本文整理汇总了C++中BN_is_odd函数的典型用法代码示例。如果您正苦于以下问题：C++ BN_is_odd函数的具体用法？C++ BN_is_odd怎么用？C++ BN_is_odd使用的例子？那么恭喜您, 这里精选的函数代码示例或许可以为您提供帮助。
在下文中一共展示了BN_is_odd函数的15个代码示例，这些例子默认根据受欢迎程度排序。您可以为喜欢或者感觉有用的代码点赞，您的评价将有助于系统推荐出更棒的C++代码示例。
示例1: selfTestGeneralOps1
CHECK_RETVAL_BOOL \
static BOOLEAN selfTestGeneralOps1( void )
{
BIGNUM a;
/* Simple tests that don't need the support of higher-level routines
like importBignum() */
BN_init( &a );
if( !BN_zero( &a ) )
return( FALSE );
if( !BN_is_zero( &a ) || BN_is_one( &a ) )
return( FALSE );
if( !BN_is_word( &a, 0 ) || BN_is_word( &a, 1 ) )
return( FALSE );
if( BN_is_odd( &a ) )
return( FALSE );
if( BN_get_word( &a ) != 0 )
return( FALSE );
if( !BN_one( &a ) )
return( FALSE );
if( BN_is_zero( &a ) || !BN_is_one( &a ) )
return( FALSE );
if( BN_is_word( &a, 0 ) || !BN_is_word( &a, 1 ) )
return( FALSE );
if( !BN_is_odd( &a ) )
return( FALSE );
if( BN_num_bytes( &a ) != 1 )
return( FALSE );
if( BN_get_word( &a ) != 1 )
return( FALSE );
BN_clear( &a );
return( TRUE );
}示例2: bn_check_top
static BIGNUM *euclid(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b)
{
BIGNUM *t;
int shifts=0;
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(b);
/* 0 <= b <= a */
while (!BN_is_zero(b))
{
/* 0 < b <= a */
if (BN_is_odd(a))
{
if (BN_is_odd(b))
{
if (!BN_sub(a,a,b)) goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(a,a)) goto err;
if (BN_cmp(a,b) < 0)
{ t=a; a=b; b=t; }
}
else /* a odd - b even */
{
if (!BN_rshift1(b,b)) goto err;
if (BN_cmp(a,b) < 0)
{ t=a; a=b; b=t; }
}
}
else /* a is even */
{
if (BN_is_odd(b))
{
if (!BN_rshift1(a,a)) goto err;
if (BN_cmp(a,b) < 0)
{ t=a; a=b; b=t; }
}
else /* a even - b even */
{
if (!BN_rshift1(a,a)) goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(b,b)) goto err;
shifts++;
}
}
/* 0 <= b <= a */
}
if (shifts)
{
if (!BN_lshift(a,a,shifts)) goto err;
}
bn_check_top(a);
return(a);
err:
return(NULL);
}示例3: rsa_public_encrypt
void
rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
{
u_char *inbuf, *outbuf;
int len, ilen, olen;
if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() exponent too small or not odd");
olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
outbuf = xmalloc(olen);
ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
inbuf = xmalloc(ilen);
BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() failed");
if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL)
fatal("rsa_public_encrypt: BN_bin2bn failed");
explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen);
explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen);
free(outbuf);
free(inbuf);
}示例4: rsa_public_encrypt
void
rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
{
u_char *inbuf, *outbuf;
int len, ilen, olen;
if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
errx(1, "rsa_public_encrypt() exponent too small or not odd");
olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
outbuf = (u_char*)malloc(olen);
ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
inbuf = (u_char*)malloc(ilen);
if (outbuf == NULL || inbuf == NULL)
err(1, "malloc");
BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
errx(1, "rsa_public_encrypt() failed");
BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out);
memset(outbuf, 0, olen);
memset(inbuf, 0, ilen);
free(outbuf);
free(inbuf);
}示例5: LoadPublicKey
RSA* LoadPublicKey(const char* filename)
{
unsigned long err;
FILE* fp;
RSA* key;
static char *passphrase = "Cfengine passphrase";
fp = fopen(filename, "r");
if (fp == NULL)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Cannot open file '%s'. (fopen: %s)", filename, GetErrorStr());
return NULL;
};
if ((key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, passphrase)) == NULL)
{
err = ERR_get_error();
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Error reading public key. (PEM_read_RSAPublicKey: %s)",
ERR_reason_error_string(err));
fclose(fp);
return NULL;
};
fclose(fp);
if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "RSA Exponent in key '%s' too small or not odd. (BN_num_bits: %s)",
filename, GetErrorStr());
return NULL;
};
return key;
}示例6: ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve
int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group,
const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp_a;
/* p must be a prime > 3 */
if (BN_num_bits(p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd(p)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
return 0;
}
if (ctx == NULL) {
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
tmp_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp_a == NULL)
goto err;
/* group->field */
if (!BN_copy(&group->field, p))
goto err;
BN_set_negative(&group->field, 0);
/* group->a */
if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_a, a, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (group->meth->field_encode) {
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->a, tmp_a, ctx))
goto err;
} else if (!BN_copy(&group->a, tmp_a))
goto err;
/* group->b */
if (!BN_nnmod(&group->b, b, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (group->meth->field_encode)
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->b, &group->b, ctx))
goto err;
/* group->a_is_minus3 */
