C++ BN_CTX_new函數代碼示例

void Server::handshake(const char *_I, BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM **B, uint32_t *_salt) {
  if (I && _I && strcmp(I, _I) == 0) {
    BIGNUM *b = NULL;
    BIGNUM *kv = NULL;
    BIGNUM *u = NULL;
    BIGNUM *vu = NULL;
    BIGNUM *Avu = NULL;
    BIGNUM *S = NULL;
    unsigned char uH[SHA256_HASH_LEN];
    unsigned char K[SHA256_HASH_LEN];
    unsigned char *bn_bin1 = NULL;
    unsigned char *bn_bin2 = NULL;
    unsigned char *bn_bin3 = NULL;
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
    SHA256_CTX sha_ctx;
    uint32_t md_len = 0;

    if (!N || !g || !k || !v || !P || !A)
      goto err;

    // S->C
    // Send salt, B=kv + g**b % N
    if (!(b = BN_new()))
      goto err;
  
    if (!BN_rand_range(b, N))
      goto err;
  
    if (!(*B = BN_new()))
      goto err;

    if (!(ctx = BN_CTX_new()))
      goto err;
  
    if (!BN_mod_exp(*B, g, b, N, ctx))
      goto err;

    if (!(kv = BN_new()))
      goto err;

    if (!BN_mul(kv, k, v, ctx))
      goto err;

    if (!BN_add(*B, kv, *B))
      goto err;

    // S, C
    // Compute string uH = SHA256(A|B), u = integer of uH
    bn_bin1 = new unsigned char[BN_num_bytes(A)];
    BN_bn2bin(A, bn_bin1);
  
    bn_bin2 = new unsigned char[BN_num_bytes(*B)];
    BN_bn2bin(*B, bn_bin2);

    if (!SHA256_Init(&sha_ctx))
      goto err;

    if (!SHA256_Update(&sha_ctx, bn_bin1, BN_num_bytes(A)))
      goto err;
  
    if (!SHA256_Update(&sha_ctx, bn_bin2, BN_num_bytes(*B)))
      goto err;
  
    if (!SHA256_Final(uH, &sha_ctx))
      goto err;

    if (!(u = BN_new()))
      goto err;
  
    if (!BN_bin2bn(uH, SHA256_HASH_LEN, u))
      goto err;

    // S
    // Generate S = (A * v**u) ** b % N
    // Generate K = SHA256(S)
    if (!(vu = BN_new()))
      goto err;
    
    if (!BN_mod_exp(vu, v, u, N, ctx))
      goto err;

    if (!(Avu = BN_new()))
      goto err;

    if (!BN_mul(Avu, A, vu, ctx))
      goto err;

    if (!(S = BN_new()))
      goto err;

    if (!BN_mod_exp(S, Avu, b, N, ctx))
      goto err;

    bn_bin3 = new unsigned char[BN_num_bytes(S)];
    BN_bn2bin(S, bn_bin3);

    if (!SHA256_Init(&sha_ctx))
      goto err;

    if (!SHA256_Update(&sha_ctx, bn_bin3, BN_num_bytes(S)))
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

int rsa_default_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
                           size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
                           int padding) {
  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
  BIGNUM *f, *result;
  int ret = 0;
  int r = -1;
  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
    return 0;
  }

  /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS &&
      BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
    return 0;
  }

  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
  if (ctx == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
    buf = out;
  } else {
    /* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext. */
    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
    if (buf == NULL) {
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
      goto err;
    }
  }
  if (!f || !result) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    goto err;
  }

  if (in_len != rsa_size) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
    goto err;
  }

  if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
    goto err;
  }

  if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
    if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) {
      goto err;
    }
  }

  if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
    goto err;
  }

  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, rsa_size, result)) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
    goto err;
  }

  switch (padding) {
    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
      r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
      break;
    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
      r = rsa_size;
      break;
    default:
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
      goto err;
  }

  if (r < 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
  } else {
    *out_len = r;
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

int rsa_default_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
                        const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
  BIGNUM *f, *result;
  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
  int i, ret = 0;

  if (rsa_size > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
    return 0;
  }

