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C++ BN_cmp函数代码示例

本文整理汇总了C++中BN_cmp函数的典型用法代码示例。如果您正苦于以下问题:C++ BN_cmp函数的具体用法?C++ BN_cmp怎么用?C++ BN_cmp使用的例子?那么恭喜您, 这里精选的函数代码示例或许可以为您提供帮助。


在下文中一共展示了BN_cmp函数的15个代码示例,这些例子默认根据受欢迎程度排序。您可以为喜欢或者感觉有用的代码点赞,您的评价将有助于系统推荐出更棒的C++代码示例。

示例1: void

RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value,
	     void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg)
	{
	RSA *rsa=NULL;
	BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
	int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
	unsigned i;
	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;

	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
	ctx2=BN_CTX_new();
	if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err;
	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
	r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	if (r3 == NULL) goto err;

	bitsp=(bits+1)/2;
	bitsq=bits-bitsp;
	rsa=RSA_new();
	if (rsa == NULL) goto err;

	/* set e */ 
	rsa->e=BN_new();
	if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err;

#if 1
	/* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG,
	 * unsigned long can be larger */
	for (i=0; i<sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++)
		{
		if (e_value & (((unsigned long)1)<<i))
			BN_set_bit(rsa->e,i);
		}
#else
	if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err;
#endif

	/* generate p and q */
	for (;;)
		{
		rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
		if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err;
		if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
		if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
		if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
		if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
		BN_free(rsa->p);
		}
	if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg);
	for (;;)
		{
		rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
		if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err;
		if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
		if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
		if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0))
			break;
		if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
		BN_free(rsa->q);
		}
	if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg);
	if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
		{
		tmp=rsa->p;
		rsa->p=rsa->q;
		rsa->q=tmp;
		}

	/* calculate n */
	rsa->n=BN_new();
	if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err;
	if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;

	/* calculate d */
	if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;	/* p-1 */
	if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;	/* q-1 */
	if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err;	/* (p-1)(q-1) */

/* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */
/*	for (;;)
		{
		if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
		if (BN_is_one(r3)) break;

		if (1)
			{
			if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err;
			continue;
			}
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
		goto err;
		}
*/
	rsa->d=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->e,r0,ctx2);	/* d */
	if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err;

//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:unofficial-opensource-apple,项目名称:Security,代码行数:101,代码来源:rsa_gen.c

示例2: ec_GFp_simple_cmp

int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
                      const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
  /* return values:
   *  -1   error
   *   0   equal (in affine coordinates)
   *   1   not equal
   */

  int (*field_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
                   BN_CTX *);
  int (*field_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
  BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
  BIGNUM *tmp1, *tmp2, *Za23, *Zb23;
  const BIGNUM *tmp1_, *tmp2_;
  int ret = -1;

  if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) {
    return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1;
  }

  if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) {
    return 1;
  }

  int a_Z_is_one = BN_cmp(&a->Z, &group->one) == 0;
  int b_Z_is_one = BN_cmp(&b->Z, &group->one) == 0;

  if (a_Z_is_one && b_Z_is_one) {
    return ((BN_cmp(&a->X, &b->X) == 0) && BN_cmp(&a->Y, &b->Y) == 0) ? 0 : 1;
  }

  field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
  field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;

  if (ctx == NULL) {
    ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
    if (ctx == NULL) {
      return -1;
    }
  }

  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
  tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  Za23 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  Zb23 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  if (Zb23 == NULL) {
    goto end;
  }

  /* We have to decide whether
   *     (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3),
   * or equivalently, whether
   *     (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3).
   */

  if (!b_Z_is_one) {
    if (!field_sqr(group, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx) ||
        !field_mul(group, tmp1, &a->X, Zb23, ctx)) {
      goto end;
    }
    tmp1_ = tmp1;
  } else {
    tmp1_ = &a->X;
  }
  if (!a_Z_is_one) {
    if (!field_sqr(group, Za23, &a->Z, ctx) ||
        !field_mul(group, tmp2, &b->X, Za23, ctx)) {
      goto end;
    }
    tmp2_ = tmp2;
  } else {
    tmp2_ = &b->X;
  }

