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C++ BN_nnmod函数代码示例

本文整理汇总了C++中BN_nnmod函数的典型用法代码示例。如果您正苦于以下问题:C++ BN_nnmod函数的具体用法?C++ BN_nnmod怎么用?C++ BN_nnmod使用的例子?那么恭喜您, 这里精选的函数代码示例或许可以为您提供帮助。


在下文中一共展示了BN_nnmod函数的15个代码示例,这些例子默认根据受欢迎程度排序。您可以为喜欢或者感觉有用的代码点赞,您的评价将有助于系统推荐出更棒的C++代码示例。

示例1: ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp

int ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
        EC_POINT *point,
        const BIGNUM *x,
        const BIGNUM *y,
        const BIGNUM *z,
        BN_CTX *ctx)
{
    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
    int ret = 0;

    if (ctx == NULL) {
        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
        if (ctx == NULL)
            return 0;
    }

    if (x != NULL) {
        if (!BN_nnmod(&point->X, x, &group->field, ctx))
            goto err;
        if (group->meth->field_encode) {
            if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &point->X, &point->X, ctx))
                goto err;
        }
    }

    if (y != NULL) {
        if (!BN_nnmod(&point->Y, y, &group->field, ctx))
            goto err;
        if (group->meth->field_encode) {
            if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &point->Y, &point->Y, ctx))
                goto err;
        }
    }

    if (z != NULL) {
        int Z_is_one;

        if (!BN_nnmod(&point->Z, z, &group->field, ctx))
            goto err;
        Z_is_one = BN_is_one(&point->Z);
        if (group->meth->field_encode) {
            if (Z_is_one && (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)) {
                if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, &point->Z, ctx))
                    goto err;
            } else {
                if (!group->
                        meth->field_encode(group, &point->Z, &point->Z, ctx))
                    goto err;
            }
        }
        point->Z_is_one = Z_is_one;
    }

    ret = 1;

err:
    if (new_ctx != NULL)
        BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
    return ret;
}
开发者ID:GrayKing,项目名称:Leakfix-on-OpenSSL,代码行数:60,代码来源:ecp_smpl.c

示例2: ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve

int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group,
                                  const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
                                  const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
    int ret = 0;
    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
    BIGNUM *tmp_a;

    /* p must be a prime > 3 */
    if (BN_num_bits(p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd(p)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
        return 0;
    }

    if (ctx == NULL) {
        ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
        if (ctx == NULL)
            return 0;
    }

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    tmp_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (tmp_a == NULL)
        goto err;

    /* group->field */
    if (!BN_copy(&group->field, p))
        goto err;
    BN_set_negative(&group->field, 0);

    /* group->a */
    if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_a, a, p, ctx))
        goto err;
    if (group->meth->field_encode) {
        if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->a, tmp_a, ctx))
            goto err;
    } else if (!BN_copy(&group->a, tmp_a))
        goto err;

    /* group->b */
    if (!BN_nnmod(&group->b, b, p, ctx))
        goto err;
    if (group->meth->field_encode)
        if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->b, &group->b, ctx))
            goto err;

    /* group->a_is_minus3 */
    if (!BN_add_word(tmp_a, 3))
        goto err;
    group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp(tmp_a, &group->field));

    ret = 1;

err:
    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
    if (new_ctx != NULL)
        BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
    return ret;
}
开发者ID:GrayKing,项目名称:Leakfix-on-OpenSSL,代码行数:59,代码来源:ecp_smpl.c

示例3: BN_mod_mul

/* slow but works */
int
BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
    BN_CTX *ctx)
{
	BIGNUM *t;
	int ret = 0;

	bn_check_top(a);
	bn_check_top(b);
	bn_check_top(m);

	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
	if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
		goto err;
	if (a == b) {
		if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx))
			goto err;
	} else {
		if (!BN_mul(t, a,b, ctx))
			goto err;
	}
	if (!BN_nnmod(r, t,m, ctx))
		goto err;
	bn_check_top(r);
	ret = 1;

err:
	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
	return (ret);
}
开发者ID:Basskrapfen,项目名称:openbsd,代码行数:31,代码来源:bn_mod.c

示例4: BN_mod_sub

int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
               BN_CTX *ctx)
{
    if (!BN_sub(r, a, b))
        return 0;
    return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
}
开发者ID:1234-,项目名称:openssl,代码行数:7,代码来源:bn_mod.c

示例5: BN_mod_lshift1

int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
    if (!BN_lshift1(r, a))
        return 0;
    bn_check_top(r);
    return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
}
开发者ID:1234-,项目名称:openssl,代码行数:7,代码来源:bn_mod.c

