C++ BN_bn2bin函數代碼示例

int receive_and_decrypt(byte * msg){

	int length = readFromPipe(inputChannel , msg); 

	if(length < 0)
	{
		fprintf(stderr , " **** error reading message **** \n\n");
		return -1;
	}	

	if(strncmp(msg , ClientCloseConnection , length) == 0 && length == strlen(ClientCloseConnection))
		return length;
	
	if(encType == PLAIN)
		return length;

	if(encType == RSA64){
		BIGNUM *message = BN_new();	
		message = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char *) msg, RSA64_BYTE_LENGTH , NULL);
		
		printf("%s\n", BN_bn2hex(message));
		
		rsaEXP(message , &server64Rsa);	//Decrypt with private keyExchange
		
		BN_bn2bin(message , msg);

		BN_free(message);		
		return length;		
	}
	
	if(encType == RSA512){
		BIGNUM *message = BN_new();	
		message = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char *) msg, RSA512_BYTE_LENGTH , NULL);
		
		printf("%s\n", BN_bn2hex(message));
		
		rsaEXP(message , &server512Rsa);	//Decrypt with private keyExchange

		BN_bn2bin(message , msg);

		BN_free(message);		
		return length;		
	}
	
	if(encType == Cipher_ALL5){
		BIGNUM *tm = BN_new();	
		tm = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char *) msg, length , NULL);
		printf("ALL5 : %s\n", BN_bn2hex(tm));

		byte message[length - HASH_BYTE_LENGTH];	
		byte hash[HASH_BYTE_LENGTH];

		int recv_length = length;
		
		if(cipherSpec.hash_function == hash_spongeBunny)
		{
		recv_length -= HASH_BYTE_LENGTH;	
		memmove(hash , msg + (sizeof(byte) * recv_length) , sizeof(byte) * HASH_BYTE_LENGTH);	//copy the hash
		memcpy(message , msg , sizeof(byte) * recv_length);	//copy the cihpertext				
		
		ALL5_decrypt(&cipherStruct.all5, message, message, recv_length);	//decrypt
		
		byte rec_hash[HASH_BYTE_LENGTH];
		spongeBunnyComputeHash(message , rec_hash , recv_length);	//compute the hash of the plaintext
		
		if(memcmp(rec_hash, hash, sizeof(byte) * HASH_BYTE_LENGTH) != 0)
		{
			recv_length = 0;
			fprintf(stderr , "Wrong HASH !!!!!!! \n");
		}
		
		tm = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char *) hash, HASH_BYTE_LENGTH , NULL);
		printf("HASH : %s\n", BN_bn2hex(tm));
		memcpy(msg , message , sizeof(byte) * recv_length);
		
			
		}	//no hash function
		else
			ALL5_decrypt(&cipherStruct.all5, msg, msg, recv_length);	//decrypt	
		
		BN_free(tm);		
		return recv_length;
	}
	
	if(encType == Cipher_MAJ5){
		BIGNUM *tm = BN_new();	
		tm = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char *) msg, length , NULL);
		printf("MAJ5 : %s\n", BN_bn2hex(tm));
		
		int recv_length = length;
		
		if(cipherSpec.hash_function == hash_spongeBunny)		
		{
		byte message[length - HASH_BYTE_LENGTH];	
		byte hash[HASH_BYTE_LENGTH];
		
		recv_length -= HASH_BYTE_LENGTH;	
		memmove(hash , msg + (sizeof(byte) * recv_length) , sizeof(byte) * HASH_BYTE_LENGTH);	//copy the hash
		memcpy(message , msg , sizeof(byte) * recv_length);	//copy the cihpertext				
		
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

void tgl_do_send_create_encr_chat (struct tgl_state *TLS, void *x, unsigned char *random, void (*callback)(struct tgl_state *TLS, void *callback_extra, int success, struct tgl_secret_chat *E), void *callback_extra) {
  int user_id = (long)x;
  int i;
  unsigned char random_here[256];
  tglt_secure_random (random_here, 256);
  for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
    random[i] ^= random_here[i];
  }
  BIGNUM *a = BN_bin2bn (random, 256, 0);
  ensure_ptr (a);
  BIGNUM *p = BN_bin2bn (TLS->encr_prime, 256, 0); 
  ensure_ptr (p);
 
  BIGNUM *g = BN_new ();
  ensure_ptr (g);

  ensure (BN_set_word (g, TLS->encr_root));