  /* compare  X_a*Z_b^2  with  X_b*Z_a^2 */
  if (BN_cmp(tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0) {
    ret = 1; /* points differ */
    goto end;
  }


  if (!b_Z_is_one) {
    if (!field_mul(group, Zb23, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx) ||
        !field_mul(group, tmp1, &a->Y, Zb23, ctx)) {
      goto end;
    }
    /* tmp1_ = tmp1 */
  } else {
    tmp1_ = &a->Y;
  }
  if (!a_Z_is_one) {
    if (!field_mul(group, Za23, Za23, &a->Z, ctx) ||
        !field_mul(group, tmp2, &b->Y, Za23, ctx)) {
      goto end;
    }
    /* tmp2_ = tmp2 */
  } else {
    tmp2_ = &b->Y;
  }
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:garfieldonly,项目名称:boringssl,代码行数:101,代码来源:simple.c

示例3: void


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
			/* step 7 */
			if (!BN_zero(W)) goto err;
			/* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
			for (k=0; k<=n; k++)
				{
				/* obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */
				for (i=SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH-1; i >= 0; i--)
					{
					buf[i]++;
					if (buf[i] != 0) break;
					}

				EVP_Digest(buf,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,md,NULL,HASH, NULL);

				/* step 8 */
				if (!BN_bin2bn(md,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,r0))
					goto err;
				if (!BN_lshift(r0,r0,160*k)) goto err;
				if (!BN_add(W,W,r0)) goto err;
				}

			/* more of step 8 */
			if (!BN_mask_bits(W,bits-1)) goto err;
			if (!BN_copy(X,W)) goto err;
			if (!BN_add(X,X,test)) goto err;

			/* step 9 */
			if (!BN_lshift1(r0,q)) goto err;
			if (!BN_mod(c,X,r0,ctx)) goto err;
			if (!BN_sub(r0,c,BN_value_one())) goto err;
			if (!BN_sub(p,X,r0)) goto err;

			/* step 10 */
			if (BN_cmp(p,test) >= 0)
				{
				/* step 11 */
				r = BN_is_prime_fasttest(p, DSS_prime_checks, callback, ctx3, cb_arg, 1);
				if (r > 0)
						goto end; /* found it */
				if (r != 0)
					goto err;
				}

			/* step 13 */
			counter++;
			/* "offset = offset + n + 1" */

			/* step 14 */
			if (counter >= 4096) break;
			}
		}
end:
	if (callback != NULL) callback(2,1,cb_arg);

	/* We now need to generate g */
	/* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
	if (!BN_sub(test,p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
	if (!BN_div(r0,NULL,test,q,ctx)) goto err;

	if (!BN_set_word(test,h)) goto err;
	if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont,p,ctx)) goto err;

	for (;;)
		{
		/* g=test^r0%p */
		if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g,test,r0,p,ctx,mont)) goto err;
开发者ID:FelipeFernandes1988,项目名称:Alice-1121-Modem,代码行数:67,代码来源:dsa_gen.c

示例4: ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve

int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
                                  const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
                                  BN_CTX *ctx) {
  int ret = 0;
  BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
  BIGNUM *tmp_a;

  /* p must be a prime > 3 */
  if (BN_num_bits(p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd(p)) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
    return 0;
  }

  if (ctx == NULL) {
    ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
    if (ctx == NULL) {
      return 0;
    }
  }

  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
  tmp_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  if (tmp_a == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  /* group->field */
  if (!BN_copy(&group->field, p)) {
    goto err;
  }
  BN_set_negative(&group->field, 0);

  /* group->a */
  if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_a, a, p, ctx)) {
    goto err;
  }
  if (group->meth->field_encode) {
    if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->a, tmp_a, ctx)) {
      goto err;
    }
  } else if (!BN_copy(&group->a, tmp_a)) {
    goto err;
  }

  /* group->b */
  if (!BN_nnmod(&group->b, b, p, ctx)) {
    goto err;
  }
  if (group->meth->field_encode &&
      !group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->b, &group->b, ctx)) {
    goto err;
  }

  /* group->a_is_minus3 */
  if (!BN_add_word(tmp_a, 3)) {
    goto err;
  }
  group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp(tmp_a, &group->field));

  if (group->meth->field_encode != NULL) {
    if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->one, BN_value_one(), ctx)) {
      goto err;
    }
  } else if (!BN_copy(&group->one, BN_value_one())) {
    goto err;
  }

  ret = 1;

err:
  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
  BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
  return ret;
}
开发者ID:garfieldonly,项目名称:boringssl,代码行数:74,代码来源:simple.c