if (!BN_add_word(tmp_a, 3))
goto err;
group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp(tmp_a, &group->field));
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
return ret;
}示例7: BN_exp
int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) {
int i, bits, ret = 0;
BIGNUM *v, *rr;
if ((p->flags & BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
/* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if (r == a || r == p) {
rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
} else {
rr = r;
}
v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (rr == NULL || v == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_copy(v, a) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (BN_is_odd(p)) {
if (BN_copy(rr, a) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
} else {
if (!BN_one(rr)) {
goto err;
}
}
for (i = 1; i < bits; i++) {
if (!BN_sqr(v, v, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_bit_set(p, i)) {
if (!BN_mul(rr, rr, v, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
}
}
if (r != rr && !BN_copy(r, rr)) {
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}示例8: BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex
int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx,
int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb) {
if (BN_cmp(a, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
return 0;
}
/* first look for small factors */
if (!BN_is_odd(a)) {
/* a is even => a is prime if and only if a == 2 */
return BN_is_word(a, 2);
}
/* Enhanced Miller-Rabin does not work for three. */
if (BN_is_word(a, 3)) {
return 1;
}
if (do_trial_division) {
for (int i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(a, primes[i]);
if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1) {
return -1;
}
if (mod == 0) {
return BN_is_word(a, primes[i]);
}
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1)) {
return -1;
}
}
int ret = -1;
BN_CTX *ctx_allocated = NULL;
if (ctx == NULL) {
ctx_allocated = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx_allocated == NULL) {
return -1;
}
ctx = ctx_allocated;
}
enum bn_primality_result_t result;
if (!BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test(&result, a, checks, ctx, cb)) {
goto err;
}
ret = (result == bn_probably_prime);
err:
BN_CTX_free(ctx_allocated);
return ret;
}示例9: BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex
/* See FIPS 186-4 C.3.1 Miller Rabin Probabilistic Primality Test. */
int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx_passed,
int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
int i, status, ret = -1;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
/* w must be bigger than 1 */
if (BN_cmp(w, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
return 0;
/* w must be odd */
if (BN_is_odd(w)) {
/* Take care of the really small prime 3 */
if (BN_is_word(w, 3))
return 1;
} else {
/* 2 is the only even prime */
return BN_is_word(w, 2);
}
/* first look for small factors */
if (do_trial_division) {
for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(w, primes[i]);
if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1)
return -1;
if (mod == 0)
return BN_is_word(w, primes[i]);
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1))
return -1;
}
if (ctx_passed != NULL)
ctx = ctx_passed;
else if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
ret = bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(w, checks, ctx, cb, 0, &status);
if (!ret)
goto err;
ret = (status == BN_PRIMETEST_PROBABLY_PRIME);
err:
if (ctx_passed == NULL)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}示例10: rsa_public_encrypt
int
rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
{
u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL;
int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
if ((inbuf = malloc(ilen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
if (outbuf != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen);
free(outbuf);
}
if (inbuf != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen);
free(inbuf);
}
return r;
}示例11: bn_x931_derive_pi
static int bn_x931_derive_pi(BIGNUM *pi, const BIGNUM *Xpi, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_GENCB *cb)
{
int i = 0;
if (!BN_copy(pi, Xpi))
return 0;
if (!BN_is_odd(pi) && !BN_add_word(pi, 1))
return 0;
for (;;) {
i++;
BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i);
/* NB 27 MR is specificed in X9.31 */
if (BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(pi, 27, ctx, 1, cb))
break;
if (!BN_add_word(pi, 2))
return 0;
}
BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, i);
return 1;
}示例12: EC_GROUP_set_generator
int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor)
{
if (generator == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if (group->generator == NULL) {
group->generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (group->generator == NULL)
return 0;
}
if (!EC_POINT_copy(group->generator, generator))
return 0;
if (order != NULL) {
if (!BN_copy(group->order, order))
return 0;
} else
BN_zero(group->order);
if (cofactor != NULL) {
if (!BN_copy(group->cofactor, cofactor))
return 0;
} else
BN_zero(group->cofactor);
/*
* Some groups have an order with
* factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
* |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case.
*/
if (BN_is_odd(group->order)) {
return ec_precompute_mont_data(group);
}
BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
group->mont_data = NULL;
return 1;
}示例13: RSA_new
static RSA *parse_public_key(CBS *cbs, int buggy) {
RSA *ret = RSA_new();
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
CBS child;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!parse_integer_buggy(&child, &ret->n, buggy) ||
!parse_integer(&child, &ret->e) ||
CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
RSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
if (!BN_is_odd(ret->e) ||
BN_num_bits(ret->e) < 2) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
RSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}示例14: ec_GFp_simple_oct2point
static int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
const uint8_t *buf, size_t len,
BN_CTX *ctx) {
point_conversion_form_t form;
int y_bit;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *x, *y;
size_t field_len, enc_len;
int ret = 0;
if (len == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ec_GFp_simple_oct2point, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
form = buf[0];
y_bit = form & 1;
form = form & ~1U;
if ((form != 0) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) &&
(form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) &&
(form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ec_GFp_simple_oct2point, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
if ((form == 0 || form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && y_bit) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ec_GFp_simple_oct2point, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
if (form == 0) {
if (len != 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ec_GFp_simple_oct2point, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, point);
}
field_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
enc_len =
(form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len;
if (len != enc_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ec_GFp_simple_oct2point, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
if (ctx == NULL) {
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (y == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1, field_len, x))
goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(x, &group->field) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ec_GFp_simple_oct2point, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
goto err;
}
if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx))
goto err;
} else {
if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1 + field_len, field_len, y))
goto err;
if (BN_ucmp(y, &group->field) >= 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ec_GFp_simple_oct2point, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
goto err;
}
if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) {
if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(y)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ec_GFp_simple_oct2point, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
goto err;
}
}
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx))
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) /* test required by X9.62 */
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ec_GFp_simple_oct2point, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
return ret;
}示例15: pkey_rsa_ctrl
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
return 0;
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
if (!(ctx->operation &
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
goto bad_pad;
if (!rctx->md)
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
} else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
goto bad_pad;
}
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
goto bad_pad;
if (!rctx->md)
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
}
rctx->pad_mode = p1;
return 1;
}
bad_pad:
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
*(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
return -2;
}
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
*(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
} else {
if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
return -2;
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
&& ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
return -2;
}
if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
&& rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(rctx->md))
|| (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
}
rctx->saltlen = p1;
}
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
if (p1 < 512) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
return -2;
}
rctx->nbits = p1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return -2;
}
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
}
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
else
rctx->md = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
return 0;
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_type(p2))
return 1;
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
//.........这里部分代码省略.........