  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
    return 0;
  }

  if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
    return 0;
  }

  /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS &&
      BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
    return 0;
  }

  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
  if (ctx == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
  if (!f || !result || !buf) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    goto err;
  }

  switch (padding) {
    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
      break;
    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
      /* Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label. */
      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len,
                                          NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
      break;
    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
      i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
      break;
    default:
      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
      goto err;
  }

  if (i <= 0) {
    goto err;
  }

  if (BN_bin2bn(buf, rsa_size, f) == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
    /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
    goto err;
  }

  if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
    if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) {
      goto err;
    }
  }

  if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
    goto err;
  }

  /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
   * modulus */
  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, rsa_size, result)) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
    goto err;
  }

  *out_len = rsa_size;
  ret = 1;

err:
  if (ctx != NULL) {
    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
  }
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

/*
 * Generate Schnorr signature to prove knowledge of private value 'x' used
 * in public exponent g^x, under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'
 * using the hash function "evp_md".
 * 'idlen' bytes from 'id' will be included in the signature hash as an anti-
 * replay salt.
 * 
 * On success, 0 is returned. The signature values are returned as *e_p
 * (g^v mod p) and *r_p (v - xh mod q). The caller must free these values.
 * On failure, -1 is returned.
 */
int
schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x,
    const u_char *id, u_int idlen, BIGNUM **r_p, BIGNUM **e_p)
{
	int success = -1;
	BIGNUM *h, *tmp, *v, *g_v, *r;
	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;

	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((x, "%s: x = ", __func__));
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_x, "%s: g_x = ", __func__));

	/* Avoid degenerate cases: g^0 yields a spoofable signature */
	if (BN_cmp(g_x, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
		error("%s: g_x < 1", __func__);
		return -1;
	}

	h = g_v = r = tmp = v = NULL;
	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
		error("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	if ((g_v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
	    (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
		goto out;
	}

	/*
	 * v must be a random element of Zq, so 1 <= v < q
	 * we also exclude v = 1, since g^1 looks dangerous
	 */
	if ((v = bn_rand_range_gt_one(grp_p)) == NULL) {
		error("%s: bn_rand_range2", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((v, "%s: v = ", __func__));

	/* g_v = g^v mod p */
	if (BN_mod_exp(g_v, grp_g, v, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1) {
		error("%s: BN_mod_exp (g^v mod p)", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: g_v = ", __func__));

	/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, evp_md, g_v, g_x,
	    id, idlen)) == NULL) {
		error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
		goto out;
	}

	/* r = v - xh mod q */
	if (BN_mod_mul(tmp, x, h, grp_q, bn_ctx) == -1) {
		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (tmp = xv mod q)", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	if (BN_mod_sub(r, v, tmp, grp_q, bn_ctx) == -1) {
		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (r = v - tmp)", __func__);
		goto out;
	}
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: e = ", __func__));
	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));

	*e_p = g_v;
	*r_p = r;

	success = 0;
 out:
	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
	if (h != NULL)
		BN_clear_free(h);
	if (v != NULL)
		BN_clear_free(v);
	BN_clear_free(tmp);

	return success;
}

int main()
{
    BIGNUM   *x, *y, *exp, *m, *order, *cof;
    BIGNUM   t, store[30];
    COMPLEX  *a, *b, *r;
    EC_POINT *point, *Q;
    int      i;

    x = BN_new();
    y = BN_new();
    order = BN_new();
    exp = BN_new();
    m = BN_new();

    a = COMP_new();
    b = COMP_new();
    r = COMP_new();
    for( i = 0; i < 30; i++ )
    	BN_init( &(store[i]) );

    if ( Context == NULL )
    	Context = BN_CTX_new();

    bi_init( &malloc );

    group = EC_GROUP_new( EC_GFp_simple_method() );
    if ( group == NULL )
    	goto err;

    if(!BN_set_word(m, 43l))
    	goto err;
    BN_set_word(x, 1l);
    BN_set_word(y, 0l);

    if ( !EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp( group, m, x, y, Context) )
    	goto err;

