C++ ASN1_STRING_data函数代码示例

void OpenSSLCertificate::parse() {
	if (!cert) {
		return;
	}

	// Subject name
	X509_NAME* subjectName = X509_get_subject_name(cert.get());
	if (subjectName) {
		// Subject name
		ByteArray subjectNameData;
		subjectNameData.resize(256);
		X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert.get()), reinterpret_cast<char*>(subjectNameData.getData()), subjectNameData.getSize());
		this->subjectName = std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(subjectNameData.getData()));

		// Common name
		int cnLoc = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subjectName, NID_commonName, -1);
		while (cnLoc != -1) {
			X509_NAME_ENTRY* cnEntry = X509_NAME_get_entry(subjectName, cnLoc);
			ASN1_STRING* cnData = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(cnEntry);
			commonNames.push_back(ByteArray(cnData->data, cnData->length).toString());
			cnLoc = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subjectName, NID_commonName, cnLoc);
		}
	}

	// subjectAltNames
	int subjectAltNameLoc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert.get(), NID_subject_alt_name, -1);
	if(subjectAltNameLoc != -1) {
		X509_EXTENSION* extension = X509_get_ext(cert.get(), subjectAltNameLoc);
		boost::shared_ptr<GENERAL_NAMES> generalNames(reinterpret_cast<GENERAL_NAMES*>(X509V3_EXT_d2i(extension)), GENERAL_NAMES_free);
		boost::shared_ptr<ASN1_OBJECT> xmppAddrObject(OBJ_txt2obj(ID_ON_XMPPADDR_OID, 1), ASN1_OBJECT_free);
		boost::shared_ptr<ASN1_OBJECT> dnsSRVObject(OBJ_txt2obj(ID_ON_DNSSRV_OID, 1), ASN1_OBJECT_free);
		for (int i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(generalNames.get()); ++i) {
			GENERAL_NAME* generalName = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(generalNames.get(), i);
			if (generalName->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) {
				OTHERNAME* otherName = generalName->d.otherName;
				if (OBJ_cmp(otherName->type_id, xmppAddrObject.get()) == 0) {
					// XmppAddr
					if (otherName->value->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
						continue;
					}
					ASN1_UTF8STRING* xmppAddrValue = otherName->value->value.utf8string;
					addXMPPAddress(ByteArray(ASN1_STRING_data(xmppAddrValue), ASN1_STRING_length(xmppAddrValue)).toString());
				}
				else if (OBJ_cmp(otherName->type_id, dnsSRVObject.get()) == 0) {
					// SRVName
					if (otherName->value->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
						continue;
					}
					ASN1_IA5STRING* srvNameValue = otherName->value->value.ia5string;
					addSRVName(ByteArray(ASN1_STRING_data(srvNameValue), ASN1_STRING_length(srvNameValue)).toString());
				}
			}
			else if (generalName->type == GEN_DNS) {
				// DNSName
				addDNSName(ByteArray(ASN1_STRING_data(generalName->d.dNSName), ASN1_STRING_length(generalName->d.dNSName)).toString());
			}
		}
	}
}

/*
 * For each name in the cert. Iterate them. Call the callback. If one returns true, then consider it validated,
 * if none of them return true, the cert is considered invalid.
 */
static uint8_t s2n_verify_host_information(struct s2n_x509_validator *validator, struct s2n_connection *conn, X509 *public_cert) {
    uint8_t verified = 0;
    uint8_t san_found = 0;

    /* Check SubjectAltNames before CommonName as per RFC 6125 6.4.4 */
    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names_list = X509_get_ext_d2i(public_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
    int n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names_list);
    for (int i = 0; i < n && !verified; i++) {
        GENERAL_NAME *current_name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names_list, i);
        if (current_name->type == GEN_DNS) {
            san_found = 1;

            const char *name = (const char *) ASN1_STRING_data(current_name->d.ia5);
            size_t name_len = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(current_name->d.ia5);

            verified = conn->verify_host_fn(name, name_len, conn->data_for_verify_host);
        }
    }

    GENERAL_NAMES_free(names_list);