示例5: ec_GFp_simple_dbl

int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
                      BN_CTX *ctx) {
  int (*field_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
                   BN_CTX *);
  int (*field_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
  const BIGNUM *p;
  BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
  BIGNUM *n0, *n1, *n2, *n3;
  int ret = 0;

  if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) {
    BN_zero(&r->Z);
    return 1;
  }

  field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
  field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
  p = &group->field;

  if (ctx == NULL) {
    ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
    if (ctx == NULL) {
      return 0;
    }
  }

  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
  n0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  n1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  n2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  n3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  if (n3 == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  /* Note that in this function we must not read components of 'a'
   * once we have written the corresponding components of 'r'.
   * ('r' might the same as 'a'.)
   */

  /* n1 */
  if (BN_cmp(&a->Z, &group->one) == 0) {
    if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->X, ctx) ||
        !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p) ||
        !BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p) ||
        !BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, &group->a, p)) {
      goto err;
    }
    /* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve */
  } else if (group->a_is_minus3) {
    if (!field_sqr(group, n1, &a->Z, ctx) ||
        !BN_mod_add_quick(n0, &a->X, n1, p) ||
        !BN_mod_sub_quick(n2, &a->X, n1, p) ||
        !field_mul(group, n1, n0, n2, ctx) ||
        !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, n1, p) ||
        !BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, n1, p)) {
      goto err;
    }
    /* n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2)
     *    = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4 */
  } else {
    if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->X, ctx) ||
        !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p) ||
        !BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p) ||
        !field_sqr(group, n1, &a->Z, ctx) ||
        !field_sqr(group, n1, n1, ctx) ||
        !field_mul(group, n1, n1, &group->a, ctx) ||
        !BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n1, n0, p)) {
      goto err;
    }
    /* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve * Z_a^4 */
  }

  /* Z_r */
  if (BN_cmp(&a->Z, &group->one) == 0) {
    if (!BN_copy(n0, &a->Y)) {
      goto err;
    }
  } else if (!field_mul(group, n0, &a->Y, &a->Z, ctx)) {
    goto err;
  }
  if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(&r->Z, n0, p)) {
    goto err;
  }
  /* Z_r = 2 * Y_a * Z_a */

  /* n2 */
  if (!field_sqr(group, n3, &a->Y, ctx) ||
      !field_mul(group, n2, &a->X, n3, ctx) ||
      !BN_mod_lshift_quick(n2, n2, 2, p)) {
    goto err;
  }
  /* n2 = 4 * X_a * Y_a^2 */

  /* X_r */
  if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, n2, p) ||
      !field_sqr(group, &r->X, n1, ctx) ||
      !BN_mod_sub_quick(&r->X, &r->X, n0, p)) {
    goto err;
  }
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:garfieldonly,项目名称:boringssl,代码行数:101,代码来源:simple.c

示例6: x9_62_test_internal

/* some tests from the X9.62 draft */
int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in)
{
    int ret = 0;
    const char message[] = "abc";
    unsigned char digest[20];
    unsigned int dgst_len = 0;
    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
    EC_KEY *key = NULL;
    ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL;
    BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL;

    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
    /* get the message digest */
    if (!EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx, EVP_ecdsa())
        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, (const void *)message, 3)
        || !EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, digest, &dgst_len))
        goto x962_int_err;

    BIO_printf(out, "testing %s: ", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
    /* create the key */
    if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL)
        goto x962_int_err;
    use_fake = 1;
    if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
        goto x962_int_err;
    BIO_printf(out, ".");
    (void)BIO_flush(out);
    /* create the signature */
    use_fake = 1;
    /* Use ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */
    if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp))
        goto x962_int_err;
    signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, 20, kinv, rp, key);
    if (signature == NULL)
        goto x962_int_err;
    BIO_printf(out, ".");
    (void)BIO_flush(out);
    /* compare the created signature with the expected signature */
    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL || (s = BN_new()) == NULL)
        goto x962_int_err;
    if (!BN_dec2bn(&r, r_in) || !BN_dec2bn(&s, s_in))
        goto x962_int_err;
    if (BN_cmp(signature->r, r) || BN_cmp(signature->s, s))
        goto x962_int_err;
    BIO_printf(out, ".");
    (void)BIO_flush(out);
    /* verify the signature */
    if (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, signature, key) != 1)
        goto x962_int_err;
    BIO_printf(out, ".");
    (void)BIO_flush(out);

    BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
    ret = 1;
 x962_int_err:
    if (!ret)
        BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
    EC_KEY_free(key);
    ECDSA_SIG_free(signature);
    BN_free(r);
    BN_free(s);
    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
    BN_clear_free(kinv);
    BN_clear_free(rp);
    return ret;
}
开发者ID:rachellearussell12,项目名称:openssl,代码行数:68,代码来源:ecdsatest.c

示例7: run_srp

static int run_srp(const char *username, const char *client_pass,
                   const char *server_pass)
{
    int ret = -1;
    BIGNUM *s = NULL;
    BIGNUM *v = NULL;
    BIGNUM *a = NULL;
    BIGNUM *b = NULL;
    BIGNUM *u = NULL;
    BIGNUM *x = NULL;
    BIGNUM *Apub = NULL;
    BIGNUM *Bpub = NULL;
    BIGNUM *Kclient = NULL;
    BIGNUM *Kserver = NULL;
    unsigned char rand_tmp[RANDOM_SIZE];
    /* use builtin 1024-bit params */
    const SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN("1024");

    if (GN == NULL) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get SRP parameters\n");
        return -1;
    }
    /* Set up server's password entry */
    if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(username, server_pass, &s, &v, GN->N, GN->g)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create SRP verifier\n");
        return -1;
    }

    showbn("N", GN->N);
    showbn("g", GN->g);
    showbn("Salt", s);
    showbn("Verifier", v);

    /* Server random */
    RAND_bytes(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp));
    b = BN_bin2bn(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp), NULL);
    /* TODO - check b != 0 */
    showbn("b", b);

    /* Server's first message */
    Bpub = SRP_Calc_B(b, GN->N, GN->g, v);
    showbn("B", Bpub);

    if (!SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(Bpub, GN->N)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid B\n");
        return -1;
    }

    /* Client random */
    RAND_bytes(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp));
    a = BN_bin2bn(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp), NULL);
    /* TODO - check a != 0 */
    showbn("a", a);

    /* Client's response */
    Apub = SRP_Calc_A(a, GN->N, GN->g);
    showbn("A", Apub);

    if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(Apub, GN->N)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid A\n");
        return -1;
    }

    /* Both sides calculate u */
    u = SRP_Calc_u(Apub, Bpub, GN->N);

    /* Client's key */
    x = SRP_Calc_x(s, username, client_pass);
    Kclient = SRP_Calc_client_key(GN->N, Bpub, GN->g, x, a, u);
    showbn("Client's key", Kclient);

    /* Server's key */
    Kserver = SRP_Calc_server_key(Apub, v, u, b, GN->N);
    showbn("Server's key", Kserver);

    if (BN_cmp(Kclient, Kserver) == 0) {
        ret = 0;
    } else {
        fprintf(stderr, "Keys mismatch\n");
        ret = 1;
    }

    BN_clear_free(Kclient);
    BN_clear_free(Kserver);
    BN_clear_free(x);
    BN_free(u);
    BN_free(Apub);
    BN_clear_free(a);
    BN_free(Bpub);
    BN_clear_free(b);
    BN_free(s);
    BN_clear_free(v);

    return ret;
}
开发者ID:SpongeEdmund,项目名称:openssl,代码行数:95,代码来源:srptest.c

示例8: main

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    BN_CTX *ctx;
    BIO *out = NULL;
    int i, ret;
    unsigned char c;
    BIGNUM *r_mont, *r_mont_const, *r_recp, *r_simple, *a, *b, *m;

    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_rand may fail, and we
                                           * don't even check its return
                                           * value (which we should) */

    ERR_load_BN_strings();