    BN_set_word(x, 23l);
    BN_set_word(y, 8l);
    BN_set_word(order, 11l);

    point = EC_POINT_new( group );
    EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp( group, point, x, y, Context );

    cof = BN_new();
    BN_set_word( cof, 4 );
    EC_GROUP_set_generator( group, point, order, cof );

    if ( EC_GROUP_check( group, Context ) )
    	printf(" group set is ok \n");

    TSS_DAA_ISSUER_KEY   issuer_key;
    TSS_DAA_ISSUER_PROOF issuer_proof;
    TSS_DAA_JOIN_issuer_setup(&issuer_key, &issuer_proof);


//    printf("\n");
//    BN_set_word(x, 41l);
//    BN_mod_inverse(x, x, m, Context);
//    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
//
//    printf("\n");
//    BN_set_word(x, 11l);
//    BN_mod_inverse(x, x, m, Context);
//    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);

    char *str = "abcdefghijklmnop";
    Q = map_to_point( str );

    BN_set_word(x, 23l);
    BN_set_word(y, 8l);
    BN_set_word(order, 11l);

    Q = EC_POINT_new( group );
    EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp( group, Q, x, y, Context );

    Tate( point, Q, order, 0,  store, a );
    printf("tate pair  t(p, Q) =:\n a.x: ");
    BN_print_fp(stdout, &a->x);
    printf("\na.y: ");
    BN_print_fp(stdout, &a->y);

    EC_POINT_dbl( group, point, point, Context);
    EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp( group, point, x, y, Context);
    printf("2A.x =:\n");
    BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
    printf("2P.y= :\n");
    BN_print_fp(stdout, y);

    Tate( point, Q, order, 0,  store, a );
    printf("tate pair  t(2p, Q) =:\n a.x: ");
    BN_print_fp(stdout, &a->x);
    printf("\na.y: ");
    BN_print_fp(stdout, &a->y);

    BN_free( x );
    BN_free( y );
    BN_free( exp );
    BN_free( m );
    BN_free( order );
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........

int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
	{
	int	ok   = 0;
	BN_CTX	*ctx = NULL;
	const BIGNUM	*order  = NULL;
	EC_POINT *point = NULL;

	if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key)
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
		return 0;
		}
	
	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
		goto err;
	if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
		goto err;

	/* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx))
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
		goto err;
		}
	/* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */
	order = &eckey->group->order;
	if (BN_is_zero(order))
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
		goto err;
		}
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx))
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
		goto err;
		}
	if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point))
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
		goto err;
		}
	/* in case the priv_key is present : 
	 * check if generator * priv_key == pub_key 
	 */
	if (eckey->priv_key)
		{
		if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0)
			{
			ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
			goto err;
			}
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
			NULL, NULL, ctx))
			{
			ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, 
			ctx) != 0)
			{
			ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
			goto err;
			}
		}
	ok = 1;
err:
	if (ctx   != NULL)
		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
	if (point != NULL)
		EC_POINT_free(point);
	return(ok);
	}

static void
bexp(void)
{
	struct number	*a, *p;
	struct number	*r;
	bool		neg;
	u_int		scale;

	p = pop_number();
	if (p == NULL) {
		return;
	}
	a = pop_number();
	if (a == NULL) {
		push_number(p);
		return;
	}

	if (p->scale != 0)
		warnx("Runtime warning: non-zero scale in exponent");
	normalize(p, 0);