    /* if no SubjectAltNames of type DNS found, go to the common name. */
    if (!san_found) {
        X509_NAME *subject_name = X509_get_subject_name(public_cert);
        if (subject_name) {
            int next_idx = 0, curr_idx = -1;
            while ((next_idx = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subject_name, NID_commonName, curr_idx)) >= 0) {
                curr_idx = next_idx;
            }

            if (curr_idx >= 0) {
                ASN1_STRING *common_name =
                        X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subject_name, curr_idx));

                if (common_name) {
                    char peer_cn[255];
                    static size_t peer_cn_size = sizeof(peer_cn);
                    memset_check(&peer_cn, 0, peer_cn_size);
                    
                    // X520CommonName allows the following ANSI string types per RFC 5280 Appendix A.1
                    if (ASN1_STRING_type(common_name) == V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING || 
                        ASN1_STRING_type(common_name) == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
                        ASN1_STRING_type(common_name) == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING ||
                        ASN1_STRING_type(common_name) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING ||
                        ASN1_STRING_type(common_name) == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING ) {

                        size_t len = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(common_name);

                        lte_check(len, sizeof(peer_cn) - 1);
                        memcpy_check(peer_cn, ASN1_STRING_data(common_name), len);
                        verified = conn->verify_host_fn(peer_cn, len, conn->data_for_verify_host);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    return verified;
}

/* This code is based heavily on the example provided in "Secure Programming
 * Cookbook for C and C++".
 */
int _mosquitto_verify_certificate_hostname(X509 *cert, const char *hostname)
{
	int i;
	char name[256];
	X509_NAME *subj;
	bool have_san_dns = false;
	STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *san;
	const GENERAL_NAME *nval;
	const unsigned char *data;
	unsigned char ipv6_addr[16];
	unsigned char ipv4_addr[4];
	int ipv6_ok;
	int ipv4_ok;

#ifdef WIN32
	ipv6_ok = InetPton(AF_INET6, hostname, &ipv6_addr);
	ipv4_ok = InetPton(AF_INET, hostname, &ipv4_addr);
#else
	ipv6_ok = inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &ipv6_addr);
	ipv4_ok = inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &ipv4_addr);
#endif

	san = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
	if(san){
		for(i=0; i<sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(san); i++){
			nval = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(san, i);
			if(nval->type == GEN_DNS){
				data = ASN1_STRING_data(nval->d.dNSName);
				if(data && match_hostname((char *)data, hostname)){
					return 1;
				}
				have_san_dns = true;
			}else if(nval->type == GEN_IPADD){
				data = ASN1_STRING_data(nval->d.iPAddress);
				if(nval->d.iPAddress->length == 4 && ipv4_ok){
					if(!memcmp(ipv4_addr, data, 4)){
						return 1;
					}
				}else if(nval->d.iPAddress->length == 16 && ipv6_ok){
					if(!memcmp(ipv6_addr, data, 16)){
						return 1;
					}
				}
			}
		}
		if(have_san_dns){
			/* Only check CN if subjectAltName DNS entry does not exist. */
			return 0;
		}
	}
	subj = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
	if(X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, name, sizeof(name)) > 0){
		name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
		if (!strcasecmp(name, hostname)) return 1;
	}
	return 0;
}

/* int max_len:  for returned value    */
int
ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, long *num, unsigned char *data,
    int max_len)
{
	int ret = -1, n;
	ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL;
	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
	const unsigned char *p;
	long length;
	ASN1_const_CTX c;

	if ((a->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (a->value.sequence == NULL)) {
		goto err;
	}
	p = ASN1_STRING_data(a->value.sequence);
	length = ASN1_STRING_length(a->value.sequence);

	c.pp = &p;
	c.p = p;
	c.max = p + length;
	c.error = ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG;

	M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
	c.q = c.p;
	if ((ai = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &c.p, c.slen)) == NULL)
		goto err;
	c.slen -= (c.p - c.q);
	c.q = c.p;
	if ((os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &c.p, c.slen)) == NULL)
		goto err;
	c.slen -= (c.p - c.q);
	if (!M_ASN1_D2I_end_sequence())
		goto err;

	if (num != NULL)
		*num = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ai);

	ret = ASN1_STRING_length(os);
	if (max_len > ret)
		n = ret;
	else
		n = max_len;

	if (data != NULL)
		memcpy(data, ASN1_STRING_data(os), n);
	if (0) {
err:
		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING,
		    ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG);
	}
	M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
	M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai);
	return (ret);
}