  BIGNUM *r = BN_new ();
  ensure_ptr (r);

  ensure (BN_mod_exp (r, g, a, p, TLS->BN_ctx));

  BN_clear_free (a);

  static char g_a[256];
  memset (g_a, 0, 256);

  BN_bn2bin (r, (void *)(g_a + (256 - BN_num_bytes (r))));
  
  int t = lrand48 ();
  while (tgl_peer_get (TLS, TGL_MK_ENCR_CHAT (t))) {
    t = lrand48 ();
  }

  //bl_do_encr_chat_init (TLS, t, user_id, (void *)random, (void *)g_a);
  
  int state = sc_waiting;
  bl_do_encr_chat_new (TLS, t, NULL, NULL, &TLS->our_id, &user_id, random, NULL, NULL, &state, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, TGLPF_CREATE | TGLPF_CREATED);

  
  tgl_peer_t *_E = tgl_peer_get (TLS, TGL_MK_ENCR_CHAT (t));
  assert (_E);
  struct tgl_secret_chat *E = &_E->encr_chat;
  
  clear_packet ();
  out_int (CODE_messages_request_encryption);
  tgl_peer_t *U = tgl_peer_get (TLS, TGL_MK_USER (E->user_id));
  assert (U);
  if (U && U->user.access_hash) {
    out_int (CODE_input_user_foreign);
    out_int (E->user_id);
    out_long (U->user.access_hash);
  } else {
    out_int (CODE_input_user_contact);
    out_int (E->user_id);
  }
  out_int (tgl_get_peer_id (E->id));
  out_cstring (g_a, 256);
  //write_secret_chat_file ();
  
  BN_clear_free (g);
  BN_clear_free (p);
  BN_clear_free (r);

  tglq_send_query (TLS, TLS->DC_working, packet_ptr - packet_buffer, packet_buffer, &send_encr_request_methods, E, callback, callback_extra);
}

static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
	{
	BIGNUM *f,*ret;
	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;

	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
		return -1;
		}

	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
		return -1;
		}

	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
		{
		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
			{
			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
			return -1;
			}
		}
	
	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
	f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
	if (!f || !ret || !buf)
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto err;
		}

	switch (padding)
		{
	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
		i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
		break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
	        i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
		break;
#endif
	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
		i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
		break;
	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
		i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
		break;
	default:
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
		goto err;
		}
	if (i <= 0) goto err;

	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
	
	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
		{
		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
		goto err;
		}

	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
		if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
			goto err;

	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;

	/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
	 * length of the modulus */
	j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
	i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
	for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
		to[k]=0;

	r=num;
err:
	if (ctx != NULL)
		{
		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
		}
	if (buf != NULL) 
		{
		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
		OPENSSL_free(buf);
		}
	return(r);
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

int
ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
	DSA_SIG *sig;
	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
	EVP_MD_CTX md;
	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
	u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen;
	Buffer b;

	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || (key->type != KEY_DSA &&
	    key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT_V00)) {
		error("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key");
		return -1;
	}
	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
	EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);

	sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa);
	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));

	if (sig == NULL) {
		error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed");
		return -1;
	}

	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
	slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
	if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
		error("bad sig size %u %u", rlen, slen);
		DSA_SIG_free(sig);
		return -1;
	}
	memset(sigblob, 0, SIGBLOB_LEN);
	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
	DSA_SIG_free(sig);

	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
		if (lenp != NULL)
			*lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN;
		if (sigp != NULL) {
			*sigp = xmalloc(SIGBLOB_LEN);
			memcpy(*sigp, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
		}
	} else {
		/* ietf-drafts */
		buffer_init(&b);
		buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-dss");
		buffer_put_string(&b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
		len = buffer_len(&b);
		if (lenp != NULL)
			*lenp = len;
		if (sigp != NULL) {
			*sigp = xmalloc(len);
			memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
		}
		buffer_free(&b);
	}
	return 0;
}

SESSION *session_init_client (void)
{
	SESSION *session;

	if ((session = (SESSION *) calloc (1, sizeof (SESSION))) == NULL)
		return NULL;

	session->client_OS = 0x00;	/* 0x00 == Windows, 0x01 == Mac OS X */
	memcpy(session->client_id, "\x01\x04\x01\x01", 4);
	session->client_revision = 99999;
	