示例6: one

/* The secret integers s0 and s1 must be in the range 0 < s < n for
   some n, and must be relatively prime to that n.  We know a priori
   that n is of the form 2**k * p for some small integer k and prime
   p.  Therefore, it suffices to choose a random integer in the range
   [0, n/2), multiply by two and add one (enforcing oddness), and then
   reject values which are divisible by p.  */
static BIGNUM *
random_s(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *c)
{
  BIGNUM h, m, *r;

  BN_init(&h);
  BN_init(&m);
  FAILZ(r = BN_new());
  FAILZ(BN_copy(&h, n));
  FAILZ(BN_rshift1(&h, &h));

  do {
    FAILZ(BN_rand_range(r, &h));
    FAILZ(BN_lshift1(r, r));
    FAILZ(BN_add(r, r, BN_value_one()));
    FAILZ(BN_nnmod(&m, r, p, c));
  } while (BN_is_zero(&m));

  BN_clear(&h);
  BN_clear(&m);
  return r;

 fail:
  BN_clear(&h);
  BN_clear(&m);
  if (r) BN_clear_free(r);
  return 0;
}
开发者ID:zackw,项目名称:moeller-ref,代码行数:34,代码来源:mref-o.c

示例7: BN_CTX_new

bool CECKey::TweakSecret(unsigned char vchSecretOut[32], const unsigned char vchSecretIn[32], const unsigned char vchTweak[32])
{
    bool ret = true;
    BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    BIGNUM *bnSecret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    BIGNUM *bnTweak = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    BIGNUM *bnOrder = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    EC_GROUP *group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1);
    EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bnOrder, ctx); // what a grossly inefficient way to get the (constant) group order...
    BN_bin2bn(vchTweak, 32, bnTweak);
    if (BN_cmp(bnTweak, bnOrder) >= 0)
        ret = false; // extremely unlikely
    BN_bin2bn(vchSecretIn, 32, bnSecret);
    BN_add(bnSecret, bnSecret, bnTweak);
    BN_nnmod(bnSecret, bnSecret, bnOrder, ctx);
    if (BN_is_zero(bnSecret))
        ret = false; // ridiculously unlikely
    int nBits = BN_num_bits(bnSecret);
    memset(vchSecretOut, 0, 32);
    BN_bn2bin(bnSecret, &vchSecretOut[32-(nBits+7)/8]);
    EC_GROUP_free(group);
    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    return ret;
}
开发者ID:flirtcoin,项目名称:flirtcoin,代码行数:26,代码来源:ecwrapper.cpp

示例8: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name

CSignerECDSA::CSignerECDSA(const uint8_t PrivData[32], unsigned char Signature[65])
{
    order.setuint256(g_Order);

    EC_KEY* pkey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1);
    const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey);

    CBigNum privkey;
    BN_bin2bn(PrivData, 32, &privkey);
    EC_KEY_regenerate_key(pkey, &privkey);

    EC_POINT *tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
    EC_POINT *test_point = EC_POINT_new(group);

    CBigNum r, X, Y;
    bool which = false;
    do
    {
        // get random k
        do
            BN_rand_range(&kinv, &order);
        while (!kinv);

        /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
         * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
         * bit-length. */
        kinv += order;
        if (BN_num_bits(&kinv) <= 256)
            kinv += order;

        // compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k
        EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, &kinv, NULL, NULL, ctx);
        EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, tmp_point, &X, &Y, ctx);
        EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, test_point, &X, 0, ctx);
        which = !!EC_POINT_cmp(group, tmp_point, test_point, ctx);
        BN_nnmod(&r, &X, &order, ctx);
    }
    while (!r);

    // compute the inverse of k
    BN_mod_inverse(&kinv, &kinv, &order, ctx);

    BN_mod_mul(&pmr, &privkey, &r, &order, ctx);

    BN_mod_mul(&prk, &pmr, &kinv, &order, ctx);

    memset(Signature, 0, 65);
    int nBitsR = BN_num_bits(&r);
    BN_bn2bin(&r, &Signature[33-(nBitsR+7)/8]);
    Signature[0] = 27 + which;

    EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
    EC_POINT_free(test_point);
    EC_KEY_free(pkey);
}
开发者ID:a-russo,项目名称:spreadcoin,代码行数:55,代码来源:ecdsa.cpp

示例9: BN_mod_lshift

int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
	{
	BIGNUM *abs_m = NULL;
	int ret;

	if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) return 0;

	if (m->neg)
		{
		abs_m = BN_dup(m);
		if (abs_m == NULL) return 0;
		abs_m->neg = 0;
		}

	ret = BN_mod_lshift_quick(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m : m));

	if (abs_m)
		BN_free(abs_m);
	return ret;
	}
开发者ID:12019,项目名称:svn.gov.pt,代码行数:20,代码来源:bn_mod.c

示例10: SRP_Verify_B_mod_N

int SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(BIGNUM *B, BIGNUM *N)
{
    BIGNUM *r;
    BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
    int ret = 0;

    if (B == NULL || N == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
        return 0;