/* Server certificate name check, logic adapted from libcurl */
static int
_SSL_check_server_cert(SSL *ssl, const char *hostname)
{
        X509 *cert;
        X509_NAME *subject;
        const GENERAL_NAME *altname;
        STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
        ASN1_STRING *tmp;
        int i, n, match = -1;
        const char *p;
        
        if (SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl) == SSL_VERIFY_NONE ||
            (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) == NULL) {
                return (1);
        }
        /* Check subjectAltName */
        if ((altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
                    NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
                n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
                
                for (i = 0; i < n && match != 1; i++) {
                        altname = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
                        p = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(altname->d.ia5);
                        if (altname->type == GEN_DNS) {
                                match = (ASN1_STRING_length(altname->d.ia5) ==
                                    strlen(p) && match_pattern(hostname, p));
                        }
                }
                GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
        }
        /* No subjectAltName, try CN */
        if (match == -1 &&
            (subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert)) != NULL) {
                for (i = -1; (n = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subject,
                            NID_commonName, i)) >= 0; ) {
                        i = n;
                }
                if (i >= 0) {
                        if ((tmp = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(
                                   X509_NAME_get_entry(subject, i))) != NULL &&
                            ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
                                p = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(tmp);
                                match = (ASN1_STRING_length(tmp) ==
                                    strlen(p) && match_pattern(hostname, p));
                        }
                }
        }
        X509_free(cert);
        
        return (match > 0);
}

static PyObject *
get_subject (certificate_x509 *self, PyObject *args)
{
	if (!PyArg_ParseTuple (args, "")) {
		return NULL;
	}

	X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name (self->x509);
	int entries = X509_NAME_entry_count (name);
	int i;

	PyObject *dict = PyDict_New ();
	for (i = 0; i < entries; i++) {
		X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry (name, i);
		ASN1_OBJECT *obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object (entry);
		ASN1_STRING *data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data (entry);

		PyObject *key =
			PyString_FromString (OBJ_nid2sn (OBJ_obj2nid (obj)));
		PyObject *value = PyString_FromString ((const char *)
						       ASN1_STRING_data (data));
		PyDict_SetItem (dict, key, value);

		Py_DECREF (key);
		Py_DECREF (value);
	}

	return dict;
}

static HostnameValidationResult validate_name(const char *hostname, ASN1_STRING *certname_asn1) {
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
	char *certname_s = (char *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(certname_asn1);
#else
	char *certname_s = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(certname_asn1);
#endif
	int certname_len = ASN1_STRING_length(certname_asn1), hostname_len = strlen(hostname);

	// Make sure there isn't an embedded NUL character in the DNS name
	if (has_nul(certname_s, certname_len)) {
		return MalformedCertificate;
	}
	// remove last '.' from hostname
	if (hostname_len != 0 && hostname[hostname_len - 1] == '.')
		--hostname_len;
	// skip the first segment if wildcard
	if (certname_len > 2 && certname_s[0] == '*' && certname_s[1] == '.') {
		if (hostname_len != 0) {
			do {
				--hostname_len;
				if (*hostname++ == '.')
					break;
			} while (hostname_len != 0);
		}
		certname_s += 2;
		certname_len -= 2;
	}
	// Compare expected hostname with the DNS name
	if (certname_len != hostname_len) {
		return MatchNotFound;
	}
	return memeq_ncase(hostname, certname_s, hostname_len) ? MatchFound : MatchNotFound;
}

/* Convert an ASN1 string which may not be null terminated into a
 * standard null terminated string. Also check for embedded null
 * characters.
 */
char *asn1_to_cstr(ASN1_STRING *astr)
{
    unsigned int astr_len = 0;
    char *tmp = NULL;
    char *cstr = NULL;

    if (!(astr_len = (unsigned int) ASN1_STRING_length(astr))) {
        return NULL;
    }

    if (!(tmp = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(astr))) {
        return NULL;
    }

    /* Verify that the string does not contain embedded null characters.
     */
    if (memchr(tmp, '\0', astr_len)) {
        return NULL;
    }

    if ((cstr = (char *) malloc(astr_len + 1)) == NULL) {
        return NULL;
    }

    memcpy(cstr, tmp, astr_len);
    cstr[astr_len] = '\0';

    return cstr;
}

TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX (TS_REQ * req, TS_VERIFY_CTX * ctx)
{
    TS_VERIFY_CTX *ret = ctx;