	neg = false;
	if (BN_cmp(p->number, &zero) < 0) {
		neg = true;
		negate(p);
		scale = bmachine.scale;
	} else {
		/* Posix bc says min(a.scale * b, max(a.scale, scale) */
		u_long	b;
		u_int	m;

		b = BN_get_word(p->number);
		m = max(a->scale, bmachine.scale);
		scale = a->scale * (u_int)b;
		if (scale > m || (a->scale > 0 && (b == BN_MASK2 ||
		    b > UINT_MAX)))
			scale = m;
	}

	if (BN_is_zero(p->number)) {
		r = new_number();
		bn_check(BN_one(r->number));
		normalize(r, scale);
	} else {
		while (!BN_is_bit_set(p->number, 0)) {
			bmul_number(a, a, a);
			bn_check(BN_rshift1(p->number, p->number));
		}

		r = dup_number(a);
		normalize(r, scale);
		bn_check(BN_rshift1(p->number, p->number));

		while (!BN_is_zero(p->number)) {
			bmul_number(a, a, a);
			if (BN_is_bit_set(p->number, 0))
				bmul_number(r, r, a);
			bn_check(BN_rshift1(p->number, p->number));
		}

		if (neg) {
			BN_CTX	*ctx;
			BIGNUM	*one;

			one = BN_new();
			bn_checkp(one);
			bn_check(BN_one(one));
			ctx = BN_CTX_new();
			bn_checkp(ctx);
			scale_number(one, r->scale + scale);
			normalize(r, scale);
			bn_check(BN_div(r->number, NULL, one, r->number, ctx));
			BN_free(one);
			BN_CTX_free(ctx);
		} else
			normalize(r, scale);
	}
	push_number(r);
	free_number(a);
	free_number(p);
}

static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
	{
	BN_CTX *ctx;
	BIGNUM k,kq,*K,*kinv=NULL,*r=NULL;
	int ret=0;

	if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
		{
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
		return 0;
		}

	BN_init(&k);
	BN_init(&kq);

	if (ctx_in == NULL)
		{
		if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
		}
	else
		ctx=ctx_in;

	if ((r=BN_new()) == NULL) goto err;

	/* Get random k */
	do
		if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) goto err;
	while (BN_is_zero(&k));
	if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0)
		{
		BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
		}

	if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P)
		{
		if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
						CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA,
						dsa->p, ctx))
			goto err;
		}

	/* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */

	if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0)
		{
		if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k)) goto err;

		/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
		 * so we compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length.
		 *
		 * (This is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont()
		 * does not let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) */

		if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) goto err;
		if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q))
			{
			if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) goto err;
			}

		K = &kq;
		}
	else
		{
		K = &k;
		}
	DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
			dsa->method_mont_p);
	if (!BN_mod(r,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;

	/* Compute  part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
	if ((kinv=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,&k,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;

	if (*kinvp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
	*kinvp=kinv;
	kinv=NULL;
	if (*rp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*rp);
	*rp=r;
	ret=1;
err:
	if (!ret)
		{
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
		if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
		if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r);
		}
	if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
	if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
	BN_clear_free(&k);
	BN_clear_free(&kq);
	return(ret);
	}

static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
		  DSA *dsa)
	{
	BN_CTX *ctx;
	BIGNUM u1,u2,t1;
	BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL;
	int ret = -1;
	if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
		{
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
		return -1;
		}

	if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160)
		{
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
		return -1;
		}

	if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
		{
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
		return -1;
		}

	BN_init(&u1);
	BN_init(&u2);
	BN_init(&t1);

	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;

	if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
	    BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
		{
		ret = 0;
		goto err;
		}
	if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
	    BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
		{
		ret = 0;
		goto err;
		}

	/* Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q
	 * save W in u2 */
	if ((BN_mod_inverse(&u2,sig->s,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;

	/* save M in u1 */
	if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dgst_len,&u1) == NULL) goto err;

	/* u1 = M * w mod q */
	if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&u1,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;