    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
        goto err;
    /* Checks if B % N == 0 */
    if (!BN_nnmod(r, B, N, bn_ctx))
        goto err;
    ret = !BN_is_zero(r);
 err:
    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
    BN_free(r);
    return ret;
}
开发者ID:AndreV84,项目名称:openssl,代码行数:20,代码来源:srp_lib.c

示例11: test_mont

int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
	{
	BIGNUM a,b,c,d,A,B;
	BIGNUM n;
	int i;
	BN_MONT_CTX *mont;

	BN_init(&a);
	BN_init(&b);
	BN_init(&c);
	BN_init(&d);
	BN_init(&A);
	BN_init(&B);
	BN_init(&n);

	mont=BN_MONT_CTX_new();

	BN_bntest_rand(&a,100,0,0); /**/
	BN_bntest_rand(&b,100,0,0); /**/
	for (i=0; i<num2; i++)
		{
		int bits = (200*(i+1))/num2;

		if (bits == 0)
			continue;
		BN_bntest_rand(&n,bits,0,1);
		BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont,&n,ctx);

		BN_nnmod(&a,&a,&n,ctx);
		BN_nnmod(&b,&b,&n,ctx);

		BN_to_montgomery(&A,&a,mont,ctx);
		BN_to_montgomery(&B,&b,mont,ctx);

		BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&c,&A,&B,mont,ctx);/**/
		BN_from_montgomery(&A,&c,mont,ctx);/**/
		if (bp != NULL)
			{
			if (!results)
				{
#ifdef undef
fprintf(stderr,"%d * %d %% %d\n",
BN_num_bits(&a),
BN_num_bits(&b),
BN_num_bits(mont->N));
#endif
				BN_print(bp,&a);
				BIO_puts(bp," * ");
				BN_print(bp,&b);
				BIO_puts(bp," % ");
				BN_print(bp,&(mont->N));
				BIO_puts(bp," - ");
				}
			BN_print(bp,&A);
			BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
			}
		BN_mod_mul(&d,&a,&b,&n,ctx);
		BN_sub(&d,&d,&A);
		if(!BN_is_zero(&d))
		    {
		    fprintf(stderr,"Montgomery multiplication test failed!\n");
		    return 0;
		    }
		}
	BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
	BN_free(&a);
	BN_free(&b);
	BN_free(&c);
	BN_free(&d);
	BN_free(&A);
	BN_free(&B);
	BN_free(&n);
	return(1);
	}
开发者ID:froggatt,项目名称:edimax-br-6528n,代码行数:74,代码来源:bntest.c

示例12: ecdsa_sign_setup

static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
                            BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
                            const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen)
{
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
    BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL;
    EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
    const EC_GROUP *group;
    int ret = 0;

    if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
        return 0;
    }

    if (ctx_in == NULL) {
        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            return 0;
        }
    } else
        ctx = ctx_in;

    k = BN_new();               /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
    r = BN_new();               /* this value is later returned in *rp */
    order = BN_new();
    X = BN_new();
    if (k == NULL || r == NULL || order == NULL || X == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto err;
    }
    if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
        ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }

    do {
        /* get random k */
        do
            if (dgst != NULL) {
                if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce
                    (k, order, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey), dgst, dlen,
                     ctx)) {
                    ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,
                             EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
                    goto err;
                }
            } else {
                if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) {
                    ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,
                             EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
                    goto err;
                }
            }
        while (BN_is_zero(k));

        /*
         * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
         * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
         */

        if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
            goto err;
        if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
            if (!BN_add(k, k, order))
                goto err;

        /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
        if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
            NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
            if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp
                (group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
                ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                goto err;
            }
        }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
        else {                  /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */

            if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group,
                                                      tmp_point, X, NULL,
                                                      ctx)) {
                ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                goto err;
            }
        }
#endif
        if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) {
            ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    }
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:AndreV84,项目名称:openssl,代码行数:101,代码来源:ecdsa_ossl.c

示例13: BN_kronecker


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
    /*
     * Kronecker symbol, imlemented according to Henri Cohen,
     * "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory"
     * (algorithm 1.4.10).
     */

    /* Cohen's step 1: */

    if (BN_is_zero (B))
    {
        ret = BN_abs_is_word (A, 1);
        goto end;
    }

    /* Cohen's step 2: */

    if (!BN_is_odd (A) && !BN_is_odd (B))
    {
        ret = 0;
        goto end;
    }

    /* now  B  is non-zero */
    i = 0;
    while (!BN_is_bit_set (B, i))
        i++;
    err = !BN_rshift (B, B, i);
    if (err)
        goto end;
    if (i & 1)
    {
        /* i is odd */
        /* (thus  B  was even, thus  A  must be odd!)  */