    ASN1_OBJECT *policy;

    TS_MSG_IMPRINT *imprint;

    X509_ALGOR *md_alg;

    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msg;

    const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce;

    OPENSSL_assert (req != NULL);
    if (ret)
        TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup (ret);
    else if (!(ret = TS_VERIFY_CTX_new ()))
        return NULL;

    /* Setting flags. */
    ret->flags = TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT & ~(TS_VFY_TSA_NAME | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE);

    /* Setting policy. */
    if ((policy = TS_REQ_get_policy_id (req)) != NULL)
    {
        if (!(ret->policy = OBJ_dup (policy)))
            goto err;
    }
    else
        ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_POLICY;

    /* Setting md_alg, imprint and imprint_len. */
    imprint = TS_REQ_get_msg_imprint (req);
    md_alg = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo (imprint);
    if (!(ret->md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup (md_alg)))
        goto err;
    msg = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_msg (imprint);
    ret->imprint_len = ASN1_STRING_length (msg);
    if (!(ret->imprint = OPENSSL_malloc (ret->imprint_len)))
        goto err;
    memcpy (ret->imprint, ASN1_STRING_data (msg), ret->imprint_len);

    /* Setting nonce. */
    if ((nonce = TS_REQ_get_nonce (req)) != NULL)
    {
        if (!(ret->nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_dup (nonce)))
            goto err;
    }
    else
        ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_NONCE;

    return ret;
  err:
    if (ctx)
        TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup (ctx);
    else
        TS_VERIFY_CTX_free (ret);
    return NULL;
}

static char *
get_peer_common_name(const struct ssl_stream *sslv)
{
    X509 *peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(sslv->ssl);
    if (!peer_cert) {
        return NULL;
    }

    int cn_index = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
                                              NID_commonName, -1);
    if (cn_index < 0) {
        return NULL;
    }

    X509_NAME_ENTRY *cn_entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(
        X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert), cn_index);
    if (!cn_entry) {
        return NULL;
    }

    ASN1_STRING *cn_data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(cn_entry);
    if (!cn_data) {
        return NULL;
    }

    const char *cn;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
    /* ASN1_STRING_data() is deprecated as of OpenSSL version 1.1 */
    cn = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_data(cn_data);
#else
    cn = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(cn_data);
 #endif
    return xstrdup(cn);
}

static X509_ATTRIBUTE* openssl_new_xattribute(lua_State*L, X509_ATTRIBUTE** a, int idx, int utf8)
{
  int arttype;
  size_t len;
  int nid;
  const char* data;

  lua_getfield(L, idx, "object");
  nid = openssl_get_nid(L, -1);
  lua_pop(L, 1);

  lua_getfield(L, idx, "type");
  arttype = openssl_get_asn1type(L, -1);
  lua_pop(L, 1);

  lua_getfield(L, idx, "value");
  if(lua_isuserdata(L, -1))
  {
    ASN1_STRING* value = CHECK_OBJECT(-1, ASN1_STRING, "openssl.asn1_string");
    data = ASN1_STRING_data(value);
    len  = ASN1_STRING_length(value);
  }else
    data = luaL_checklstring(L, idx, &len);
  lua_pop(L, 1);

  return X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(a, nid, arttype, data, len);
}

static int dh_cms_set_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
                              X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey)
{
    ASN1_OBJECT *aoid;
    int atype;
    void *aval;
    ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
    int rv = 0;
    EVP_PKEY *pkpeer = NULL, *pk = NULL;
    DH *dhpeer = NULL;
    const unsigned char *p;
    int plen;

    X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &atype, &aval, alg);
    if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) != NID_dhpublicnumber)
        goto err;
    /* Only absent parameters allowed in RFC XXXX */
    if (atype != V_ASN1_UNDEF && atype == V_ASN1_NULL)
        goto err;

    pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
    if (!pk)
        goto err;
    if (pk->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX)
        goto err;
    /* Get parameters from parent key */
    dhpeer = DHparams_dup(pk->pkey.dh);
    /* We have parameters now set public key */
    plen = ASN1_STRING_length(pubkey);
    p = ASN1_STRING_data(pubkey);
    if (!p || !plen)
        goto err;