	/*
	 * Client and server generate 16 random bytes each.
	 */
	RAND_bytes (session->client_random_16, 16);

	if ((session->rsa =
	     RSA_generate_key (1024, 65537, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
		DSFYDEBUG ("RSA key generation failed with error %lu\n",
			   ERR_get_error ());
	}
	assert (session->rsa != NULL);

	/*
	 * Create a private and public key.
	 * This, along with key signing, is used to securely
	 * agree on a session key for the Shannon stream cipher.
	 *
	 */
	session->dh = DH_new ();
	session->dh->p = BN_bin2bn (DH_prime, 96, NULL);
	session->dh->g = BN_bin2bn (DH_generator, 1, NULL);
	assert (DH_generate_key (session->dh) == 1);

	BN_bn2bin (session->dh->priv_key, session->my_priv_key);
	BN_bn2bin (session->dh->pub_key, session->my_pub_key);

	/*
	 * Found in Storage.dat (cache) at offset 16.
	 * Automatically generated, but we're lazy.
	 *
	 */
	memcpy (session->cache_hash,
		"\xf4\xc2\xaa\x05\xe8\x25\xa7\xb5\xe4\xe6\x59\x0f\x3d\xd0\xbe\x0a\xef\x20\x51\x95",
		20);
	session->cache_hash[0] = (unsigned char) getpid ();

	session->ap_sock = -1;
	session->username[0] = 0;
	session->server_host[0] = 0;
	session->server_port = 0;

	session->key_recv_IV = 0;
	session->key_send_IV = 0;

	session->user_info.username[0] = 0;
	session->user_info.country[0] = 0;
	session->user_info.server_host[0] = 0;
	session->user_info.server_port = 0;

	return session;
}

BigNumber *cop_convert_bignum(BIGNUM * bn)
{
	BigNumber *r = cop_bn_new_sz((size_t) BN_num_bytes(bn));
	BN_bn2bin(bn, r->number);
	return r;
}

//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

	if (text)
		{
		DHparams_print(out,dh);
		}
	
	if (check)
		{
		if (!DH_check(dh,&i))
			{
			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
			goto end;
			}
		if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
			printf("p value is not prime\n");
		if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
			printf("p value is not a safe prime\n");
		if (i & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR)
			printf("unable to check the generator value\n");
		if (i & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR)
			printf("the g value is not a generator\n");
		if (i == 0)
			printf("DH parameters appear to be ok.\n");
		}
	if (C)
		{
		unsigned char *data;
		int len,l,bits;

		len=BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
		bits=BN_num_bits(dh->p);
		data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len);
		if (data == NULL)
			{
			perror("OPENSSL_malloc");
			goto end;
			}
		printf("#ifndef HEADER_DH_H\n"
		       "#include <openssl/dh.h>\n"
		       "#endif\n");
		printf("DH *get_dh%d()\n\t{\n",bits);

		l=BN_bn2bin(dh->p,data);
		printf("\tstatic unsigned char dh%d_p[]={",bits);
		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
			{
			if ((i%12) == 0) printf("\n\t\t");
			printf("0x%02X,",data[i]);
			}
		printf("\n\t\t};\n");

		l=BN_bn2bin(dh->g,data);
		printf("\tstatic unsigned char dh%d_g[]={",bits);
		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
			{
			if ((i%12) == 0) printf("\n\t\t");
			printf("0x%02X,",data[i]);
			}
		printf("\n\t\t};\n");

		printf("\tDH *dh;\n\n");
		printf("\tif ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);\n");
		printf("\tdh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh%d_p,sizeof(dh%d_p),NULL);\n",
			bits,bits);
		printf("\tdh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh%d_g,sizeof(dh%d_g),NULL);\n",
			bits,bits);
		printf("\tif ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))\n");
		printf("\t\t{ DH_free(dh); return(NULL); }\n");
		if (dh->length)
			printf("\tdh->length = %ld;\n", dh->length);
		printf("\treturn(dh);\n\t}\n");
		OPENSSL_free(data);
		}


	if (!noout)
		{
		if 	(outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
			i=i2d_DHparams_bio(out,dh);
		else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
			i=PEM_write_bio_DHparams(out,dh);
		else	{
			BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad output format specified for outfile\n");
			goto end;
			}
		if (!i)
			{
			BIO_printf(bio_err,"unable to write DH parameters\n");
			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
			goto end;
			}
		}
	ret=0;
end:
	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
	if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out);
	if (dh != NULL) DH_free(dh);
	apps_shutdown();
	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
	}