    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
    if (ctx == NULL)
        EXIT(1);
    r_mont = BN_new();
    r_mont_const = BN_new();
    r_recp = BN_new();
    r_simple = BN_new();
    a = BN_new();
    b = BN_new();
    m = BN_new();
    if ((r_mont == NULL) || (r_recp == NULL) || (a == NULL) || (b == NULL))
        goto err;

    out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());

    if (out == NULL)
        EXIT(1);
    BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);

    for (i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
        RAND_bytes(&c, 1);
        c = (c % BN_BITS) - BN_BITS2;
        BN_rand(a, NUM_BITS + c, 0, 0);

        RAND_bytes(&c, 1);
        c = (c % BN_BITS) - BN_BITS2;
        BN_rand(b, NUM_BITS + c, 0, 0);

        RAND_bytes(&c, 1);
        c = (c % BN_BITS) - BN_BITS2;
        BN_rand(m, NUM_BITS + c, 0, 1);

        BN_mod(a, a, m, ctx);
        BN_mod(b, b, m, ctx);

        ret = BN_mod_exp_mont(r_mont, a, b, m, ctx, NULL);
        if (ret <= 0) {
            printf("BN_mod_exp_mont() problems\n");
            ERR_print_errors(out);
            EXIT(1);
        }

        ret = BN_mod_exp_recp(r_recp, a, b, m, ctx);
        if (ret <= 0) {
            printf("BN_mod_exp_recp() problems\n");
            ERR_print_errors(out);
            EXIT(1);
        }

        ret = BN_mod_exp_simple(r_simple, a, b, m, ctx);
        if (ret <= 0) {
            printf("BN_mod_exp_simple() problems\n");
            ERR_print_errors(out);
            EXIT(1);
        }

        ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r_mont_const, a, b, m, ctx, NULL);
        if (ret <= 0) {
            printf("BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() problems\n");
            ERR_print_errors(out);
            EXIT(1);
        }

        if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont) == 0
            && BN_cmp(r_simple, r_recp) == 0
            && BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont_const) == 0) {
            printf(".");
            fflush(stdout);
        } else {
            if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont) != 0)
                printf("\nsimple and mont results differ\n");
            if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont_const) != 0)
                printf("\nsimple and mont const time results differ\n");
            if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_recp) != 0)
                printf("\nsimple and recp results differ\n");

            printf("a (%3d) = ", BN_num_bits(a));
            BN_print(out, a);
            printf("\nb (%3d) = ", BN_num_bits(b));
            BN_print(out, b);
            printf("\nm (%3d) = ", BN_num_bits(m));
            BN_print(out, m);
            printf("\nsimple   =");
            BN_print(out, r_simple);
            printf("\nrecp     =");
            BN_print(out, r_recp);
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:IIJ-NetBSD,项目名称:netbsd-src,代码行数:101,代码来源:exptest.c

示例9: schnorr_sign

/*
 * Generate Schnorr signature to prove knowledge of private value 'x' used
 * in public exponent g^x, under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'
 * using the hash function "hash_alg".
 * 'idlen' bytes from 'id' will be included in the signature hash as an anti-
 * replay salt.
 * 
 * On success, 0 is returned. The signature values are returned as *e_p
 * (g^v mod p) and *r_p (v - xh mod q). The caller must free these values.
 * On failure, -1 is returned.
 */
int
schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
    int hash_alg, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x,
    const u_char *id, u_int idlen, BIGNUM **r_p, BIGNUM **e_p)
{
	int success = -1;
	BIGNUM *h, *tmp, *v, *g_v, *r;
	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;

	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((x, "%s: x = ", __func__));
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_x, "%s: g_x = ", __func__));

	/* Avoid degenerate cases: g^0 yields a spoofable signature */
	if (BN_cmp(g_x, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
		error("%s: g_x < 1", __func__);
		return -1;
	}
	if (BN_cmp(g_x, grp_p) >= 0) {
		error("%s: g_x > g", __func__);
		return -1;
	}

	h = g_v = r = tmp = v = NULL;
	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
		error("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	if ((g_v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
	    (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
		goto out;
	}

	/*
	 * v must be a random element of Zq, so 1 <= v < q
	 * we also exclude v = 1, since g^1 looks dangerous
	 */
	if ((v = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp_p)) == NULL) {
		error("%s: bn_rand_range2", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((v, "%s: v = ", __func__));

	/* g_v = g^v mod p */
	if (BN_mod_exp(g_v, grp_g, v, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
		error("%s: BN_mod_exp (g^v mod p)", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: g_v = ", __func__));