    if (!(public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, plen))) {
        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    /* We have parameters now set public key */
    if (!(dhpeer->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL))) {
        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    pkpeer = EVP_PKEY_new();
    if (!pkpeer)
        goto err;
    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkpeer, pk->ameth->pkey_id, dhpeer);
    dhpeer = NULL;
    if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pkpeer) > 0)
        rv = 1;
 err:
    if (public_key)
        ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
    if (pkpeer)
        EVP_PKEY_free(pkpeer);
    if (dhpeer)
        DH_free(dhpeer);
    return rv;
}

static int matches_common_name(const char *hostname, const X509 *server_cert)
{
    int common_name_loc = -1;
    X509_NAME_ENTRY *common_name_entry = 0;
    ASN1_STRING *common_name_asn1 = 0;
    char *common_name_str = 0;

    common_name_loc = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(
                          (X509 *) server_cert),
                      NID_commonName, -1);
    if (common_name_loc < 0) {
        return Error;
    }
    common_name_entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(
                            X509_get_subject_name(
                                (X509 *) server_cert),
                            common_name_loc);
    if (!common_name_entry) {
        return Error;
    }
    common_name_asn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(common_name_entry);
    if (!common_name_asn1) {
        return Error;
    }
    common_name_str = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(common_name_asn1);
    if (ASN1_STRING_length(common_name_asn1) != strlen(common_name_str)) {
        return MalformedCertificate;
    }
    if (!strcasecmp(hostname, common_name_str)) {
        return MatchFound;
    }
    else {
        return MatchNotFound;
    }
}

const char *tls_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME * gn,
			         const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
{
    const char *myname = "tls_dns_name";
    char   *cp;
    const char *dnsname;
    int     len;

    /*
     * Peername checks are security sensitive, carefully scrutinize the
     * input!
     */
    if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
	msg_panic("%s: Non DNS input argument", myname);

    /*
     * We expect the OpenSSL library to construct GEN_DNS extesion objects as
     * ASN1_IA5STRING values. Check we got the right union member.
     */
    if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
	msg_warn("%s: %s: invalid ASN1 value type in subjectAltName",
		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr);
	return (0);
    }

    /*
     * Safe to treat as an ASCII string possibly holding a DNS name
     */
    dnsname = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
    len = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
    TRIM0(dnsname, len);

    /*
     * Per Dr. Steven Henson of the OpenSSL development team, ASN1_IA5STRING
     * values can have internal ASCII NUL values in this context because
     * their length is taken from the decoded ASN1 buffer, a trailing NUL is
     * always appended to make sure that the string is terminated, but the
     * ASN.1 length may differ from strlen().
     */
    if (len != strlen(dnsname)) {
	msg_warn("%s: %s: internal NUL in subjectAltName",
		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr);
	return 0;
    }

    /*
     * XXX: Should we be more strict and call valid_hostname()? So long as
     * the name is safe to handle, if it is not a valid hostname, it will not
     * compare equal to the expected peername, so being more strict than
     * "printable" is likely excessive...
     */
    if (*dnsname && !allprint(dnsname)) {
	cp = mystrdup(dnsname);
	msg_warn("%s: %s: non-printable characters in subjectAltName: %.100s",
		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, printable(cp, '?'));
	myfree(cp);
	return 0;
    }
    return (dnsname);
}

static int pub_encode_gost94(X509_PUBKEY *pub,const EVP_PKEY *pk)
	{
	ASN1_OBJECT *algobj = NULL;
	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet = NULL;
	void *pval = NULL;
	unsigned char *buf=NULL,*databuf,*sptr;
	int i,j,data_len,ret=0;

	int ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
	DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0((EVP_PKEY *)pk);
	algobj = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk));
	if (pk->save_parameters) 
		{
		ASN1_STRING *params = encode_gost_algor_params(pk);
		pval = params;
		ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
		}	
	data_len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->pub_key);
	databuf = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
	BN_bn2bin(dsa->pub_key,databuf);
	octet = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
	ASN1_STRING_set(octet,NULL,data_len);
	sptr = ASN1_STRING_data(octet);
	for (i=0,j=data_len-1; i< data_len;i++,j--)
		{
		sptr[i]=databuf[j];
		}
	OPENSSL_free(databuf);
	ret = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(octet,&buf);
	ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(octet);
	if (ret <0)  return 0;
	return X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pub,algobj,ptype,pval,buf,ret);
	}