int main2()
{


    // Seed RNG


    // Generate Key Pair
    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
    char error[400];

    int modulus_length = 2048; // bits

    unsigned long e = 65537;
    const char* e_hex = "100001";
    RSA *rsa = NULL;
    rsa = RSA_generate_key(modulus_length, e, NULL /*keygen_progress*/, NULL);
    if (rsa == NULL)
    {
        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), error);
        printf("Failed to generate RSA key pair.OpenSSL error:\n %s\n", error);
        return -1;
    }

    unsigned char *n_hex = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, 2*2048/8);
    unsigned char *d_hex = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, 2*2048/8);
    unsigned char *p_hex = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, 2*2048/8);
    unsigned char *q_hex = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, 2*2048/8);
    if (!(  n_hex = (unsigned char*) BN_bn2hex((const BIGNUM*)rsa->n)  ))
    {
        printf("Modulo parsing error\n");
        return -1;
    }
    if (!(  d_hex = (unsigned char*) BN_bn2hex((const BIGNUM*)rsa->d)  ))
    {
        printf("Private exponent parsing error\n");
        return -1;
    }
    if (!(  p_hex = (unsigned char*) BN_bn2hex((const BIGNUM*)rsa->q)  ))
    {
        printf("Private exponent parsing error\n");
        return -1;
    }
    if (!(  q_hex = (unsigned char*) BN_bn2hex((const BIGNUM*)rsa->p)  ))
    {
        printf("Private exponent parsing error\n");
        return -1;
    }
    printf("Public modulus:\n\t%s\n", n_hex);
    printf("Private exponent:\n\t%s\n", d_hex);
    printf("Prime p:\n\t%s\n", p_hex);
    printf("Prime q:\n\t%s\n", q_hex);


    // Import Key Pair
    sc_cardctl_openpgp_keystore_info_t key_info;
    key_info.keytype = SC_OPENPGP_KEY_ENCR;
    key_info.keyformat = SC_OPENPGP_KEYFORMAT_STD;
    
    /* n */
    unsigned char* n_bin = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, modulus_length/8);
    key_info.n_len = BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, n_bin);
    key_info.n = n_bin;
 
    /* e */
    key_info.e = (u8*)calloc(1, 4);   
    hex_to_bin(e_hex, key_info.e, &(key_info.e_len));

    /* p */
    unsigned char* p_bin = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, strlen((const char*)p_hex)/2);
    key_info.p_len = BN_bn2bin(rsa->p, p_bin);
    key_info.p = p_bin;

    /* q */
    unsigned char* q_bin = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, strlen((const char*)q_hex)/2);
    key_info.q_len = BN_bn2bin(rsa->q, q_bin);
    key_info.q = q_bin;

    
    printf("Lengths: n = %lu\ne= %lu\np = %lu\nq = %lu\n",key_info.n_len, key_info.e_len, key_info.p_len, key_info.q_len);
    // List readers
    int r;
    card_t* card;
    reader_list* readerList = (reader_list*)malloc(sizeof(reader_list));
    r = pcsc_detect_readers(readerList);
    if( !r==SC_SUCCESS)
    {
        printf("pcsc_detect_readers: %s\n",sc_strerror(r));
        return -1;
    }

    connect_card(readerList->root->reader, &card);
    card_init(card);

    csVerifyAdminPIN(card, (unsigned char*)"12345678", 8);

    if( (r = pgp_store_key(card, &key_info)) != 0)
        printf("pgp_store_key error: %d\n",r);

    // Cleanups
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

static void
eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
				 struct eap_method_ret *ret,
				 const struct wpabuf *reqData,
				 const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
{
	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
	struct crypto_hash *hash;
	u32 cs;
	u16 grp;
	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
	int offset;

	if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
		ret->ignore = TRUE;
		goto fin;
	}

	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
		goto fin;
	}

	/*
	 * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
	 *	prf
	 */
	grp = htons(data->group_num);
	ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
	os_memcpy(ptr, &grp, sizeof(u16));
	ptr += sizeof(u16);
	*ptr = EAP_PWD_DEFAULT_RAND_FUNC;
	ptr += sizeof(u8);
	*ptr = EAP_PWD_DEFAULT_PRF;