	/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, hash_alg, g_v, g_x,
	    id, idlen)) == NULL) {
		error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
		goto out;
	}

	/* r = v - xh mod q */
	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, x, h, grp_q, bn_ctx) == -1) {
		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = xv mod q)", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	if (BN_mod_sub(r, v, tmp, grp_q, bn_ctx) == -1) {
		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (r = v - tmp)", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: e = ", __func__));
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));

	*e_p = g_v;
	*r_p = r;

	success = 0;
 out:
	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
	if (h != NULL)
		BN_clear_free(h);
	if (v != NULL)
		BN_clear_free(v);
	BN_clear_free(tmp);

	return success;
}
开发者ID:Alkzndr,项目名称:freebsd,代码行数:95,代码来源:schnorr.c

示例10: BN_init

static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
	{
	BIGNUM *kinv=NULL,*r=NULL,*s=NULL;
	BIGNUM m;
	BIGNUM xr;
	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
	int i,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB;
	DSA_SIG *ret=NULL;

	BN_init(&m);
	BN_init(&xr);

	if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
		{
		reason=DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
		goto err;
		}

	s=BN_new();
	if (s == NULL) goto err;

	i=BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
	if ((dlen > i) || (dlen > 50))
		{
		reason=DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE;
		goto err;
		}

	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;

	if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL))
		{
		if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa,ctx,&kinv,&r)) goto err;
		}
	else
		{
		kinv=dsa->kinv;
		dsa->kinv=NULL;
		r=dsa->r;
		dsa->r=NULL;
		}

	if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dlen,&m) == NULL) goto err;

	/* Compute  s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
	if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */
	if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err;		/* s = m + xr */
	if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0)
		BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q);
	if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;

	ret=DSA_SIG_new();
	if (ret == NULL) goto err;
	ret->r = r;
	ret->s = s;
	
err:
	if (!ret)
		{
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,reason);
		BN_free(r);
		BN_free(s);
		}
	if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
	BN_clear_free(&m);
	BN_clear_free(&xr);
	if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
	    BN_clear_free(kinv);
	return(ret);
	}
开发者ID:174high,项目名称:openssl-0.9.8e_linux_porting,代码行数:71,代码来源:dsa_ossl.c

示例11: DH_check

int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
	{
	int ok=0;
	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
	BN_ULONG l;
	BIGNUM *t1=NULL, *t2 = NULL;

	*ret=0;
	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
	t1=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	if (t1 == NULL) goto err;
	t2=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	if (t2 == NULL) goto err;

	if (dh->q)
		{
		if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
			*ret|=DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
		else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
			*ret|=DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
		else
			{
			/* Check g^q == 1 mod p */
			if (!BN_mod_exp(t1, dh->g, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
				goto err;
			if (!BN_is_one(t1))
				*ret|=DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
			}
		if (!BN_is_prime_ex(dh->q,BN_prime_checks,ctx,NULL))
			*ret|=DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME;
		/* Check p == 1 mod q  i.e. q divides p - 1 */
		if (!BN_div(t1, t2, dh->p, dh->q, ctx))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_is_one(t2))
			*ret|=DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
		if (dh->j && BN_cmp(dh->j, t1))
			*ret|=DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE;
			
		}
	else if (BN_is_word(dh->g,DH_GENERATOR_2))
		{
		l=BN_mod_word(dh->p,24);
		if (l != 11) *ret|=DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
		}
#if 0
	else if (BN_is_word(dh->g,DH_GENERATOR_3))
		{
		l=BN_mod_word(dh->p,12);
		if (l != 5) *ret|=DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
		}
#endif
	else if (BN_is_word(dh->g,DH_GENERATOR_5))
		{
		l=BN_mod_word(dh->p,10);
		if ((l != 3) && (l != 7))
			*ret|=DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
		}
	else
		*ret|=DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR;

	if (!BN_is_prime_ex(dh->p,BN_prime_checks,ctx,NULL))
		*ret|=DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
	else if (!dh->q)
		{
		if (!BN_rshift1(t1,dh->p)) goto err;
		if (!BN_is_prime_ex(t1,BN_prime_checks,ctx,NULL))
			*ret|=DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME;
		}
	ok=1;
err:
	if (ctx != NULL)
		{
		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
		}
	return(ok);
	}
开发者ID:0culus,项目名称:openssl,代码行数:79,代码来源:dh_check.c