	/* u2 = r * w mod q */
	if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2,sig->r,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;


	if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P)
		{
		mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
					CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx);
		if (!mont)
			goto err;
		}


	DSA_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, &t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont);
	/* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */
	/* let u1 = u1 mod q */
	if (!BN_mod(&u1,&t1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;

	/* V is now in u1.  If the signature is correct, it will be
	 * equal to R. */
	ret=(BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0);

	err:
	/* XXX: surely this is wrong - if ret is 0, it just didn't verify;
	   there is no error in BN. Test should be ret == -1 (Ben) */
	if (ret != 1) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
	if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
	BN_free(&u1);
	BN_free(&u2);
	BN_free(&t1);
	return(ret);
	}

// Perform ECDSA key recovery (see SEC1 4.1.6) for curves over (mod p)-fields
// recid selects which key is recovered
// if check is nonzero, additional checks are performed
int ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(EC_KEY *eckey, ECDSA_SIG *ecsig, const unsigned char *msg, int msglen, int recid, int check)
{
    if (!eckey) return 0;

    int ret = 0;
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

    BIGNUM *x = NULL;
    BIGNUM *e = NULL;
    BIGNUM *order = NULL;
    BIGNUM *sor = NULL;
    BIGNUM *eor = NULL;
    BIGNUM *field = NULL;
    EC_POINT *R = NULL;
    EC_POINT *O = NULL;
    EC_POINT *Q = NULL;
    BIGNUM *rr = NULL;
    BIGNUM *zero = NULL;
    int n = 0;
    int i = recid / 2;

    const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; goto err; }
    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ret = -2; goto err; }
    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_copy(x, order)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (!BN_mul_word(x, i)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (!BN_add(x, x, ecsig->r)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    field = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, field, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
    if (BN_cmp(x, field) >= 0) { ret=0; goto err; }
    if ((R = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
    if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, R, x, recid % 2, ctx)) { ret=0; goto err; }
    if (check)
    {
        if ((O = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, O, NULL, R, order, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
        if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, O)) { ret = 0; goto err; }
    }
    if ((Q = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
    n = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
    e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_bin2bn(msg, msglen, e)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (8*msglen > n) BN_rshift(e, e, 8-(n & 7));
    zero = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_zero(zero)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (!BN_mod_sub(e, zero, e, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_mod_inverse(rr, ecsig->r, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    sor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_mod_mul(sor, ecsig->s, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    eor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_mod_mul(eor, e, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, eor, R, sor, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
    if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, Q)) { ret=-2; goto err; }

    ret = 1;

err:
    if (ctx) {
        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    }
    if (R != NULL) EC_POINT_free(R);
    if (O != NULL) EC_POINT_free(O);
    if (Q != NULL) EC_POINT_free(Q);
    return ret;
}

static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
	{
	BIGNUM *kinv=NULL,*r=NULL,*s=NULL;
	BIGNUM m;
	BIGNUM xr;
	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
	int i,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB;
	DSA_SIG *ret=NULL;

	BN_init(&m);
	BN_init(&xr);

	if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
		{
		reason=DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
		goto err;
		}

	s=BN_new();
	if (s == NULL) goto err;

	i=BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
	if ((dlen > i) || (dlen > 50))
		{
		reason=DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE;
		goto err;
		}

	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;

	if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL))
		{
		if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa,ctx,&kinv,&r)) goto err;
		}
	else
		{
		kinv=dsa->kinv;
		dsa->kinv=NULL;
		r=dsa->r;
		dsa->r=NULL;
		}

	if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dlen,&m) == NULL) goto err;

	/* Compute  s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
	if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */
	if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err;		/* s = m + xr */
	if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0)
		BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q);
	if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;

	ret=DSA_SIG_new();
	if (ret == NULL) goto err;
	ret->r = r;
	ret->s = s;
	
err:
	if (!ret)
		{
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,reason);
		BN_free(r);
		BN_free(s);
		}
	if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
	BN_clear_free(&m);
	BN_clear_free(&xr);
	if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
	    BN_clear_free(kinv);
	return(ret);
	}