	/* each component of the cruft will be at most as big as the prime */
	if (((cruft = os_malloc(BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime))) == NULL) ||
	    ((x = BN_new()) == NULL) || ((y = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): confirm allocation "
			   "fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	/*
	 * server's commit is H(k | server_element | server_scalar |
	 *			peer_element | peer_scalar | ciphersuite)
	 */
	hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
	if (hash == NULL)
		goto fin;

	/*
	 * zero the memory each time because this is mod prime math and some
	 * value may start with a few zeros and the previous one did not.
	 */
	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(data->k);
	BN_bn2bin(data->k, cruft + offset);
	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));

	/* server element: x, y */
	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group,
						 data->server_element, x, y,
						 data->bnctx)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): confirm point "
			   "assignment fail");
		goto fin;
	}
	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
	BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));

	/* server scalar */
	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order) -
		BN_num_bytes(data->server_scalar);
	BN_bn2bin(data->server_scalar, cruft + offset);
	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));

	/* my element: x, y */
	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group,
						 data->my_element, x, y,
						 data->bnctx)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): confirm point "
			   "assignment fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
	BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
	{
	BIGNUM f,ret;
	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;

	BN_init(&f);
	BN_init(&ret);

	if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
		{
		FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
		goto err;
		}

	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
	num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
	if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto err;
		}

	switch (padding)
		{
	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
		i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
		break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
	        i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
		break;
#endif
	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
		i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
		break;
	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
		i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
		break;
	default:
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
		goto err;
		}
	if (i <= 0) goto err;

	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
	
	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
		{	
		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
		goto err;
		}

	if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
		{
		BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
		if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
			goto err;
		if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
			{
			BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
			goto err;
			}
		if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
			{
			CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
			if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
				{
				rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
				bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
				}
			CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
			}
		if (bn_mont_ctx)
			BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
		}
		
	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;

	/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
	 * length of the modulus */
	j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
	i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
	for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
		to[k]=0;

	r=num;
err:
	if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
	BN_clear_free(&f);
	BN_clear_free(&ret);
	if (buf != NULL) 
		{
		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
		OPENSSL_free(buf);
		}
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........
				   "is at infinity!\n");
			goto fin;
		}
	}

	/* compute the shared key, k */
	if ((!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, data->grp->pwe,
			   data->server_scalar, data->bnctx)) ||
	    (!EC_POINT_add(data->grp->group, K, K, data->server_element,
			   data->bnctx)) ||
	    (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, K, data->private_value,
			   data->bnctx))) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): computing shared key "
			   "fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	/* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
	if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, K, cofactor,
				  NULL)) {
			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): cannot multiply "
				   "shared key point by order");
			goto fin;
		}
	}

	/*
	 * This check is strictly speaking just for the case above where
	 * co-factor > 1 but it was suggested that even though this is probably
	 * never going to happen it is a simple and safe check "just to be
	 * sure" so let's be safe.
	 */
	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group, K)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): shared key point is at "
			   "infinity!\n");
		goto fin;
	}

	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group, K, data->k,
						 NULL, data->bnctx)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): unable to extract "
			   "shared secret from point");
		goto fin;
	}

	/* now do the response */
	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group,
						 data->my_element, x, y,
						 data->bnctx)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): point assignment fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	if (((scalar = os_malloc(BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order))) == NULL) ||
	    ((element = os_malloc(BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) * 2)) ==
	     NULL)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): data allocation fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	/*
	 * bignums occupy as little memory as possible so one that is
	 * sufficiently smaller than the prime or order might need pre-pending
	 * with zeros.
	 */
	os_memset(scalar, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
	os_memset(element, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) * 2);
	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order) -
		BN_num_bytes(data->my_scalar);
	BN_bn2bin(data->my_scalar, scalar + offset);

	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
	BN_bn2bin(x, element + offset);
	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
	BN_bn2bin(y, element + BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) + offset);

	data->outbuf = wpabuf_alloc(BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order) +
				    2 * BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	if (data->outbuf == NULL)
		goto fin;

	/* we send the element as (x,y) follwed by the scalar */
	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, element,
			2 * BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, scalar, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));

fin:
	os_free(scalar);
	os_free(element);
	BN_clear_free(x);
	BN_clear_free(y);
	BN_clear_free(cofactor);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(K);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
	if (data->outbuf == NULL)
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
	else
		eap_pwd_state(data, PWD_Confirm_Req);
}

static void bn_to_bin(BIGNUM* bn, unsigned char* bin, int n) {
    memset(bin, 0, n);
    int m = BN_num_bytes(bn);
    BN_bn2bin(bn, bin+n-m);
}