示例12: BN_mod_sqrt


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
			BN_zero(ret);
			err = 0;
			goto end;
		} else if (!BN_one(x))
			goto end;
	} else {
		if (!BN_mod_exp(x, A, t, p, ctx))
			goto end;
		if (BN_is_zero(x)) {
			/* special case: a == 0  (mod p) */
			BN_zero(ret);
			err = 0;
			goto end;
		}
	}

	/* b := a*x^2  (= a^q) */
	if (!BN_mod_sqr(b, x, p, ctx))
		goto end;
	if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, A, p, ctx))
		goto end;

	/* x := a*x    (= a^((q+1)/2)) */
	if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, A, p, ctx))
		goto end;

	while (1) {
		/* Now  b  is  a^q * y^k  for some even  k  (0 <= k < 2^E
		 * where  E  refers to the original value of  e,  which we
		 * don't keep in a variable),  and  x  is  a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2).
		 *
		 * We have  a*b = x^2,
		 *    y^2^(e-1) = -1,
		 *    b^2^(e-1) = 1.
		 */

		if (BN_is_one(b)) {
			if (!BN_copy(ret, x))
				goto end;
			err = 0;
			goto vrfy;
		}


		/* find smallest  i  such that  b^(2^i) = 1 */
		i = 1;
		if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
			goto end;
		while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
			i++;
			if (i == e) {
				BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
				goto end;
			}
			if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
				goto end;
		}


		/* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
		if (!BN_copy(t, y))
			goto end;
		for (j = e - i - 1; j > 0; j--) {
			if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, t, p, ctx))
				goto end;
		}
		if (!BN_mod_mul(y, t, t, p, ctx))
			goto end;
		if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx))
			goto end;
		if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, y, p, ctx))
			goto end;
		e = i;
	}

vrfy:
	if (!err) {
		/* verify the result -- the input might have been not a square
		 * (test added in 0.9.8) */

		if (!BN_mod_sqr(x, ret, p, ctx))
			err = 1;

		if (!err && 0 != BN_cmp(x, A)) {
			BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
			err = 1;
		}
	}

end:
	if (err) {
		if (ret != NULL && ret != in) {
			BN_clear_free(ret);
		}
		ret = NULL;
	}
	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
	bn_check_top(ret);
	return ret;
}
开发者ID:busterb,项目名称:libssl-openbsd,代码行数:101,代码来源:bn_sqrt.c

示例13: BN_new


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
  } else {
    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(x, A, t, p, ctx, NULL)) {
      goto end;
    }
    if (BN_is_zero(x)) {
      // special case: a == 0  (mod p)
      BN_zero(ret);
      err = 0;
      goto end;
    }
  }

  // b := a*x^2  (= a^q)
  if (!BN_mod_sqr(b, x, p, ctx) ||
      !BN_mod_mul(b, b, A, p, ctx)) {
    goto end;
  }

  // x := a*x    (= a^((q+1)/2))
  if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, A, p, ctx)) {
    goto end;
  }

  while (1) {
    // Now  b  is  a^q * y^k  for some even  k  (0 <= k < 2^E
    // where  E  refers to the original value of  e,  which we
    // don't keep in a variable),  and  x  is  a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2).
    //
    // We have  a*b = x^2,
    //    y^2^(e-1) = -1,
    //    b^2^(e-1) = 1.

    if (BN_is_one(b)) {
      if (!BN_copy(ret, x)) {
        goto end;
      }
      err = 0;
      goto vrfy;
    }


    // find smallest  i  such that  b^(2^i) = 1
    i = 1;
    if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx)) {
      goto end;
    }
    while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
      i++;
      if (i == e) {
        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
        goto end;
      }
      if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx)) {
        goto end;
      }
    }


