本文整理汇总了C++中BN_rand_range函数的典型用法代码示例。如果您正苦于以下问题:C++ BN_rand_range函数的具体用法?C++ BN_rand_range怎么用?C++ BN_rand_range使用的例子?那么恭喜您, 这里精选的函数代码示例或许可以为您提供帮助。
在下文中一共展示了BN_rand_range函数的15个代码示例,这些例子默认根据受欢迎程度排序。您可以为喜欢或者感觉有用的代码点赞,您的评价将有助于系统推荐出更棒的C++代码示例。
示例1: compute_scalar_element
int compute_scalar_element (pwd_session_t *sess, BN_CTX *bnctx) {
BIGNUM *mask = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (((sess->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((sess->my_element = EC_POINT_new(sess->group)) == NULL) ||
((sess->my_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((mask = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
DEBUG2("server scalar allocation failed");
goto fail;
}
BN_rand_range(sess->private_value, sess->order);
BN_rand_range(mask, sess->order);
BN_add(sess->my_scalar, sess->private_value, mask);
BN_mod(sess->my_scalar, sess->my_scalar, sess->order, bnctx);
if (!EC_POINT_mul(sess->group, sess->my_element, NULL, sess->pwe, mask, bnctx)) {
DEBUG2("server element allocation failed");
goto fail;
}
if (!EC_POINT_invert(sess->group, sess->my_element, bnctx)) {
DEBUG2("server element inversion failed");
goto fail;
}
ret = 0;
fail:
BN_free(mask);
return ret;
}
示例2: genrand
// Generate each party's random numbers. xa is in [0, q), xb is in [1, q).
static void genrand(JPakeUser * user, const JPakeParameters * params)
{
BIGNUM *qm1;
// xa in [0, q)
user->xa = BN_new();
BN_rand_range(user->xa, params->q);
// q-1
qm1 = BN_new();
BN_copy(qm1, params->q);
BN_sub_word(qm1, 1);
// ... and xb in [0, q-1)
user->xb = BN_new();
BN_rand_range(user->xb, qm1);
// [1, q)
BN_add_word(user->xb, 1);
// cleanup
BN_free(qm1);
// Show
printf("x%d", user->p.base);
showbn("", user->xa);
printf("x%d", user->p.base + 1);
showbn("", user->xb);
}
示例3: dsa_sign_setup
static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
{
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM k,*kinv=NULL,*r=NULL;
int ret=0;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
{
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if (ctx_in == NULL)
{
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
}
else
ctx=ctx_in;
BN_init(&k);
if ((r=BN_new()) == NULL) goto err;
kinv=NULL;
/* Get random k */
do
if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(&k));
if ((dsa->method_mont_p == NULL) && (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P))
{
if ((dsa->method_mont_p=(char *)BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set((BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p,
dsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
}
/* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r,dsa->g,&k,dsa->p,ctx,
(BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(r,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
/* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
if ((kinv=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,&k,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
if (*kinvp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
*kinvp=kinv;
kinv=NULL;
if (*rp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*rp);
*rp=r;
ret=1;
err:
if (!ret)
{
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r);
}
if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
BN_clear_free(&k);
return(ret);
}
示例4: gost2001_keygen
int
gost2001_keygen(GOST_KEY *ec)
{
BIGNUM *order = BN_new(), *d = BN_new();
const EC_GROUP *group = GOST_KEY_get0_group(ec);
int rc = 0;
if (order == NULL || d == NULL)
goto err;
if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL) == 0)
goto err;
do {
if (BN_rand_range(d, order) == 0) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_KEYGEN,
GOST_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATOR_FAILED);
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(d));
if (GOST_KEY_set_private_key(ec, d) == 0)
goto err;
rc = gost2001_compute_public(ec);
err:
BN_free(d);
BN_free(order);
return rc;
}
示例5: PSPAKE_Message_generate
void PSPAKE_Message_generate(PSPAKE_Message *message, PSPAKE_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new();
BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new();
/* just for debugging */
static int cnt = 0;
cnt++;
/* r belongs to [0, q) */
BN_rand_range(ctx->r, ctx->q);
/* t1 = g^r mod q */
BN_mod_exp(t1, ctx->g, ctx->r, ctx->q, ctx->ctx);
/* t2 = h^secret mod q */