/* Out: bytes_B, len_B.
 * 
 * On failure, bytes_B will be set to NULL and len_B will be set to 0
 */
struct SRPVerifier *  srp_verifier_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
                                        const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s, 
                                        const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
                                        const unsigned char * bytes_A, int len_A,
                                        const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B,
                                        const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex )
{
    BIGNUM             *s    = BN_bin2bn(bytes_s, len_s, NULL);
    BIGNUM             *v    = BN_bin2bn(bytes_v, len_v, NULL);
    BIGNUM             *A    = BN_bin2bn(bytes_A, len_A, NULL);
    BIGNUM             *u    = 0;
    BIGNUM             *B    = BN_new();
    BIGNUM             *S    = BN_new();
    BIGNUM             *b    = BN_new();
    BIGNUM             *k    = 0;
    BIGNUM             *tmp1 = BN_new();
    BIGNUM             *tmp2 = BN_new();
    BN_CTX             *ctx  = BN_CTX_new();
    int                 ulen = strlen(username) + 1;
    NGConstant         *ng   = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
    struct SRPVerifier *ver  = 0;

    *len_B   = 0;
    *bytes_B = 0;
    
    if( !s || !v || !A || !B || !S || !b || !tmp1 || !tmp2 || !ctx || !ng )
       goto cleanup_and_exit;
    
    ver = (struct SRPVerifier *) malloc( sizeof(struct SRPVerifier) );

    if (!ver)
       goto cleanup_and_exit;

    init_random(); /* Only happens once */
    
    ver->username = (char *) malloc( ulen );
    ver->hash_alg = alg;
    ver->ng       = ng;

    if (!ver->username)
    {
       free(ver);
       ver = 0;
       goto cleanup_and_exit;
    }
    
    memcpy( (char*)ver->username, username, ulen );
    
    ver->authenticated = 0;
        
    /* SRP-6a safety check */
    BN_mod(tmp1, A, ng->N, ctx);
    if ( !BN_is_zero(tmp1) )
    {
       BN_rand(b, 256, -1, 0);
       
       k = H_nn(alg, ng->N, ng->g);
       
       /* B = kv + g^b */
       BN_mul(tmp1, k, v, ctx);
       BN_mod_exp(tmp2, ng->g, b, ng->N, ctx);
       BN_add(B, tmp1, tmp2);
       
       u = H_nn(alg, A, B);
       
       /* S = (A *(v^u)) ^ b */
       BN_mod_exp(tmp1, v, u, ng->N, ctx);
       BN_mul(tmp2, A, tmp1, ctx);
       BN_mod_exp(S, tmp2, b, ng->N, ctx);
       
       hash_num(alg, S, ver->session_key);
       
       calculate_M( alg, ng, ver->M, username, s, A, B, ver->session_key );
       calculate_H_AMK( alg, ver->H_AMK, A, ver->M, ver->session_key );
       
       *len_B   = BN_num_bytes(B);
       *bytes_B = malloc( *len_B );
       
       if( !*bytes_B )
       {
          free( (void*) ver->username );
          free( ver );
          ver = 0;
          *len_B = 0;
          goto cleanup_and_exit;
       }
       
       BN_bn2bin( B, (unsigned char *) *bytes_B );
          
       ver->bytes_B = *bytes_B;
    }
    
 cleanup_and_exit:
    BN_free(s);
    BN_free(v);
    BN_free(A);
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

TSS_RESULT
make_fake_key(TSS_HCONTEXT hContext, TSS_HKEY *hCAKey, RSA **rsa, int padding)
{
	TSS_RESULT result;
	UINT32 encScheme, size_n, pub_size;
	BYTE n[2048];
	TCPA_PUBKEY pubkey;
	UINT32 blob_size, size;
	BYTE *blob, pub_blob[1024];

	switch (padding) {
		case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
			encScheme = TSS_ES_RSAESPKCSV15;
			break;
		case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
			encScheme = TSS_ES_RSAESOAEP_SHA1_MGF1;
			break;
		case RSA_NO_PADDING:
			encScheme = TSS_ES_NONE;
			break;
		default:
			return TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
			break;
	}

		//Create CA Key Object
	result = Tspi_Context_CreateObject(hContext, TSS_OBJECT_TYPE_RSAKEY,
	    TSS_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY|TSS_KEY_SIZE_2048, hCAKey);
	if (result != TSS_SUCCESS) {
		check("Tspi_Context_CreateObject", result);
		return result;
	}