    // t := y^2^(e - i - 1)
    if (!BN_copy(t, y)) {
      goto end;
    }
    for (j = e - i - 1; j > 0; j--) {
      if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, t, p, ctx)) {
        goto end;
      }
    }
    if (!BN_mod_mul(y, t, t, p, ctx) ||
        !BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx) ||
        !BN_mod_mul(b, b, y, p, ctx)) {
      goto end;
    }
    e = i;
  }

vrfy:
  if (!err) {
    // verify the result -- the input might have been not a square
    // (test added in 0.9.8)

    if (!BN_mod_sqr(x, ret, p, ctx)) {
      err = 1;
    }

    if (!err && 0 != BN_cmp(x, A)) {
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
      err = 1;
    }
  }

end:
  if (err) {
    if (ret != in) {
      BN_clear_free(ret);
    }
    ret = NULL;
  }
  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
  return ret;
}
开发者ID:MateusDeSousa,项目名称:FiqueRico,代码行数:101,代码来源:sqrt.c

示例14: BN_sqrt

int BN_sqrt(BIGNUM *out_sqrt, const BIGNUM *in, BN_CTX *ctx) {
  BIGNUM *estimate, *tmp, *delta, *last_delta, *tmp2;
  int ok = 0, last_delta_valid = 0;

  if (in->neg) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
    return 0;
  }
  if (BN_is_zero(in)) {
    BN_zero(out_sqrt);
    return 1;
  }

  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
  if (out_sqrt == in) {
    estimate = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  } else {
    estimate = out_sqrt;
  }
  tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  last_delta = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  delta = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  if (estimate == NULL || tmp == NULL || last_delta == NULL || delta == NULL) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    goto err;
  }

  // We estimate that the square root of an n-bit number is 2^{n/2}.
  if (!BN_lshift(estimate, BN_value_one(), BN_num_bits(in)/2)) {
    goto err;
  }

  // This is Newton's method for finding a root of the equation |estimate|^2 -
  // |in| = 0.
  for (;;) {
    // |estimate| = 1/2 * (|estimate| + |in|/|estimate|)
    if (!BN_div(tmp, NULL, in, estimate, ctx) ||
        !BN_add(tmp, tmp, estimate) ||
        !BN_rshift1(estimate, tmp) ||
        // |tmp| = |estimate|^2
        !BN_sqr(tmp, estimate, ctx) ||
        // |delta| = |in| - |tmp|
        !BN_sub(delta, in, tmp)) {
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
      goto err;
    }

    delta->neg = 0;
    // The difference between |in| and |estimate| squared is required to always
    // decrease. This ensures that the loop always terminates, but I don't have
    // a proof that it always finds the square root for a given square.
    if (last_delta_valid && BN_cmp(delta, last_delta) >= 0) {
      break;
    }

    last_delta_valid = 1;

    tmp2 = last_delta;
    last_delta = delta;
    delta = tmp2;
  }

  if (BN_cmp(tmp, in) != 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
    goto err;
  }

  ok = 1;

err:
  if (ok && out_sqrt == in && !BN_copy(out_sqrt, estimate)) {
    ok = 0;
  }
  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
  return ok;
}
开发者ID:MateusDeSousa,项目名称:FiqueRico,代码行数:76,代码来源:sqrt.c

示例15: FIPSerr

static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T dlen, DSA *dsa)
	{
	BIGNUM *kinv=NULL,*r=NULL,*s=NULL;
	BIGNUM m;
	BIGNUM xr;
	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
	int i,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB;
	DSA_SIG *ret=NULL;

	if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
	    {
	    FIPSerr(FIPS_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
	    return NULL;
	    }

	if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
		{
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
		return NULL;
		}

	BN_init(&m);
	BN_init(&xr);

	if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
		{
		reason=DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
		goto err;
		}

	s=BN_new();
	if (s == NULL) goto err;

	i=BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
	if ((dlen > i) || (dlen > 50))
		{
		reason=DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE;
		goto err;
		}

	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;

	if (!dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa,ctx,&kinv,&r)) goto err;

	if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dlen,&m) == NULL) goto err;

	/* Compute  s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
	if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */
	if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err;		/* s = m + xr */
	if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0)
		BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q);
	if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;

	ret= DSA_SIG_new();
	if (ret == NULL) goto err;
	ret->r = r;
	ret->s = s;
	
err:
	if (!ret)
		{
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,reason);
		BN_free(r);
		BN_free(s);
		}
	if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
	BN_clear_free(&m);
	BN_clear_free(&xr);
	if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
	    BN_clear_free(kinv);
	return(ret);
	}
开发者ID:alisw,项目名称:alice-openssl,代码行数:73,代码来源:fips_dsa_ossl.c


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