/* AUTN = (SQN ^ AK) || AMF || MAC */
	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) rx_sqn[i] = autn[i] ^ ak[i];
	FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(rx_sqn, MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE, "SQN");

	if (memcmp(rx_sqn, sqn_buff, sizeof(rx_sqn)) <= 0) {
		uint8_t auts_amf[MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE] = { 0x00, 0x00 }; /* TS 33.102 v7.0.0, 6.3.3 */

		if (milenage_f2345(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ak, opc, ki, rand)) return -1;

		FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ak, sizeof(ak), "AK*");
		for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) auts[i] = sqn_buff[i] ^ ak[i];

		if (milenage_f1(NULL, auts + 6, opc, ki, rand, sqn_buff, auts_amf) < 0) return -1;
		FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(auts, 14, "AUTS");
		return -2;
	}

	amf = autn + 6;
	FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(amf, MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE, "AMF");
	if (milenage_f1(mac_a, NULL, opc, ki, rand, rx_sqn, amf) < 0) return -1;

	FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(mac_a, MILENAGE_MAC_A_SIZE, "MAC_A");

	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac_a, autn + 8, 8) != 0) {
		FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(autn + 8, 8, "Received MAC_A");
		fr_strerror_printf("MAC mismatch");
		return -1;
	}

	return 0;
}

static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_state *state,
                          uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]) {
  if (!state->last_block_valid) {
    if (!hwrand(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block))) {
      CRYPTO_sysrand(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block));
    }
    state->last_block_valid = 1;
  }

  // We overread from /dev/urandom or RDRAND by a factor of 10 and XOR to
  // whiten.
#define FIPS_OVERREAD 10
  uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * FIPS_OVERREAD];

  if (!hwrand(entropy, sizeof(entropy))) {
    CRYPTO_sysrand(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
  }

  // See FIPS 140-2, section 4.9.2. This is the “continuous random number
  // generator test” which causes the program to randomly abort. Hopefully the
  // rate of failure is small enough not to be a problem in practice.
  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(state->last_block, entropy, CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "CRNGT failed.\n");
    BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
  }

  for (size_t i = CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE; i < sizeof(entropy);
       i += CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) {
    if (CRYPTO_memcmp(entropy + i - CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE, entropy + i,
                      CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
      fprintf(stderr, "CRNGT failed.\n");
      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
    }
  }
  OPENSSL_memcpy(state->last_block,
                 entropy + sizeof(entropy) - CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE,
                 CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE);

  OPENSSL_memcpy(seed, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);

  for (size_t i = 1; i < FIPS_OVERREAD; i++) {
    for (size_t j = 0; j < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; j++) {
      seed[j] ^= entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * i + j];
    }
  }
}

int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *ssl) {
  int al, finished_len, ok;
  long message_len;
  uint8_t *p;

  message_len = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
                                             ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);

  if (!ok) {
    return message_len;
  }

  /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
  ssl3_take_mac(ssl);
  if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
    goto err;
  }

  p = ssl->init_msg;
  finished_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;

  if (finished_len != message_len) {
    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
    goto f_err;
  }

  int finished_ret =
      CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
  finished_ret = 0;
#endif
  if (finished_ret != 0) {
    al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
    goto f_err;
  }

  /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
  if (ssl->server) {
    assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
    memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
           finished_len);
    ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
  } else {
    assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
    memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
           finished_len);
    ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
  }

  return 1;

f_err:
  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
  return 0;
}

static int ecx_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
{
    const ECX_KEY *akey = a->pkey.ecx;
    const ECX_KEY *bkey = b->pkey.ecx;

    if (akey == NULL || bkey == NULL)
        return -2;

    return CRYPTO_memcmp(akey->pubkey, bkey->pubkey, KEYLEN(a)) == 0;
}

int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
               const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
  const size_t rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
  int ret = 0;
  uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
  size_t signed_msg_len, len;
  int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;

  if (rsa->meth->verify) {
    return rsa->meth->verify(hash_nid, msg, msg_len, sig, sig_len, rsa);
  }

  if (sig_len != rsa_size) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
    return 0;
  }

  if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1 && msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
    return 0;
  }

  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
  if (!buf) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &len, buf, rsa_size, sig, sig_len,
                      RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
    goto out;
  }

  if (!pkcs1_prefixed_msg(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len, &signed_msg_is_alloced,
                          hash_nid, msg, msg_len)) {
    goto out;
  }

  if (len != signed_msg_len || CRYPTO_memcmp(buf, signed_msg, len) != 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
    goto out;
  }

  ret = 1;

out:
  if (buf != NULL) {
    OPENSSL_free(buf);
  }
  if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
    OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
  }
  return ret;
}

static int aria_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                              const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
    EVP_ARIA_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_ARIA_GCM_CTX,ctx);
    int rv = -1;

    /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
    if (out != in
        || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
        return -1;
    /*
     * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
     * buffer.
     */
    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) ?
                            EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
                            EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
        goto err;
    /* Use saved AAD */
    if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
                          gctx->tls_aad_len))
        goto err;
    /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */
    in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
    out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
    len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
        /* Encrypt payload */
        if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
            goto err;
        out += len;
        /* Finally write tag */
        CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
        rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
    } else {
        /* Decrypt */
        if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
            goto err;
        /* Retrieve tag */
        CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
                          EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
        /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
        if (CRYPTO_memcmp(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), in + len,
                          EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
            OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
            goto err;
        }
        rv = len;
    }

 err:
    gctx->iv_set = 0;
    gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
    return rv;
}

bool Server::validate_hmac(const unsigned char *_hmac) {
  // S->C
  // Send "OK" if HMAC-SHA256(K, salt) validates
  bool ret = false;
  if (hmac) {
    ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, _hmac, SHA256_HASH_LEN) == 0);
    delete [] hmac;
    hmac = NULL;
  }
  return ret;
}

int SSL_SESSION_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
{
    if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version ||
	a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
	return 1;
#if defined(_WIN32)
    return memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length);
#else
    return CRYPTO_memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length);
#endif
}