/*
 * rsa_get_params(): - Get the important parameters of an RSA public key
 */
int rsa_get_params(RSA *key, uint64_t *exponent, uint32_t *n0_invp,
		   BIGNUM **modulusp, BIGNUM **r_squaredp)
{
	BIGNUM *big1, *big2, *big32, *big2_32;
	BIGNUM *n, *r, *r_squared, *tmp;
	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
	int ret = 0;

	/* Initialize BIGNUMs */
	big1 = BN_new();
	big2 = BN_new();
	big32 = BN_new();
	r = BN_new();
	r_squared = BN_new();
	tmp = BN_new();
	big2_32 = BN_new();
	n = BN_new();
	if (!big1 || !big2 || !big32 || !r || !r_squared || !tmp || !big2_32 ||
	    !n) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory (bignum)\n");
		return -ENOMEM;
	}

	if (0 != rsa_get_exponent(key, exponent))
		ret = -1;

	if (!BN_copy(n, key->n) || !BN_set_word(big1, 1L) ||
	    !BN_set_word(big2, 2L) || !BN_set_word(big32, 32L))
		ret = -1;

	/* big2_32 = 2^32 */
	if (!BN_exp(big2_32, big2, big32, bn_ctx))
		ret = -1;

	/* Calculate n0_inv = -1 / n[0] mod 2^32 */
	if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, n, big2_32, bn_ctx) ||
	    !BN_sub(tmp, big2_32, tmp))
		ret = -1;
	*n0_invp = BN_get_word(tmp);

	/* Calculate R = 2^(# of key bits) */
	if (!BN_set_word(tmp, BN_num_bits(n)) ||
	    !BN_exp(r, big2, tmp, bn_ctx))
		ret = -1;

	/* Calculate r_squared = R^2 mod n */
	if (!BN_copy(r_squared, r) ||
	    !BN_mul(tmp, r_squared, r, bn_ctx) ||
	    !BN_mod(r_squared, tmp, n, bn_ctx))
		ret = -1;

	*modulusp = n;
	*r_squaredp = r_squared;

	BN_free(big1);
	BN_free(big2);
	BN_free(big32);
	BN_free(r);
	BN_free(tmp);
	BN_free(big2_32);
	if (ret) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Bignum operations failed\n");
		return -ENOMEM;
	}

	return ret;
}

void
rdssl_rsa_encrypt(uint8 * out, uint8 * in, int len, uint32 modulus_size, uint8 * modulus,
		  uint8 * exponent)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000 && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
	BN_CTX *ctx;
	BIGNUM *mod, *exp, *x, *y;
	uint8 inr[SEC_MAX_MODULUS_SIZE];
	int outlen;

	reverse(modulus, modulus_size);
	reverse(exponent, SEC_EXPONENT_SIZE);
	memcpy(inr, in, len);
	reverse(inr, len);

	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
	mod = BN_new();
	exp = BN_new();
	x = BN_new();
	y = BN_new();

	BN_bin2bn(modulus, modulus_size, mod);
	BN_bin2bn(exponent, SEC_EXPONENT_SIZE, exp);
	BN_bin2bn(inr, len, x);
	BN_mod_exp(y, x, exp, mod, ctx);
	outlen = BN_bn2bin(y, out);
	reverse(out, outlen);
	if (outlen < (int) modulus_size)
		memset(out + outlen, 0, modulus_size - outlen);

	BN_free(y);
	BN_clear_free(x);
	BN_free(exp);
	BN_free(mod);
	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
#else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000 || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */
	BN_CTX *ctx;
	BIGNUM mod, exp, x, y;
	uint8 inr[SEC_MAX_MODULUS_SIZE];
	int outlen;

	reverse(modulus, modulus_size);
	reverse(exponent, SEC_EXPONENT_SIZE);
	memcpy(inr, in, len);
	reverse(inr, len);