		// generate a software key to represent the CA's key
	if ((*rsa = RSA_generate_key(2048, 65537, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
		ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
		return 254; // ?
	}

		// get the pub CA key
	if ((size_n = BN_bn2bin((*rsa)->n, n)) <= 0) {
		fprintf(stderr, "BN_bn2bin failed\n");
		ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
		RSA_free(*rsa);
                return 254; // ?
        }

	result = Tspi_GetAttribData(*hCAKey, TSS_TSPATTRIB_KEY_BLOB,
	    TSS_TSPATTRIB_KEYBLOB_PUBLIC_KEY, &blob_size, &blob);
	if (result != TSS_SUCCESS) {
		check("Tspi_GetAttribData", result);
		return result;
	}

	pub_size = blob_pubkey(pub_blob, 1024, blob, blob_size, n, size_n);

	result = Tspi_SetAttribData(*hCAKey, TSS_TSPATTRIB_KEY_BLOB,
	    TSS_TSPATTRIB_KEYBLOB_PUBLIC_KEY, pub_size, pub_blob);
	if (result != TSS_SUCCESS) {
		check("Tspi_SetAttribData", result);
		return result;
	}

		// set the CA key's algorithm
	result = Tspi_SetAttribUint32(*hCAKey, TSS_TSPATTRIB_KEY_INFO,
				      TSS_TSPATTRIB_KEYINFO_ALGORITHM,
				      TSS_ALG_RSA);
	if (result != TSS_SUCCESS) {
		check("Tspi_SetAttribUint32", result);
		RSA_free(*rsa);
		return result;
	}

		// set the CA key's number of primes
	result = Tspi_SetAttribUint32(*hCAKey, TSS_TSPATTRIB_RSAKEY_INFO,
				      TSS_TSPATTRIB_KEYINFO_RSA_PRIMES,
				      2);
	if (result != TSS_SUCCESS) {
		check("Tspi_SetAttribUint32", result);
		RSA_free(*rsa);
		return result;
	}

		// set the CA key's encryption scheme
	result = Tspi_SetAttribUint32(*hCAKey, TSS_TSPATTRIB_KEY_INFO,
				      TSS_TSPATTRIB_KEYINFO_ENCSCHEME,
				      encScheme);
	if (result != TSS_SUCCESS) {
		check("Tspi_SetAttribUint32", result);
		RSA_free(*rsa);
		return result;
	}

	return TSS_SUCCESS;
}

*																			*
****************************************************************************/

/* The keys for testing the RSA, DSA, and Elgamal implementations. The key 
   values may be extracted with the following code pasted into the 
   generateKey() function in ctx_dsa.c/ctx_rsa.c */

#if 0
{
#include <stdio.h>

BYTE buffer[ CRYPT_MAX_PKCSIZE ];
int length, i;

printf( "static const RSA_KEY FAR_BSS rsaTestKey = {\n" );
length = BN_bn2bin( &contextInfoPtr->ctxPKC->rsaParam_n, buffer );
printf( "\t/* n */\n\t%d,", BN_num_bits( &contextInfoPtr->ctxPKC->rsaParam_n ) );
for( i = 0; i < length; i++ )
	{ if( !( i % 8 ) ) printf( "\n\t  " );
	printf( "0x%02X, ", buffer[ i ] ); }
length = BN_bn2bin( &contextInfoPtr->ctxPKC->rsaParam_e, buffer );
printf( "\n\n\t/* e */\n\t%d,", BN_num_bits( &contextInfoPtr->ctxPKC->rsaParam_e ) );
for( i = 0; i < length; i++ )
	{ if( !( i % 8 ) ) printf( "\n\t  " );
	printf( "0x%02X, ", buffer[ i ] ); }
length = BN_bn2bin( &contextInfoPtr->ctxPKC->rsaParam_d, buffer );
printf( "\n\n\t/* d */\n\t%d,", BN_num_bits( &contextInfoPtr->ctxPKC->rsaParam_d ) );
for( i = 0; i < length; i++ )
	{ if( !( i % 8 ) ) printf( "\n\t  " );
	printf( "0x%02X, ", buffer[ i ] ); }
length = BN_bn2bin( &contextInfoPtr->ctxPKC->rsaParam_p, buffer );