        /* set 'ret' to $(-1)^{(A^2-1)/8}$ */
        ret = tab[BN_lsw (A) & 7];
    }
    else
    {
        /* i is even */
        ret = 1;
    }

    if (B->neg)
    {
        B->neg = 0;
        if (A->neg)
            ret = -ret;
    }

    /* now  B  is positive and odd, so what remains to be done is
     * to compute the Jacobi symbol  (A/B)  and multiply it by 'ret' */

    while (1)
    {
        /* Cohen's step 3: */

        /*  B  is positive and odd */

        if (BN_is_zero (A))
        {
            ret = BN_is_one (B) ? ret : 0;
            goto end;
        }

        /* now  A  is non-zero */
        i = 0;
        while (!BN_is_bit_set (A, i))
            i++;
        err = !BN_rshift (A, A, i);
        if (err)
            goto end;
        if (i & 1)
        {
            /* i is odd */
            /* multiply 'ret' by  $(-1)^{(B^2-1)/8}$ */
            ret = ret * tab[BN_lsw (B) & 7];
        }

        /* Cohen's step 4: */
        /* multiply 'ret' by  $(-1)^{(A-1)(B-1)/4}$ */
        if ((A->neg ? ~BN_lsw (A) : BN_lsw (A)) & BN_lsw (B) & 2)
            ret = -ret;

        /* (A, B) := (B mod |A|, |A|) */
        err = !BN_nnmod (B, B, A, ctx);
        if (err)
            goto end;
        tmp = A;
        A = B;
        B = tmp;
        tmp->neg = 0;
    }
  end:
    BN_CTX_end (ctx);
    if (err)
        return -2;
    else
        return ret;
}
开发者ID:274914765,项目名称:C,代码行数:101,代码来源:bn_kron.c

示例14: ecdsa_sign_setup

static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
                            BIGNUM **rp)
{
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
    BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL;
    EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
    const EC_GROUP *group;
    int ret = 0;
    int order_bits;

    if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
        ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
        return 0;
    }

    if (ctx_in == NULL) {
        if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
            ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            return 0;
        }
    } else
        ctx = ctx_in;

    k = BN_new();               /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
    r = BN_new();               /* this value is later returned in *rp */
    order = BN_new();
    X = BN_new();
    if (!k || !r || !order || !X) {
        ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto err;
    }
    if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
        ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }
    if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
        ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
        goto err;
    }

    /* Preallocate space */
    order_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
    if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits)
        || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits)
        || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits))
        goto err;

    do {
        /* get random k */
        do
            if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) {
                ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,
                         ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
                goto err;
            }
        while (BN_is_zero(k)) ;

        /*
         * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
         * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
         *
         * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
         * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
         * one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the code
         * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere.
         *
         * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
         * conditional copy.
         */
        if (!BN_add(r, k, order)
            || !BN_add(X, r, order)
            || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X))
            goto err;

        /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
            ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
        if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) ==
            NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
            if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp
                (group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
                ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                goto err;
            }
        }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
        else {                  /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */

            if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group,
                                                      tmp_point, X, NULL,
                                                      ctx)) {
                ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                goto err;
            }
        }
#endif
        if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) {
            ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:pavel-pimenov,项目名称:flylinkdc-r5xx,代码行数:101,代码来源:ecs_ossl.c

示例15: ecdsa_sign_setup

static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
		BIGNUM **rp)
{
	BN_CTX   *ctx = NULL;
	BIGNUM	 *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL;
	EC_POINT *tmp_point=NULL;
	const EC_GROUP *group;
	int 	 ret = 0;

	if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL)
	{
		ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
		return 0;
	}

	if (ctx_in == NULL) 
	{
		if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
		{
			ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
			return 0;
		}
	}
	else
		ctx = ctx_in;

	k     = BN_new();	/* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
	r     = BN_new();	/* this value is later returned in *rp    */
	order = BN_new();
	X     = BN_new();
	if (!k || !r || !order || !X)
	{
		ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto err;
	}
	if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
	{
		ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
		goto err;
	}
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx))
	{
		ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
		goto err;
	}

#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
	if (!fips_check_ec_prng(eckey))
		goto err;
#endif
	
	do
	{
		/* get random k */	
		do
			if (!BN_rand_range(k, order))
			{
				ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,
				 ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);	
				goto err;
			}
		while (BN_is_zero(k));

#ifdef ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME
		/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
		 * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
		 * bit-length. */

		if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
		if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
			if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
#endif /* def(ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME) */

		/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))
		{
			ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
			goto err;
		}
		if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
		{
			if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group,
				tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx))
			{
				ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
				goto err;
			}
		}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
		else /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
		{
			if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group,
				tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx))
			{
				ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
				goto err;
			}
		}
#endif
		if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx))
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:izick,项目名称:eme,代码行数:101,代码来源:ecs_ossl.c


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