	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
	BN_init(&mod);
	BN_init(&exp);
	BN_init(&x);
	BN_init(&y);

	BN_bin2bn(modulus, modulus_size, &mod);
	BN_bin2bn(exponent, SEC_EXPONENT_SIZE, &exp);
	BN_bin2bn(inr, len, &x);
	BN_mod_exp(&y, &x, &exp, &mod, ctx);
	outlen = BN_bn2bin(&y, out);
	reverse(out, outlen);
	if (outlen < (int) modulus_size)
		memset(out + outlen, 0, modulus_size - outlen);

	BN_free(&y);
	BN_clear_free(&x);
	BN_free(&exp);
	BN_free(&mod);
	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000 || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
    int nid, ret = 1;
    EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
    size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0;
    BIO *out;

    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);

    RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);

    out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
    if (out == NULL)
        EXIT(1);
    BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);

    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
        goto err;

    /* get a list of all internal curves */
    crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
    curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len);
    if (curves == NULL) goto err;

    if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) goto err;

    /* NAMED CURVES TESTS */
    for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) {
        nid = curves[n].nid;
        /*
         * Skipped for X25519 because affine coordinate operations are not
         * supported for this curve.
         * Higher level ECDH tests are performed in evptests.txt instead.
         */
        if (nid == NID_X25519)
            continue;
        if (!test_ecdh_curve(nid, ctx, out)) goto err;
    }

    /* KATs */
    for (n = 0; n < (sizeof(ecdh_kats)/sizeof(ecdh_kat_t)); n++) {
        if (!ecdh_kat(out, &ecdh_kats[n]))
            goto err;
    }

    ret = 0;

 err:
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    OPENSSL_free(curves);
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    BIO_free(out);

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
    if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0)
        ret = 1;
#endif
    EXIT(ret);
}

static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
{
    const unsigned char *p, *pm;
    int pklen, pmlen;
    int ptype;
    void *pval;
    ASN1_STRING *pstr;
    X509_ALGOR *palg;
    ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL;
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

    STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *ndsa = NULL;
    DSA *dsa = NULL;

    if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
        return 0;
    X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);

    /* Check for broken DSA PKCS#8, UGH! */
    if (*p == (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) {
        ASN1_TYPE *t1, *t2;
        if ((ndsa = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL)
            goto decerr;
        if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(ndsa) != 2)
            goto decerr;
        /*-
         * Handle Two broken types:
         * SEQUENCE {parameters, priv_key}
         * SEQUENCE {pub_key, priv_key}
         */

        t1 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 0);
        t2 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 1);
        if (t1->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
            p8->broken = PKCS8_EMBEDDED_PARAM;
            pval = t1->value.ptr;
        } else if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
            p8->broken = PKCS8_NS_DB;
        else
            goto decerr;

        if (t2->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER)
            goto decerr;

        privkey = t2->value.integer;
    } else {
        const unsigned char *q = p;
        if ((privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL)
            goto decerr;
        if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
            p8->broken = PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY;
            ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
            if ((privkey = d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(NULL, &q, pklen)) == NULL)
                goto decerr;
        }
        if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
            goto decerr;
    }

    pstr = pval;
    pm = pstr->data;
    pmlen = pstr->length;
    if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL)
        goto decerr;
    /* We have parameters now set private key */
    if ((dsa->priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL
        || !ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, dsa->priv_key)) {
        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
        goto dsaerr;
    }
    /* Calculate public key */
    if ((dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) {
        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto dsaerr;
    }
    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto dsaerr;
    }

    if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) {
        DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
        goto dsaerr;
    }

    EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    if (ndsa)
        sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
    else
        ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);

    return 1;

 decerr:
    DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
 dsaerr:
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
    sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
//.........這裏部分代碼省略.........