BN_mod_exp(t2, ctx->h, ctx->secret, ctx->q, ctx->ctx);
/* ctx->y = t1 * t2 mod q */
BN_mod_mul(ctx->y, t1, t2, ctx->q, ctx->ctx);
/* message->y = ctx->y */
message->y = BN_dup(ctx->y);
/* print the random number r generated (just for debugging) */
if (cnt == 1)
{
print_bn("alice's r", ctx->r);
}
else
{
print_bn("bob's r", ctx->r);
}
}
示例6: bn_blinding_create_param
static int bn_blinding_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx,
const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_ctx) {
int retry_counter = 32;
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(b->A, b->mod)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
int no_inverse;
if (BN_mod_inverse_ex(b->Ai, &no_inverse, b->A, b->mod, ctx) == NULL) {
/* this should almost never happen for good RSA keys */
if (no_inverse) {
if (retry_counter-- == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
return 0;
}
ERR_clear_error();
} else {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
} else {
break;
}
} while (1);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(b->A, b->A, b->e, b->mod, ctx, mont_ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
示例7: ec_key_new_ex
EC_KEY *EC_KEY_generate_key_ex(const EC_GROUP *group) {
EC_KEY *eckey = ec_key_new_ex(group);
if (!eckey) {
return NULL;
}
assert(eckey->priv_key == NULL);
eckey->priv_key = BN_new();
if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(eckey->priv_key, &eckey->group->order)) {
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(eckey->priv_key));
assert(eckey->pub_key == NULL);
eckey->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (!eckey->group->meth->mul_private(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key,
eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
return eckey;
err:
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
return NULL;
}
示例8: one
/* The secret integers s0 and s1 must be in the range 0 < s < n for
some n, and must be relatively prime to that n. We know a priori
that n is of the form 2**k * p for some small integer k and prime
p. Therefore, it suffices to choose a random integer in the range
[0, n/2), multiply by two and add one (enforcing oddness), and then
reject values which are divisible by p. */
static BIGNUM *
random_s(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *c)
{
BIGNUM h, m, *r;
BN_init(&h);
BN_init(&m);
FAILZ(r = BN_new());
FAILZ(BN_copy(&h, n));
FAILZ(BN_rshift1(&h, &h));
do {
FAILZ(BN_rand_range(r, &h));
FAILZ(BN_lshift1(r, r));
FAILZ(BN_add(r, r, BN_value_one()));
FAILZ(BN_nnmod(&m, r, p, c));
} while (BN_is_zero(&m));
BN_clear(&h);
BN_clear(&m);
return r;
fail:
BN_clear(&h);
BN_clear(&m);
if (r) BN_clear_free(r);
return 0;
}
示例9: generate_zkp
/*
* Prove knowledge of x
* Note that p->gx has already been calculated
*/
static void generate_zkp(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *x,
const BIGNUM *zkpg, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
BIGNUM *h = BN_new();
BIGNUM *t = BN_new();
/*
* r in [0,q)
* XXX: Java chooses r in [0, 2^160) - i.e. distribution not uniform
*/
BN_rand_range(r, ctx->p.q);
/* g^r */
BN_mod_exp(p->zkpx.gr, zkpg, r, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
/* h=hash... */
zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.name);
/* b = r - x*h */
BN_mod_mul(t, x, h, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
BN_mod_sub(p->zkpx.b, r, t, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
/* cleanup */
BN_free(t);
BN_free(h);
BN_free(r);
}
示例10: gost2001_keygen
/*
*
* Generates GOST R 34.10-2001 keypair
*
*
*/
int gost2001_keygen(EC_KEY *ec)
{
BIGNUM *order = BN_new(), *d = BN_new();
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
if (!group || !EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL)) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_KEYGEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(order);
return 0;
}
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(d, order)) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_KEYGEN,
GOST_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATOR_FAILED);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(order);
return 0;
}
}
while (BN_is_zero(d));
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(ec, d)) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_KEYGEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(order);
return 0;
}
BN_free(d);
BN_free(order);
return gost2001_compute_public(ec);
}
示例11: EC_KEY_generate_key
int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL, *order = NULL;
EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
if (!eckey || !eckey->group) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
priv_key = BN_new();
if (priv_key == NULL)
goto err;
} else
priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(eckey->group, order, ctx))
goto err;
do
if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto err;
} else
pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
goto err;
eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
ok = 1;
err:
if (order)
BN_free(order);
if (pub_key != NULL && eckey->pub_key == NULL)
EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
if (priv_key != NULL && eckey->priv_key == NULL)
BN_free(priv_key);
if (ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return (ok);
}
示例12: BN_new
void Person::set_keys() {
a = BN_new();
BN_rand_range(a, p);
A = BN_new();
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
BN_mod_exp(A, g, a, p, ctx);
if (ctx) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
示例13: dsa_builtin_keygen
static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa)
{
int ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
if ((priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
} else
priv_key = dsa->priv_key;
do
if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dsa->q))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
if (dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
if ((pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
} else
pub_key = dsa->pub_key;
{
BIGNUM *local_prk = NULL;
BIGNUM *prk;
if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
local_prk = prk = BN_new();
if (!local_prk)
goto err;
BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else
prk = priv_key;
if (!BN_mod_exp(pub_key, dsa->g, prk, dsa->p, ctx)) {
BN_free(local_prk);
goto err;
}
BN_free(local_prk);
}
dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
ok = 1;
err:
if (pub_key != dsa->pub_key)
BN_free(pub_key);
if (priv_key != dsa->priv_key)
BN_free(priv_key);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return (ok);
}
示例14: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name
CSignerECDSA::CSignerECDSA(const uint8_t PrivData[32], unsigned char Signature[65])
{
order.setuint256(g_Order);
EC_KEY* pkey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1);
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey);
CBigNum privkey;
BN_bin2bn(PrivData, 32, &privkey);
EC_KEY_regenerate_key(pkey, &privkey);
EC_POINT *tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
EC_POINT *test_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
CBigNum r, X, Y;
bool which = false;
do
{
// get random k
do
BN_rand_range(&kinv, &order);
while (!kinv);
/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
* so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
* bit-length. */
kinv += order;
if (BN_num_bits(&kinv) <= 256)
kinv += order;
// compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k
EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, &kinv, NULL, NULL, ctx);
EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, tmp_point, &X, &Y, ctx);
EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, test_point, &X, 0, ctx);
which = !!EC_POINT_cmp(group, tmp_point, test_point, ctx);
BN_nnmod(&r, &X, &order, ctx);
}
while (!r);
// compute the inverse of k
BN_mod_inverse(&kinv, &kinv, &order, ctx);
BN_mod_mul(&pmr, &privkey, &r, &order, ctx);
BN_mod_mul(&prk, &pmr, &kinv, &order, ctx);
memset(Signature, 0, 65);
int nBitsR = BN_num_bits(&r);
BN_bn2bin(&r, &Signature[33-(nBitsR+7)/8]);
Signature[0] = 27 + which;
EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
EC_POINT_free(test_point);
EC_KEY_free(pkey);
}
示例15: genrand
/* Generate each party's random numbers. xa is in [0, q), xb is in [1, q). */
static void genrand(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *qm1;
/* xa in [0, q) */
BN_rand_range(ctx->xa, ctx->p.q);
/* q-1 */
qm1 = BN_new();
BN_copy(qm1, ctx->p.q);
BN_sub_word(qm1, 1);
/* ... and xb in [0, q-1) */
BN_rand_range(ctx->xb, qm1);
/* [1, q) */
BN_add_word(ctx->xb, 1);
/* cleanup */
BN_free(qm1);
}